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The soccer world cup championships final of 2006 promised to be a 
memorable match for Zinedine Zidane, Europe’s best soccer player ever, 
according to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). The former 
Juventus and Real Madrid star, known for his highly technical and almost 
elegant style of play, had returned from retirement in the build-up to the 
tournament and was directly reinstated as captain of the French national team. 
He had helped France qualify for the tournament and get through to the final. He 
was also declared best player of the tournament. Zidane was expected by 
everyone to lead France to victory, win his second World Cup and restore his 
rank among the top players of the world, in what he had announced to be the 
final match of his career. All seemed to be going according to plan as he helped 
France gain a lead on Italy with a goal, though Italy scored an equalizer later in 
the game. However, things turned for the worse during extra time. In the 110th 
minute of the game, Zinedine Zidane was sent off by the referee with a red card 
because he fiercely head-butted Italian defender Marco Materazzi in the chest. 
After that, France lost the game to Italy during a penalty shootout. To date, 
soccer fans across the world remember the almost tragic TV-footage of Zinedine 
Zidane walking past the cup trophy as he made his way to the dressing room for 
the last time, symbolizing a tragic and disillusioned ending to an exceptional 
career.  
Soon rumors spread about what had taken place between the two players 
and why Zidane had reacted in such a way at an important moment during such 
an important game. Based on later statements by both players, we now know 
that Materazzi was pulling his shirt in a challenge when Zidane remarked: “You 
can have my shirt after the game if you want it so badly.” After which Materazzi 
hurled: “I’d rather have the whore that is your sister”. This insult sent the French 
player from Algerian descent over the edge, resulting in the head-butt. He later 
stated that he was sorry that viewers had seen what he did, but that he did not 
regret doing it, for after all, he was a man. And regretting his action would mean 
agreeing with the insult.  
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Many people condemned Zidane’s outburst, even after hearing about the 
immediate cause, saying that ‘sticks and stones may break your bones but names 
will never hurt you’. Others, among which the Algerian president, were very 
sympathetic to him, not the least because Marco Materazzi was such a 
belligerent player. One of Zidane’s main supporters was his mother, applauding 
her son for his fierce response. She stated that the family was sad her son had to 
end his career with a red card but at least he had his honor.  
Relevant to this account is Zidane’s Algerian cultural heritage. 
Anthropological research classifies cultures in the Mediterranean, such as in 
Algeria, as honor cultures (Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965; Schneider, 1969). 
Zidane responded in a way in accordance with the code of honor, an imperative 
moral guideline dictating how people should respond to offenses. His behavior 
may have seemed irrational to people unfamiliar with this code, because the loss 
he and his team sustained seemed in no way equal to the impact of a mere insult. 
However, in contexts that give rise to these norms, not responding in accordance 
with the code may have resulted in far more adverse consequences. As Zidane’s 
mother noted “Some things are bigger than soccer”.  
In the past decades, honor cultures have also received attention in the field 
of social- and cultural psychology, particularly with respect to honor-culture 
members’ vigorous response to offensive encounters. In the current dissertation, 
I build on this line of research. My main goal is to identify, from a social 
psychological perspective, how honor concerns influence self-perceptions and 
conflict development, why people concerned with honor tend to become angrier 
and respond more vigorously to insults, and whether or how these negative 
ramifications of offensive behavior can be prevented. With this knowledge I 
hope to contribute to both cross-cultural theory as well as the practice of 
intercultural conflict management.  
In this first chapter, I will first provide a theoretical background for the 
research in this dissertation by setting forth a recently developed cultural 
framework that distinguishes different types of cultures based on so called 
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cultural ideals. The advantages of this framework over the traditional 
approaches to cultural differences will be discussed. Next, I will discuss 
previous research connecting the ideal of honor to insult-elicited aggression, 
highlighting current gaps in the literature. This discussion will set the stage for 
introducing my own research in this area, followed by a brief overview of the 
empirical chapters in this thesis.  
Cultural ideals 
Contact between members of different cultures has become commonplace 
in modern societies, be it as the result of political refuge, migration or contact 
over the World Wide Web. This increase in cultural diversity and intercultural 
contact can lead to positive outcomes regarding knowledge, acceptance, and 
cooperation among members of ethnically diverse groups. However, it can also 
be a source of misunderstanding, tension, and conflict. Hence, understanding 
cross-cultural similarities and differences has become an important topic in 
current psychological research.  
Traditionally, the majority of research investigating cultural differences in 
social psychology has been based on seminal research on values by Hofstede 
and colleagues (Green, Deschamps, & Páez, 2005; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998). The distinction between individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures in particular has spawned a considerable body of literature in many 
different fields of research (Heine, 2007; Hoshino-Browne, et al., 2005; 
Kitayama & Cohen, 2007b; Markus & Kitayama, 2003). Individualistic cultures, 
usually present in Western societies such as the USA, Canada, and Europe 
promote autonomy, achievement, and independence of the individual. On the 
other hand, collectivistic cultures, usually present in the Far East such as China, 
Japan, and India promote interdependence, loyalty, and communality among 
individuals (Schwartz, 1994). The majority of research on cultural differences in 
conflict management and negotiation has also been based on this cultural 
framework (Brett, 2000; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Oetzel, et al., 2001; 
Triandis, 2000). 
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Although the individualism-collectivism distinction is informative, it 
tends to overlook a large group of cultures that are not positioned on the extreme 
ends of either of the two dimensions, such as in the Middle-East and the 
Mediterranean. Additionally, studies investigating cultures that do not clearly 
represent one of these two dimensions show results that cannot be readily 
understood from the dominant theoretical framework, provided by Hofstede and 
colleagues (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 1991). For example, Turkish 
participants — somewhat collectivistic — showed a preference for more direct 
and assertive styles of conflict management, compared to individualistic 
Canadian participants who were more complying and compromising (Cingöz-
Ulu & Lalonde, 2007). These findings are surprising, as previous research has 
generally shown that individualists tend to engage in more forcing behavior 
because they pursue personal goals, while collectivists tend to engage in more 
obliging behavior because they pursue communal goals (Brett, 2000; Holt & 
DeVore, 2005). This example is only one demonstration of the limitations to the 
suitability of the individualism-collectivism in understanding cross-cultural 
differences.  
An alternative theoretical framework that has recently gained more 
support among social psychologists distinguishes between different cultures 
based on so called cultural logics. These logics are informative because they 
weave together a “constellation of shared beliefs, values, behaviors, practices, 
and so on that are organized around a central theme” (Leung & Cohen, 2011, p. 
2). Additionally, they take into account historic, economic, and contextual 
factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of these logics over 
time. The logics prescribe what constitutes an ideal prototype of each culture 
and reflect in what way the value of an individual is defined within that context. 
Below I will elaborate on three ideals identified by previous research: honor, 
dignity and face.  
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Honor 
A first cultural logic is the ideal of honor. Based on anthropological 
research honor is defined as “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in 
the eyes of his society” (Pitt-Rivers, 1965, p. 21). Honor is considered a special 
form of collectivism that is characterized by a strong reliance on positive social 
evaluations as an important source of personal worth (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). In honor cultures, there is a strong 
emphasis on adhering to a social code of conduct in order to ensure positive 
evaluations. As honor relies on positive social evaluations, it can be lost or even 
taken away by others. Having honor not only gives entitlement to respect and 
precedence, but losing honor is associated with humiliation, degradation, or 
exclusion from the group (Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965). Therefore people 
are very concerned with being perceived by others as someone who is worthy of 
honor. In such cultures, honor is a person’s claim to worth, but this worth can 
only be claimed effectively if it is conferred by others (Gilmore, 1987). The 
maintenance and protection of one’s reputation plays an important part in this 
process (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). Accordingly, social interactions are 
regulated by the vigilant avoidance of shame (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Having a 
sense of shame is considered very important in such cultures because this 
emotion signals when an important moral or social standard has been 
transgressed (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008).  
Research has shown that honor extends to different domains. A domain 
very central to honor in Middle-Eastern and Mediterranean cultures is family 
honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b; Van Osch, 
Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, & Bölük, 2013). Family honor pertains to the good 
name and virtue of one’s extended family and it reciprocally influences the 
extent to which people are valued and respected in society. Other domains, such 
as the male and female honor code prescribe gender-related norms. For example, 
in many honor cultures, it is important for male members to have a reputation of 
toughness and being someone not to be taken advantage of (Cohen, Nisbett, 
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Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Schneider, 1969). Males are expected to protect 
themselves and their family, if necessary even by force. Female honor mainly 
relates to norms surrounding modesty and sexual shame. Finally, the domain of 
personal integrity contains norms that dictate trustworthiness, honesty, and 
social interdependence (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b).  
Honor cultures are believed to develop in areas with limited resources and 
beyond the protection of central law enforcement. In these areas — e.g., herding 
communities or inner city ghetto’s — people are at high risk of being robbed 
from their livelihood and have to rely on vigilance and self-protection to ward 
off potential rivals. One way to do so is by having a reputation of toughness, or 
at least giving the impression that you are prepared to defend yourself at all 
costs (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, et al., 1996). Likewise, it is important to 
be seen as someone who is trustworthy and not about to take advantage of 
others, in order to prevent being perceived as a potential threat to others (Cohen, 
2001; Schneider, 1969). Therefore, in such contexts, strict reciprocity norms 
dictate social exchanges. People from honor cultures go to great lengths to 
showcase their trustworthiness and pay back a good deed — i.e. a favor. They 
will also do whatever it takes to avenge a bad deed — i.e. an offense — even to 
an extent that might seem irrational to people who do not endorse honor norms 
(Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
Honor cultures can be found in many countries around the world, 
predominantly in the Middle-East, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and the 
southern parts of the USA (Cohen, et al., 1996; Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-
Swing, & Ataca, 2012; Van Osch, et al., 2013). Although in many of these 
areas, the environmental factors prompting the development of such cultures 
have faded, standards instilled in institutions and socializing customs perpetuate 
the existence of honor norms (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997).  
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Dignity 
Another cultural logic is provided by the ideal of dignity. Dignity is best 
described by the conviction that “each individual at birth possesses an intrinsic 
value at least theoretically equal to that of every other person” (Ayers, 1984, p. 
19). Dignity thus revolves around the value of a person, inherent at birth and 
independent from the evaluations of others. People endorsing the ideal of dignity 
rely on internal evaluations to define their worth; they follow internally-defined 
moral norms to guide their behavior (Leung & Cohen, 2011). They are therefore 
less concerned about the impressions they leave on others, because getting other 
people’s approval is not a major concern when one relies on internal evaluations 
as a source of self-worth. As Leung and Cohen indicate “A person with a sense 
of dignity is a sturdy person who will behave according to his or her own 
internal standards, rather than being driven by impulse or the whims of the 
situation” (2011, p. 3). Even if these moral standards are at odds with those of 
others. More so than shame, avoidance of an internal sense of guilt guides 
behavior in social interaction in dignity cultures, because it signals the 
transgression of internal moral standards.  
Historically, dignity cultures are believed to have developed in 
cooperative farming communities backed up by an effective law-system (Leung 
& Cohen, 2011). In such contexts social exchange is often governed by short 
term tit-for-tit contracts. Positive reciprocity is an important norm in that respect 
— though not to the same extent as in honor cultures — because it signals 
trustworthiness and accountability. However, there is less reliance on negative 
reciprocity — i.e. paying back a bad deed — because transgressions of social 
norms are sanctioned through effective law enforcement. As such, people do not 
have to be self-reliant or to promote an image of toughness to uphold law and 
order (Cohen, et al., 1996; Uskul, et al., 2012).  
Dignity is the dominant ideal endorsed in cultures originating in Western 
societies, such as Europe, Canada, and the (northern parts of) the USA and 
aligns with the syndrome of individualism in the traditional framework of 
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cultural values (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Research has shown for 
example that Dutch people – dignity culture — value achievement and 
independence more and social interdependence less than people from Spain who 
endorse an honor culture (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). 
Additionally, people from the northern parts for the USA — dignity culture — 
endorse statements related to invulnerability of self-worth in the face of external 
evaluations to a greater extent than people from the southern parts of the USA 
and Hispanics — honor culture (Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
Face 
A third logic relates to the ideal of face. Similar to honor, the ideal of face 
revolves around the value of an individual in the eyes of others. However, it is 
different from honor in the sense that while honor is contested for in unstable 
and competitive contexts, consisting of rough equals, face develops in more or 
less stable hierarchies. A person’s face is strongly tied to his/her standing within 
the larger societal hierarchy (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Consequently, face is not 
as easily challenged as honor.  
Social evaluations also play an important role in face cultures. 
Accordingly, people are highly motivated to live up to social standards and 
avoid being shamed in social interaction, in order to prevent loss of face. 
However face is not lost or gained at the expense of others. People have face 
until they lose it, but others cannot take it away from them. In contrast to honor 
cultures, where successfully challenging another person’s honor can increase 
one’s own honor, challenging another person’s face is likely to be considered a 
transgression itself and may lead to loss of face for the perpetrator. Moreover, 
violations of social norms are not sanctioned by the victim, but by superiors 
along hierarchical lines. Face aligns with the cultural syndrome of collectivism. 
Face cultures are usually found in the Far East, in countries such as China, 
Japan, and the Korea’s (Leung & Cohen, 2011). This ideal is not relevant to the 
topic of this dissertation and therefore, I only discuss it briefly.  
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Cultural logics within the Dutch society 
In this dissertation, I will mainly focus on the ideals of honor and dignity 
for two reasons. First, numbers from the Central Bureau for Statistics show that 
honor and dignity represent the two largest cultural groups in the Dutch society. 
As discussed before, the ideal of dignity is most prototypical for the Dutch 
culture and history. Moreover, in 2013, over 6% of the almost 17 million people 
in the Netherlands belonged to the largest ethnic groups associated with an 
honor culture, such as Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch (CBS, November 
2013). At the same time, a lack of appreciation of the differences between 
people from these two different cultural backgrounds is often cited as an 
important source of conflict within the Dutch society (e.g., the killing of Theo 
van Gogh, the shooting at Terra College and more recently, the rise of right 
wing politician Geert Wilders). Understanding the impact of intercultural 
incompatibilities between honor and dignity may assist in preventing further 
escalation of existing tensions. 
Second, much of the previous research on this cultural framework has 
compared the cultural ideals of honor and dignity. Focusing on these two ideal 
allows for formulation and assessment of more concrete hypotheses. Therefore, 
before introducing my own research, I will first consider previous findings 
relevant for my analysis.  
Honor, insult and aggression 
Much of the previous work investigating the impact of honor has focused 
on how people endorsing honor values respond to possibly offensive 
interactions. One seminal study in this line of research was conducted by Cohen 
and colleagues (Cohen, et al., 1996) in an effort to experimentally assess 
whether participants from the south of the USA would respond more fiercely to 
an insult than participants from the North of the USA. Participants in this 
experiment had to walk through a narrow corridor, in which a confederate was 
positioned who had to make way for the participants to pass by. The second time 
the participant walks by, the confederate is ostensibly annoyed, bumps into the 
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participant and calls him an ‘asshole’. Then responses to this insult were 
assessed and related to the regional background of the participants. This 
paradigm was used in three different experiments in which different indicators 
of aggression and dominance were assessed. Cohen and colleagues found that 
offended Southerners appeared to be more angry, showed more signs of 
dominance in interpersonal contact, and were physiologically more primed for 
aggression — i.e. rise in testosterone levels — compared to insulted Northerners 
who were not strongly affected by the provocation (Cohen, et al., 1996). The 
authors ascribed this vigilance towards provocations and the vigorous response 
following it to norms of honor instilled in the Southern culture of the USA.  
Many studies have since examined the relation between honor 
endorsement and aggressive responses to offensive encounters. (Cohen, 
Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999; Cross, Uskul, Gerçek-Swing, Alözkan, & 
Ataca, 2013; Henry, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 
2008; Van Osch, et al., 2013; Vandello & Cohen, 2004). For example, archival 
data have shown higher homicide rates resulting from seemingly trivial 
interpersonal slights in areas conducive to the development of honor norms in 
the USA and around the world (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Henry, 2009). Field 
studies have shown that honor norms pertaining to aggressive responses to 
personal insults are tolerated to a higher extent in the south of the USA than in 
the north of the USA, both by people and by institutions (Cohen & Nisbett, 
1994, 1997; Hayes & Lee, 2005). Different experiments have shown that insults 
instigate more anger and aggression among honor culture members, compared to 
non-honor-culture members (Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 1999; Van Osch, 
et al., 2013). Additionally, some studies have linked these fierce responses to 
specific concerns such as family honor and the need to restore one‘s social 
image in Mediterranean honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b; Van Osch, et al., 2013). Moreover, there is 
research showing that even within the same cultural context, interpersonal 
differences in honor endorsement significantly predict anger, threat perception, 
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and more competitive conflict management after an insult (Beersma, Harinck, & 
Gerts, 2003; IJzerman, Van Dijk, & Galluci, 2007). The latter findings highlight 
that honor-endorsement is not something specific to certain cultures. In fact 
interpersonal variations in honor-endorsement affect insult-elicited antagonism, 
even in cultures in which honor is not a major concern.  
The good news about honor cultures 
The accumulation of research connecting honor to aggressive responses 
paints a rather bleak picture of the implications of honor for interpersonal 
interactions. However, there is also research showing that in honor cultures, 
aggression is only excused in a limited number of contexts, such as for self-
defense or for socializing purposes (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). In fact, a number 
of studies investigating the link between honor and insults have demonstrated 
that the least amount of antagonism is usually displayed by those high in honor 
in the absence of an insult (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996) rather 
than by those low in honor. Recent research has even connected honor to less 
competitive and more cooperative behavior in the absence of insults (Harinck, 
Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013; Leung & Cohen, 2011) and prevention of 
conflict escalation in the initial stages of a confrontation (Cohen, et al., 1999). 
Additionally, some results indicate that, in the absence of such conditions, the 
pattern may well be reversed in the sense that aggression is more likely avoided 
by those high in honor (see also Cohen & Vandello, 2004). Apparently, the 
relationship between honor and aggression only holds true under limited 
conditions and should not be generalized thoughtlessly.  
The role of honor concerns in explaining and preventing insult-elicited 
aggression 
Despite the accumulation of research connecting honor to aggression, so 
far only a limited number of studies has investigated what underlying 
psychological mechanisms might account for diverging responses in insult-
elicited aggression (Henry, 2009; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). As such, it 
is yet unclear why people endorsing the ideal of honor respond more fiercely 
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after being offended. Moreover, hardly any systematic attempts have been 
undertaken to identify ways in which these negative ramifications of offensive 
encounters can be prevented or reduced. Therefore, the goal of the current 
dissertation is twofold. First, I aim to identify which psychological mechanisms 
and motivational processes are responsible for the way people concerned with 
honor approach and respond to offensive encounters. Second, building on these 
new insights, I hope to identify how the negative ramifications of offensive 
interpersonal encounters may be prevented or diminished for those high in 
honor.  
In the following chapters, I will discuss research conducted during the 
past four years, that will address each of these questions. I do so by 
systematically investigating the different phases of conflict development and 
escalation separately. Most of the previous research on this topic has only 
focused on outcome measures of emotion and aggression after an insult, but has 
rarely considered the process by which an ostensibly calm situation seems to 
unexpectedly blowup into an act of aggression (see also Cohen, et al., 1999). By 
separating the different phases of conflict development, conflict escalation, and 
conflict intervention, I hope to gain more insight into how honor influences each 
specific step in the process that leads to more aggressive responses. This 
knowledge is important, because it allows for a better understanding of conflict 
escalation and possible development of conflict resolution methods, by tailoring 
to each step separately.  
In the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter, honor is defined as a 
cultural logic, a major concern in certain parts of the world and less so in other 
parts. However, as mentioned before, endorsement of honor ideals differs 
between and within cultures, be it an honor-culture or else (Leung & Cohen, 
2011). People in the same cultural context do not adhere to honor norms to an 
equal extent. Moreover, it is somewhat problematic to ascribe any cultural 
difference to honor endorsement, because cultures usually differ on more than 
one dimension. Additionally, studies have shown that honor is related to 
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differences on an intercultural as well as on an interpersonal level (Beersma, et 
al., 2003; IJzerman, et al., 2007). To tackle this issue, in the current dissertation 
I take a multi-method approach in investigating honor. In some studies, I 
examine honor on an intercultural level by comparing participants from different 
cultural backgrounds after ascertaining their levels of honor endorsement. In 
other studies, I approach honor at an interpersonal level and use interpersonal 
differences in honor endorsement as a predictor of affect and behavior. In other 
studies, I employ an experimental manipulation to activate or deactivate honor 
concerns and investigate the effect of this manipulation on affect and behavior. 
Where possible, I try to replicate results with different methods. The goal of this 
approach to study the logic of honor, independent from other — cultural — 
confounds, such as societal status of ethnic minorities or language barriers, and 
to determine certain levels of causality when connecting findings to honor. 
Nevertheless, with this approach, I hope to contribute to knowledge on how 
cultural ideals influence cognition, emotion, and behavior.  
Insults as a methodological tool 
An insult can be regarded as a negative comment or gesture about who we 
are or what we do (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). In most of the studies 
discussed in this dissertation, I use explicit verbal insults to simulate offensive 
behavior. For example, in some studies I ask participants to imagine oneself in a 
scenario in which they are insulted and assess their intentions. In other studies, 
participants receive verbal insults from a supposed team fellow and I assess their 
behavior and emotions. These and other insults were gathered during a free 
writing format among honor- and dignity-culture participants as discussed in 
Chapter 2. I selected insults that were commonly used and rated as equally 
severe by participants from both groups. 
It is important to note that my goal is not to investigate how people 
respond to specific types of explicit verbal abuse, but to offensive behavior in 
general. There are many ways in which people might become offended, be it 
through physical confrontation, explicit insults, implicit remarks, gossip, and so 
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on (see also Cross, et al., 2013; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b; Uskul, et al., 
2012). Additionally, insulting someone might happen intentionally or 
unintentionally. However, the goal of this dissertation is not to clarify what 
people find insulting.  
My research focusses on the impact of offensive behavior in the context 
of interpersonal interactions in day to day situations such as with colleagues, 
fellow students, neighbors, and so forth. A lack of understanding of both parties’ 
situational goals and personal and cultural norms is likely to turn such 
interactions into conflicts that arise as the results diverging values, rather than 
competing resource interest (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Kouzakova, Ellemers, 
Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012). The scenarios and paradigms in my studies are 
designed in a way that they are offensive, but they do not reflect ruthless 
provocations. More likely, they resemble interpersonal interaction in the heat of 
the moment, when people forget to maintain interpersonal respect and 
communicate in a more direct and confrontational manner. The verbal insults I 
use serve as methodological tools for this purpose. However, I presume that the 
reported effects on emotions, intentions, and behavior are not limited to these 
specific verbal insults, but likely extend to offensive behavior in general — 
although they may vary in intensity depending on the severity and offensiveness 
of the behavior. To verify this presumption to a certain extent, in most studies I 
use more than one scenario or insult type and investigate honor-related 
difference after collapsing the data over insult type. 
Outline of dissertation 
In four empirical chapters I investigate the role of honor concerns in 
understanding and preventing vigorous responses to insults. In Chapter 2 I 
focus on the precursor of conflict escalation by examining what seems to 
constitute an insult and how honor influences this perception. As offensive 
behavior has considerable potential for escalating a conflict, it is important to 
understand how this behavior is perceived differently by those high in honor and 
why this differs from those low in honor. I follow Bond and Venus, who 
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conceptualize insults as “…a blatant maneuver to establish dominance over 
another by impugning their competence or morality” (Bond & Venus, 1991, p. 
85). In two studies I assess how honor influences the way insulting behaviors 
defy people’s sense of morality vs. competence and whether this effect is 
mediated by the extent to which an insult is considered offensive. To link my 
findings to honor, I compare high-honor cultures to low-honor cultures using a 
multi-cultural sample, and I also compare high-honor participants to low-honor 
participants by using a mono-cultural sample. Additionally, using a free writing 
format, I ask participants from different cultural backgrounds to generate insults 
to be used as potential stimuli in the remainder of the empirical studies. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the appraisal of insulting feedback beyond 
self-reports by assessing cardiovascular indicators of arousal regulation — 
heart-rate, blood pressure and vascular impedance — and explicit indicators of 
aggression — white noise. In this study, I build on the Biopsychosocial model of 
arousal regulation (Blascovich, 2000; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) which 
distinguishes between the psychophysiological states of threat vs. challenge. I 
investigate whether insults instigate more threat and evoke more aggression 
among participants with — experimentally-induced — honor vs. dignity, and 
compare these outcomes to a control group who received neutral feedback.  
In Chapter 4, I try to clarify a seemingly contradictory finding in 
previous literature. That is, those high in honor are more obliging and 
forthcoming at the initial stages of a possibly confrontational encounter, while 
they become more dominant and forceful after being insulted. In order to 
understand what underlying psychological mechanisms can account for these 
diverging responses I approach this issue by building on knowledge from 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1996, 1997). Highlighting that honor is 
associated with a vigilant concern for reputation, I try to demonstrate that both 
obliging behavior before and confrontational behavior after an insult are driven 
by prevention focus. In a first study, I examine the connection between honor 
and prevention focus using a community. In the second and third study, I induce 
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honor concerns using a newly developed experimental manipulation. I examine 
honor-related intentions in a situation that has the potential to escalate but has 
not escalated yet, and in a truly confrontational situation with controlled 
provocations and aggression — white noise. I assess the role of prevention focus 
in both types of responses. By doing so, I hope to imbed knowledge about honor 
into a broader theoretical framework of Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 
1997).  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I focus on concerns related to the way self-worth is 
defined in honor cultures, by distinguishing between personal worth — the value 
of a person in his/her own eyes — and social-worth — the value of a person in 
the eyes of others. I investigate how reliance on these two sources of self-worth 
affects the way people respond to an insult. In a first correlational study, I 
investigate the role of personally vs. socially defined worth in explaining 
susceptibility to the negative ramifications of interpersonal insults. In a second 
study, I assess the causal impact of socially defined worth, by investigating 
whether a social affirmation (vs. a self-affirmation) is effective in reducing 
insult-elicited aggression. I do so among an honor-culture sample, using an 
immersive paradigm with controlled provocations and behavioral indicators of 
aggression — white noise.  
 These chapters are based on individual articles, written with the intent to 
submit for publication, and can be read separately and in any order. 
Additionally, the original articles have been written in close cooperation with 
my supervisors. Their contribution is reflected by the use of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’ 
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Abstract 
In two studies, we examined honor-related differences in morality vs. 
competence evaluations as a way to tap into social judgment formation after an 
insult. In Study 2.1 we distinguished between high-honor and low-honor 
cultures. Participants’ evaluations of a norm transgressor were gathered. Results 
indicated that high-honor participants devalued the transgressor more strongly in 
terms of morality than competence in comparison to low-honor participants. In 
Study 2.2, we distinguished between participants with high or low honor values 
and investigated morality and competence in self-perception. Participants were 
asked to respond to different types of insults gathered in Study 2.1. High-honor 
participants were primarily harmed in their morality after being insulted, while 
this prominence was less apparent in low-honor participants. Both studies 
showed that those who value honor highly moralize insults to a greater extent 
because they take more offense to them.   
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Cultural differences have been the focus of much work in social 
psychology (Hofstede, 1980; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007b; Markus & Kitayama, 
2003; Triandis, 1989). Research has revealed that there is a class of cultures that 
is particularly relevant to the way people interact with each other in conflict 
situations. These are so-called honor cultures, common in the Mediterranean, the 
Middle-East and southern parts of the USA (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1997; Henry, 2009; IJzerman, et al., 2007; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). 
Distinctive for members of honor cultures is their effort to maintain a positive 
and honorable image. Having honor not only gives entitlement to respect and 
precedence, but losing honor is associated with humiliation and degradation 
(Peristiany, 1965).  
One way of damaging a person’s honor is by offensive behavior or 
insulting the person (Cohen, et al., 1996). Insults can lead to anger and 
aggression and have been shown to play an important role in the escalation of 
conflicts, especially in honor cultures (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; 
IJzerman, et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Several studies have 
demonstrated a relation between honor and aggressive responses to insults, but 
there is still little empirical work on why people with high honor concerns 
respond in such way to insults (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). One 
possible explanation for why people endorsing honor culture respond more 
vigorously to insults might relate to the way in which they evaluate themselves 
and each other after having been insulted. Examining how insults affect people’s 
social evaluations can increase understanding of why people respond differently 
to them. In the present article, we therefore extend previous research on insults 
by investigating their impact on social judgment formation. As morality and 
competence are considered key components of social judgment and have 
important implications for the way people behave in many settings (Leach, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke, 2005), we examine the implications of 
insults for perceived morality vs. competence and we assess how honor values 
affect these perceptions and subsequent behavior. We do so by first investigating 
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how people from different cultures evaluate somebody else after being insulted 
by them, and second, by examining how people with high and low honor 
evaluate themselves after being insulted. Our goal is to increase understanding 
of why insults affect interactions in day to day life differently across different 
cultural contexts. Understanding these processes more clearly informs us on 
what the function of insult-elicited aggression is, and what can be done to 
prevent it. 
Honor  
Researchers generally distinguish between cultures in terms of 
individualism (vs. collectivism), power distance, masculinity (vs. femininity) 
and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007b; 
Triandis, 1972; Wagner & Moch, 1986). More recently however, researchers 
have also looked at other cultural syndromes such as honor, dignity, and face. 
These cultural syndromes do not describe one specific trait but are rather “a 
constellation of shared beliefs, values, behaviors, practices, and so on that are 
organized around a central theme” (Leung & Cohen, 2011, p. 2). They are also 
considered ideals, in the sense that they are not absolute but rather function as 
guidelines that model social interaction within each cultural setting. This also 
means that not everyone within each type of culture fully adheres to these ideals. 
However, these ideals can be very informative for intercultural comparison.  
This paper concentrates on the ideal of honor, as previous research has 
demonstrated that insults are particularly detrimental for people who endorse 
high honor values (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; IJzerman, et al., 
2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Honor revolves around “…the value 
of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society.” (Pitt-Rivers, 
1965, p. 21). Members of honor cultures are characterized by their adherence to 
the honor code — a set of rules of conduct — prescribing how people should 
behave and interact with others in social situations. The honor code 
encompasses domains such as family honor, social integrity, masculine honor, 
and feminine honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). The way people are 
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perceived by their peers contributes significantly to honor culture members’ 
worth, more so than in other cultures. For example, one’s honor is for a large 
part based on the extent to which a person or a person’s in-group (such as 
family) is perceived to adhere to honor-related norms. Moreover, a person can 
only claim honor after it has been paid by others. As a result, honor can be 
gained or lost depending on one’s behavior in a certain context, or even be taken 
away by others.  
It is argued that such cultures are more likely to develop in areas with 
tough competition as a result of limited resources, that are beyond the reach of 
law enforcement and federal authority, such as herding communities (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen & Vandello, 2004) but also inner city 
ghetto’s (Anderson, 1994). Interpersonal interactions in these cultures are based 
on strict reciprocity norms and emotions such as pride and shame are considered 
more crucial in regulating social behavior (Leung & Cohen, 2011) than in other 
cultures. For example, in honor cultures, not having a sense of shame is 
considered a vice (Gilmore, 1987). 
In other cultures, external evaluations may play a less important role in 
defining people’s sense of worthiness. For example, people in some cultures 
endorse the ideal of dignity. Dignity pertains to someone’s internally defined 
and inalienable worth (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
Dignity is something that is considered innate to every human being. All people 
are born with dignity and in principle everyone has an equal amount of dignity. 
The value of a person is thus presumed to be located internally and cannot easily 
be taken away by others. In such cultures an individual’s conduct is guided and 
evaluated for a large part according to their own internalized moral standards.  
Dignity cultures are more common in western, industrialized, 
individualistic regions such as northern America, Canada, and North-Europe. In 
the Netherlands for example, values pertaining to achievement and 
independence are more closely related to a sense of self-worth than in honor 
cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a). Cultures of dignity are argued to 
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develop in agricultural communities consisting of independently operating 
farmers (Cohen, 2001), who cooperate according to a market model. 
Interpersonal interactions in dignity cultures are based on short term tit-for-tat 
contracts and social conduct is generally regulated by mechanisms such as law 
and guilt (Leung & Cohen, 2011), more so than in honor cultures.  
In other words, while in honor cultures a person’s moral guidelines 
(honor) are relatively context dependent and alienable, in dignity cultures a 
person’s moral guidelines (dignity) are relatively internalized and inalienable. 
We argue that these differences affect the way people evaluate themselves and 
each other and we will explore these differences by investigating honor-related 
differences in responses to insults. 
Insult 
An insult can be regarded as a negative comment or gesture about who we 
are or what we do (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). Insults represent a 
powerful way of expressing aggression against other people or communicating 
negative views of other people, but a relatively subtle way of expressing such 
aggression when compared to physical violence. About 0.3 % to 0.7% of 
adolescent speakers’ daily output consists of offensive words, which averages 
up to about 60-90 words per day (Jay, 2009). Most of these words are 
considered conversational swearing and can be triggered by concrete day to day 
events (e.g., someone jumping the line, or not giving way in traffic). However, 
insults also carry important implicit social information about underlying views 
of, and attitudes about, others, depending also on the cultural context. For 
instance, previous research (Semin & Rubini, 1990) has shown that people in 
more collectivistic contexts like the south of Italy use more relational insults — 
“I wish your father an accident”— than people in more individualistic contexts 
like the north of Italy — “I wish you an accident”— to insult someone. Another 
well-known phenomenon associated with the cultural specificity of insults is that 
whereas some insults seem to be universal — e.g., reference to genitals — other 
types of insults are clearly culture-specific. For example, the reference to an 
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illness — e.g., cancer sufferer — is considered an insult particularly in the 
Netherlands, while a reference to the devil or Satan is particularly insulting in 
Scandinavian countries (Van Oudenhoven, et al., 2008).  
One universal function of insults is that they communicate perceived 
violations of important general and normative values (Van Oudenhoven, et al., 
2008). Insults thus convey important contextual information about which norms 
have been transgressed and which values are at stake. This knowledge is 
especially relevant to multicultural societies where different cultural value 
systems co-exist. Unfortunately, research investigating the link between verbal 
abuse, social evaluations, and culture is scarce or refers to very general 
distinctions such as individualism vs. collectivism (Semin & Rubini, 1990) or 
ethnicity-based linguistic preferences (De Raad, van Oudenhoven, & Hofstede, 
2005; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 2008).  
We believe that knowledge about how people evaluate themselves or each 
other after an insult is essential in understanding why people respond differently 
to insults, particularly when people strongly adhere to honor. Indeed research 
has shown that the concept of honor is strongly tied to social evaluations 
(Peristiany, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera, Liskow, & DiBona, 2012; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002a). As such, one’s social esteem — the extent to which 
one is valued by him-/herself and by others in social settings — has considerable 
impact on people’s sense of self-worth (honor) in honor cultures. By examining 
how insults affect people’s evaluation, we can more clearly understand why 
people respond differently to them.  
In our research we will elaborate on previous findings by focusing on 
underlying values of morality and competence to theoretically ground our 
predicted differences. Our aim is to assess the effect of insults on people’s self- 
and social perceptions as a way to gain more insight in the way insults influence 
day to day interactions. 
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Morality vs. competence 
Insulting someone is one of the many forms in which people pass 
judgments on others. Indeed, Bond and Venus conceptualized an insult as “…a 
blatant maneuver to establish dominance over another by impugning their 
competence or morality” (Bond & Venus, 1991, p. 85; italics added). Research 
has shown that morality and competence are two evaluative domains central to 
social judgment of individuals as well as groups (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & 
Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, 2005). Morality refers to whether the goals that 
people aspire to are beneficial or harmful for others (Wojciszke, 2005). This 
means that morality concerns traits that are considered other-profitable such as 
honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity (G. Peeters, 1992). Competence refers to 
characteristics associated with effective and efficient goal attainment; it is about 
how well people strive for their goals, not the goals themselves (Wojciszke, 
2005). Therefore it refers to traits that directly benefit or harm the trait possessor 
(G. Peeters, 1992). Characteristics associated with competence are might, 
intelligence, creativity, and skill.  
Judgments of morality and competence are considered key components 
“…basic to survival in the social world” (Brambilla, et al., 2011, p. 135; Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Several lines of research have demonstrated that 
evaluations on these two dimensions form the basis for social judgments of both 
individuals and groups. Moreover, many researchers have found that in general, 
morality has primacy over competence with respect to judgment formation 
(Brambilla, et al., 2011; De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Ellemers, Pagliaro, 
Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach, et al., 2007; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 
2011; Wojciszke, 2005). For example, it has been widely demonstrated that 
moral characteristics have a greater bearing on impression formation of others 
than competence characteristics (Brambilla, et al., 2011; De Bruin & Van 
Lange, 1999; Wojciszke, 2005). This is because when we encounter someone 
we do not know, we first have to assess whether the intentions of this person are 
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good or bad, before we assess whether the person is capable of enforcing those 
intentions (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998).  
Cultural differences 
Heretofore, most researchers have investigated the primacy of morality 
and competence compared to each other in one cultural setting. However, to 
what extent and in what way people value these domains in different cultural 
contexts has not been systematically addressed so far. Moreover, the 
implications of such cultural differences in judgment formation in the specific 
context of a transgression on emotions and behaviors are also unknown. We 
propose that people from different cultures differ in the value they attach to the 
dimensions of morality and competence. More specifically, we propose that the 
primacy of morality in relation to competence will be stronger in honor cultures. 
There are several theoretical arguments to support this statement.  
First, we argue that the primacy of morality is the result of honor culture 
members’ concern for reputation and vigilance towards offenses. Morality is 
considered an indication of a person’s intentions (are they good or bad?) while 
competence is an indication of a person’s capabilities (can they impose on me or 
not?). Honor cultures are believed to develop under circumstances of limited 
resources, high competitiveness, and a lack of central law enforcement (Cohen 
& Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, et al., 1996). Under those circumstances, it is 
conceivable that people are mainly concerned with ascertaining as soon as 
possible whether others are of good intentions and trustworthy or not, 
particularly in a confrontational setting. Also, in order to maintain and to protect 
the group from threats, transgressions of moral standards have to be addressed 
immediately.  
Assessment of might on the other hand may be less crucial because harm 
is easily imposed anyway. In low-honor cultures, where circumstances are less 
competitive, people consider others more as their equal and social interaction is 
governed by short term tit-for-tat contracts (Leung & Cohen, 2011), concerns 
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for moral judgments — though still important — might be less crucial in person 
evaluations.  
Moreover, this heightened concern for moral judgments in honor cultures 
is not only limited to evaluations of others, but also to the way people view and 
present themselves. In honor cultures one’s worth is more context dependent and 
alienable, because it depends on one’s reputation and the amount of honor one 
receives from other group members (Peristiany, 1965). Research has 
demonstrated that adherence to moral norms is more important for securing 
group members’ respect than adhering to competence norms (Pagliaro, et al., 
2011). This means that members of honor cultures have a stronger incentive to 
adhere to moral norms, because it secures them the respect they need from their 
group members. In low-honor cultures, on the other hand, self-esteem is a 
greater source of personal worth than social esteem. Wojciszke (Wojciszke, 
2005) has demonstrated that evaluations of the self, as indicated by self-esteem, 
rely more on notions of self-competence than notions of self-morality. In other 
words, a person’s evaluations of their own competence-related attributes were 
better predictors of their self-esteem, than a person’s evaluations of their own 
morality related attributes.  
Present studies 
We argue that insults have a stronger impact on people’s morality 
concerns vs. competence concerns when they endorse honor. As such we hope 
to take a first step in more accurately classifying insult-elicited aggression as 
serving a moral purpose. In some previous research it has been theorized that 
vigorous responses to insults among those high in honor might stem from 
competence concerns: retaliation is necessary so that one does not appear weak 
(Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, et al., 1996). However, we argue and 
empirically demonstrate that insults threaten (self-)perceptions of morality more 
than competence among those high in honor. If insults are indeed moralized 
more by those high in honor, subsequent responses may serve to address moral 
failure and restore moral standards rather than competence.  
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In our studies we assess both dimensions of morality and competence 
after an insult because they are crucial parts of social judgment formation and 
relevant to the concept of insults (Bond & Venus, 1991). For example, previous 
research has demonstrated that insults can address both immorality and 
incompetence in many cultures (e.g., stupidity and physical disabilities, see also 
Semin & Rubini, 1990; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 2008). In a similar vein, insults 
to both immorality and incompetence are considered offensive to some extent, 
irrespective of cultural background (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). 
Additionally, by contrasting the two dimensions to each other within each 
group, we can rule out that general evaluative differences between groups drive 
the reported effects.  
Our main interest in this research is the interplay of honor and insults. 
Because honor endorsement is not necessarily tied to culture and because culture 
does not only influence honor endorsement (Leung & Cohen, 2011), we 
considered honor as an intercultural as well as an intracultural variable in our 
studies. In Study 2.1 we compared native Dutch participants to participants with 
an honor culture background (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). In 
Study 2.2, we used an honor concerns questionnaire to distinguish between high 
and low honor ideology endorsement within a sample of Dutch participants (see 
also Beersma, et al., 2003; IJzerman, et al., 2007). 
In summary, in this paper we investigate honor related differences in how 
insults impact the way people evaluate themselves or each other. We do so by 
extending previous findings on honor and insults to the social evaluative 
domains of morality and competence. We expect that, when people high in 
honor endorsement are confronted with insulting behavior, they consider this to 
be more indicative of immorality, rather than incompetence, compared to people 
low in honor endorsement. We also expect that this effect is mediated by 
stronger feelings of being offended among those high in honor. In two studies, 
we investigate how high and low-honor participants evaluate others (Study 2.1) 
and themselves (Study 2.2) after an insult.  
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Study 2.1 
In Study 2.1, we focused on how people with different cultural 
backgrounds evaluate another person’s insulting behavior. We hypothesized that 
high-honor culture participants would consider insulting behavior to be more 
severe and offensive than low-honor culture participants. We also hypothesized 
that, although people in general judge others more readily in terms of morality 
rather than competence, this difference would be amplified among those from a 
high–honor culture. Finally, we predicted that this difference between groups in 
their preference for a morality judgment could be accounted for by honor culture 
participants heightened concerns for being offended. We tested our hypotheses 
by having participants indicate their response to an offensive episode and to 
judge the transgressor in terms of morality and competence. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-three participants (103 female, 56%, Mage, = 
20.87, SD = 2.73) took part in Study 2.1. They were recruited on college 
grounds around different large cities in The Netherlands. Participants who were 
born in honor cultures, or whose parents (at least one) were born in honor 
cultures — countries in the Middle-East, the Mediterranean and South America 
— were categorized as high-honor participants (n = 76), while participants from 
Dutch parents who were born in the Netherlands themselves were categorized as 
low-honor participants (n = 107). Gender and age were distributed equally 
among both groups. Five gift certificates of €40 were raffled off amongst 
participants as a reward for their participation. 
Instruments and procedure 
Candidates were asked to participate in a study on norm transgressions. 
After consenting, they received the questionnaire in paper and pencil format. 
The questionnaire consisted of several scales and a scenario describing a norm 
transgression. First, honor concerns were measured using a twelve-item 
questionnaire.  
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Then participants read the following scenario: 
Imagine that you are waiting in line at a bank, because your 
debit card is broken. It is near closing time and you have yet 
to buy a present for a good friend. When, after waiting for 
15 minutes your turn comes up, a man/woman steps in and 
walks straight to the counter. When you claim that it was 
your turn, the man/woman ignores your account. He/she 




Participants were asked to write down insults or offenses they might think 
of in this situation against the transgressor. These insults were gathered to be 
used in Study 2.2. Please note that the scenario did not specify whether the 
transgression was an act of immorality (e.g., purposefully cheating the line) or 
incompetence (e.g., having overlooked the row). Next, three variables — 
severity and offensiveness of the transgression and the amount of negative affect 
— were measured. Participants were also asked to indicate to what extent they 
thought the transgressor was immoral and incompetent. Finally, demographics 
were gathered. Upon completion, participants were thanked for their cooperation 
and had the opportunity to leave their email address if they wanted to participate 
in the raffle. All items were measured on seven-point Likert scales, unless stated 
otherwise.  
Measures 
Honor concerns. Because honor is considered important in all cultures, 
but to a different degree, we included an honor concerns measure to assess the 
assumption that participants from a high-honor culture background indeed 
endorsed honor to a higher extent than participants with a low-honor culture 
background. The honor concerns scale (α = .82) was adapted from the original 
                                                 
1 In half the cases the transgressor was a male, in the other half the transgressor was a female. 
Preliminary analyses showed no differences on the various dependent measures in respect to the 
gender of the transgressor. Therefore, the data were collapsed in the final analyses.  
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scale by Rodriguez Mosquera and colleagues (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 
2002b). Per honor domain three items were selected that reflected the content of 
that domain adequately and were also relevant for our student sample, in order 
to keep the length of the questionnaire acceptable. Items on this scale describe a 
situation and participants are asked to indicate to what extent it would reduce 
their self-worth if they were in such a situation (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
This scale measures honor-related domains such as family honor (e.g., To what 
extent would it diminish your self-worth if you would personally damage your 
family’s reputation?), social integrity (e.g., To what extent would it diminish 
your self-worth if you were known as someone who is not to be trusted?), 
masculine honor (e.g., To what extent would it diminish your self-worth if you 
were known as someone who is not able to defend himself/herself when insulted) 
and feminine honor (e.g., To what extent would it diminish your self-worth if you 
would were known as someone who wears sexually provocative clothing?).  
Control variables. Previous research has demonstrated that insults might 
— though not always — raise general negative assessments such as negative 
affect or the severity of a particular insult (Beersma, et al., 2003; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Hence, we included 
two variables to control for and to rule out general negative assessments of the 
transgression as an explanation for honor-related differences on morality vs. 
competence evaluations. These control questions asked about the severity of the 
transgression (e.g., How severe do you think this transgression is?) and negative 
affect (e.g., How upset would you be?). Each variable was measured with three 
items with answers ranging from 1(not at all) to 7 (very much,αseverity = .74; 
αnegativity = .78).  
Offensiveness. Offensiveness of the transgression was also measured 
using three items (e.g., How offended would you be?, α= .83) with answers 
ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much.  
Immorality. Participants indicated to what extent they considered the 
transgressor to be immoral on a scale consisting of six items (α = .78), with 
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answers ranging from 1= not at all to 7 = very much. Both positively worded 
(e.g., To what extent do you consider this person to be honest?) and negatively 
worded items were used (e.g., To what extent do you consider this person to be 
unfair?). Before analyses, positively worded items were recoded such that a 
higher score indicated more immorality. 
Incompetence. Participants were also asked to indicate to what extent 
they considered the transgressor to be incompetent. Six items were used to 
measure this scale (α = .75), with answers ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very 
much. Items were worded positively (e.g., To what extent do you consider this 
person to be intelligent?) as well as negatively (e.g., To what extent do you 
consider this person to be incompetent?). Before analyses, positively worded 
items were recoded such that a higher score indicated more incompetence. The 
five latter scales were developed for the purpose of this study. 
Results 
Table 2.1 









Negative affect -.03    
Severity .11 .74   
Offensiveness .35* .27* .50*  
Imm-Inc .24* .24* .27* .27* 
Note. n = 183, * p < .001,  
 
Unless otherwise stated, the data were analyzed by means of ANOVA 
with cultural group (high honor vs. low honor) as independent variable. Table 
2.1 gives an overview of the correlations between the different measures. 
Honor concerns. To test the proposition that participants in the honor 
group actually endorsed honor values to a greater extent than participants in the 
low-honor group, the mean score on the honor concerns scale was compared 
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between the two groups. It was confirmed that participants from a high-honor 
culture background scored significantly higher on honor concerns (M = 5.38, SD 
= 0.85) than participants from a low-honor culture background (M = 4.87, SD = 
0.88), F(1, 181) = 14.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08.2 
Control variables. The scores on the two control variables severity and 
negativity of the transgression were compared between groups to determine 
whether participants interpreted the situation differently. None of the effects 
reached significance (all Fs < 2, ps > .13). This means that both groups 
considered the transgression to be equally severe and negative. 
Offensiveness. As expected, there was a significant main effect of group 
on the offensiveness measure, F(1, 181) = 28.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14. High-honor 
participants reported to be more offended (M = 4.65, SD = 1.46) by the 
transgression than low-honor participants (M = 3.58, SD = 1.22). Thus, although 
both groups considered the transgression to be equally severe and negative, 
high-honor participants did report to be more offended by it. 
Immoral vs. incompetent. Participants evaluated to what extent they 
considered the transgressor to be immoral or incompetent. First, both scales 
were entered in a paired sample t-test to assess whether immorality was higher 
in both groups than incompetence. Results indeed showed a significant effect, 
t(182) = 3.73, p < .001; r = .26, indicating that in general participants considered 
the transgressor to be more immoral (M = 5.79, SD = .96) than incompetent (M 
= 5.60, SD = 1.02).  
Mediating effect of offensiveness on immorality-incompetence. To 
assess cultural differences in the way participants devalued the transgressor and 
the mediating role of offensiveness, a new variable was created by subtracting 
                                                 
2 Because the honor culture group was ethnically diverse, we also tested whether intragroup 
differences were present on the honor-concerns scale. Honor-culture countries were grouped by 
continent and honor concerns were compared with ANOVA. No significant intragroup 
differences were found in the honor-culture group, F(3, 72) = .696, ns. 
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the incompetence score from the immorality score for each participant, thus 
creating a measure of the precedence of immorality. Positive scores indicated 
precedence of immorality and negative scores indicated precedence of 
incompetence in the devaluation of the transgressor. We then entered this 
variable as a dependent measure in a mediation analysis model with culture as a 
predictor and offensiveness as the mediator, using a bootstrap method as 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004)3. Results are depicted in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 
Mediational effect of culture on immorality-incompetence through offensiveness 
 B SE t p BCa 95 % CI 
Total effect .34 .10 3.23 .001  
Culture to Offensiveness 1.03 .20 5.09 <.001  
Offensiveness to Imm-Inc .10 .04 2.83 .005  
Indirect Effect .11 .04 2.49* .01 .02 - .23 
Direct effect .23 .11 2.17 .03  
Note. Culture (Low honor = 0, High honor = 1); n = 183; Bootstrap = 5000,  
BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, * = Sobel Z 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.2, the significant regression coefficient of the 
direct effect of culture on the difference score indicates that high-honor culture 
participants gave even more precedence to immorality evaluation vs. 
incompetence (M = 0.39, SD = 0.76) than low-honor culture participants (M = 
0.05, SD = 0.62). Moreover, assessment of the mediation effect demonstrated 
that this difference is significantly (though not fully) accounted for by the extent 
to which participants felt offended by the transgression. These results thus 
                                                 
3 We only used offensiveness as a mediator in a simple mediator model, because previous 
analyses had shown that culture only affected offensiveness and not severity and negative affect.  
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demonstrate that, as hypothesized, the extent to which high-honor participants 
are concerned with reputation and being offended accounts significantly for their 
stronger devaluation of the transgressor in terms of morality in comparison to 
competence.  
Discussion 
This study revealed that members from different cultural groups respond 
differently to the same instance of offensive behavior. Participants in general 
considered the transgressor to be more immoral than incompetent. As 
hypothesized, this difference was even amplified among high-honor culture 
participants compared to low-honor culture participants. We also found support 
for our notion that this difference is accounted for by honor culture participants’ 
concerns for reputation and (not) being offended, as demonstrated by the 
intermediating effect of offensiveness. In general, Study 2.1 confirms our 
prediction that moral norms indeed have more precedence over competence 
norms in high-honor cultures at least with respect to the way members evaluate 
a transgressor after an insult.  
One limitation in this study is that we used only one scenario, which 
makes it difficult to generalize our findings to different everyday situations. We 
cannot rule out that the stronger devaluation in the moral domain is a result of 
the particular transgression and specific type of insult. Moreover, a stronger 
devaluation of another person in terms of moral concerns was to be expected 
when judging others concerns irrespective of the level of honor, as previous 
literature has shown that morality is a more central domain than competence, 
especially when evaluating others (Brambilla, et al., 2011; Ellemers, et al., 2008; 
Wojciszke, 2005). Would a similar effect occur when people had to evaluate 
themselves after an insult?  
Furthermore, in this study we distinguished between members of different 
groups on the basis of their ethnic background. Therefore it was not possible to 
control for other variables that might have explained the differences we found. 
For example, all our participants might have been thinking of a native Dutch 
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transgressor in the scenario, which would have constituted an in-group member 
for the low-honor group and an out-group member for the high-honor group. 
This may also be a reason for why we only found a partial mediational effect. 
We conducted a second study to address these limitations.  
Study 2.2 
In the first study, we reported differences between high-honor and low-
honor participants as members of different cultural background. The findings 
confirmed the notion that norms regarding what is considered offensive and 
inappropriate in others may be even more strongly linked to morality than to 
competence in high-honor cultures, in comparison to low-honor cultures. 
However, these findings do not necessarily reflect how people evaluate their 
own morality vs. competence, especially when they are the target of such 
insults. Additionally, in view of our interest in the connection between judgment 
formation and conflict escalation, it is important to assess not only how people 
respond to these insults at an emotional level (i.e., what they consider to be 
offensive), but also how they respond in terms of their behavioral strategy.  
In order to examine the effect of honor values on different responses to 
insults irrespective of cultural background, in the second study we distinguished 
between high and low-honor participants on the basis of their adherence to the 
honor code as measured by the honor concerns questionnaire of Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al. (2002b). This method has been used in previous studies to 
isolate the predictive value of honor-related concerns (Beersma, et al., 2003; 
IJzerman, et al., 2007) especially because recent research suggests that not all 
members of a culture necessarily adhere to prevailing cultural norms (Leung & 
Cohen, 2011) 
To study the way people with high and low honor values respond to 
different types of insults, we used insults from Study 2.1. We presented a 
selection of these insults to participants followed by questions regarding their 
emotional and behavioral responses to each of these insults. We selected 
different types of insults, in order to prevent our results from being restricted to 
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one type of insult. We hypothesized that high-honor participants would consider 
the insults more severe and offensive than low-honor participants. Furthermore 
we hypothesized that participants would consider themselves more immoral than 
incompetent, and that this difference would be even greater among individuals 
with high honor concerns, as found in Study 2.1. We further hypothesized that 
among high honor participants, feelings of being offended and not so much the 
severity of the insults would mediate the higher sense of immorality.  
In regard to the behavioral inclinations of participants after an insult, we 
did not specify any hypotheses, because previous research on this topic is 
somewhat contradictory. Most studies report aggressive responses after a clear 
provocation (Cohen, et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008), as well as a 
more reserved and avoidant response — especially at the initial stages of a 
confrontation — (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1999; Harinck, et al., 
2013).  
Method 
Procedure and participants 
Participants were recruited randomly in the waiting room of a medical 
center and were asked to participate voluntarily in a study on insults. After 
consenting, they received the booklet containing the questionnaires. After 
completion participants were thanked and given the option to partake in a raffle. 
Five gift certificates of € 15, - were raffled off amongst participants. Sixty-one 
participants (37 female, Mage = 32.79 years, SD = 14.29) took part in Study 2.2. 
Of all participants 77% was from Dutch decent. Other ethnicities were 
predominantly European (e.g., German). Only six participants (10 %) had a 
background associated with honor cultures (Turkish and Moroccan). Exclusion 
of these participants did not affect the results, so they were included in the 
analysis.  
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Instruments  
Insults collected in Study 2.1 were used as stimuli in Study 2.2. In 
previous work, insults have been categorized based on their content reference 
(Van Oudenhoven, et al., 2008). After inspection of the gathered insults, we 
selected eight insult categories that were found to be most common among our 
data. The insult in these eight categories formed about 63% of the totally 
collected insults and were good representatives of commonly used insults in. In 
case of gender relevant insults, we printed both the male and female version of 
an insult. The insults that were used were: mental inability (idiot, retard), 
antisocial (rotter, antisocial), threats and curses (drop dead, get lost), indecency 
(slut/faggot, whore/anal goer), genitals (dick/cunt, prick/twat), family (your 
mother/whorechild), diseases (cancer sufferer, typhoid sufferer), and 
miscellaneous (piss head, Bozo). As can be seen, we selected two insults per 
insult category — e.g., cancer sufferer and typhoid sufferer for diseases — to 
create two versions of the same questionnaire. Each version was administered to 
half of the participants. Preliminary analyses revealed no differences on the 
responses between the two versions. Therefore the data were collapsed. Using 
different examples from different categories of insults allowed us to measure our 
participants’ response regardless of the content of a specific insult.  
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of eight sections. In each 
section a different type of insult was introduced and the same set of questions 
was asked about how participants appraised that specific insult (severity and 
offensiveness), how they viewed themselves when insulted like that (immoral 
and incompetent) and how likely they would behave in a certain manner (avoid 
and aggress) if such an insult was uttered at them. The final part of the 
questionnaire contained the same honor scale as Study 2.1. All variables were 
measured using five-point scales (1 = not at all to 5 = very much) unless 
otherwise stated.  
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Measures 
Honor concerns. This variable was measured on seven-point scales (1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much, α = .86) with the same questionnaire we used in 
Study 2.1. 
Severity. Participants first indicated how unpleasant it would be if 
someone familiar and someone unfamiliar would insult them in such a way. 
Preliminary analyses revealed that there were no systematic differences in how 
people felt depending on whether the insults came from a familiar or unfamiliar 
person4. Correlations between the two items ranged from r = .49 to r = .79, all ps 
<.001. Therefore, for each category of insult, the scores on these two items were 
averaged, creating a single variable indicating the severity of that insult. 
Offensiveness. Three items were used for each insult to measure how 
offended participants would be if they were insulted in such a way (upset, hurt, 
and offended; reliability coefficient of all sets ranged from α = .78 to α = .89). 
The three measures were combined into one offensiveness variable for each 
insult category. 
Immorality-incompetence. To investigate self-perception after the insult, 
participants were then asked whether this insult would make them feel like an 
immoral person — we used the Dutch term ‘slecht mens’, literally translated 
into ‘bad’ or ‘evil human being’ — or an incompetent person — we used the 
Dutch term ‘stom mens’, literally translated into ‘stupid human being’. To 
examine the primacy of morality over competence in self-perception after an 
insult, a new variable was created by subtracting the incompetence item from 
the immoral item for each insult category, thus creating a difference score. 
Positive scores on this item indicate that an insult made people feel more 
                                                 
4 Paired t-tests revealed that only in the threats category it made a difference whether the insult 
was coming from a familiar or an unfamiliar person, t(60) = 3.11, p = .003, r = .38. Participants 
considered it to be worse when a threat insult came from a familiar person M = 3.26, SD = 1.52 
vs. from an unfamiliar person M = 2.71, SD = 1.34.  
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immoral than incompetent, whereas negative scores indicate that people felt 
more incompetent than immoral after an insult. 
Avoidance. To investigate their action tendencies, two items were used to 
measure if participants would employ a passive and avoidant strategy (ignore, 
walk away). Both items correlated significantly in all insult categories, ranging 
from r = .27 to r = .56, all ps < .037, and were combined into one avoidance 
measure.  
Aggression. There were also significant correlations between the two 
more active and confrontational items (insult back, aggress) in the categories 
miscellaneous, threats, family, and disease, r = .36 to r = .52, all ps < .006. The 
correlation between the two confrontational items in the categories mental 
inability, antisocial, indecency, and genitals were non-significant. However, 
combined and separate analyses yielded the same results. For practical reasons 
we will discuss the results for the combined aggression measure.  
Results 
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the correlations between the different 
measures. Unless stated otherwise, the honor concerns questionnaire was used as 
a continuous independent variable and analyses were done on the aggregated 
score on a variable (i.e. aggregated over the eight different insult categories)5.  
Severity and Offensiveness. The severity and offensiveness measures 
were highly correlated (see Table 2.3). More central to our hypothesis, both 
                                                 
5 Similar results were found if we treated the eight insult categories as separate and performed 
Repeated Measures ANCOVAs on the dependent measures, with honor concerns as independent 
variable. Only in the case of the immorality vs. incompetence variable, the results were slightly 
different. The Repeated measures ANCOVA on the immorality-incompetence measure yielded a 
significant effect of honor concerns, F (1, 58) = 5.58, p = .022, ηp
2 = .09 indicating that higher 
honor concerns caused people to feel more immoral than incompetent about themselves. 
Moreover, the linear between-subjects effect of insult categories was also significant F (1, 58) = 
4.09, p = .048, ηp
2 = .07 and was qualified by a significant interactional effect of honor concerns 
and the insult categories F (1, 58) = 6.12, p = .016, ηp
2 = .09. This means that there was also an 
increase in the precedence of morality over competence in self-perception as insults became 
more severe, and that this effect was mainly present among those high in honor concerns.  
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variables were also significantly correlated with honor, as predicted. This means 
that people with high honor concerns considered the insults more severe and 
more offending than participants with low honor concerns.  
 
Table 2.3  










Severity .59**     
Offensivenes .48** .85**    
Imm-Inc .25* .24 .35**   
Avoid .15 .35** .47** .13  
Aggress -.07 .03 -.02 -.06 -.40** 
Note. n = 61, ** p < .001, * p < .05,  
 
Immoral vs. incompetent. There was also a significant correlation 
between this variable and the honor concerns measure (see Table 2.3). Those 
with higher honor concerns thus reported to be more strongly harmed in terms of 
morality (I am a bad human being) than competence (I am a stupid human 
being) compared to those with low honor concerns after being insulted.  
Interestingly, and in line with our hypothesis, this variable also correlated 
significantly with the offensiveness measure but not with the severity measure. 
To further explore the relation between honor, offensiveness and severity of the 
insults, and the precedence of morality vs. competence devaluations, these 
variables were entered in a multiple mediation analysis as recommended by 
Preacher and Hayes (2008). The mediation analysis (see Table 2.4) indicated 
that offensiveness completely mediated the effect of honor concerns on the 
primacy of the morality evaluation. The results also indicated that the contrast 
between offensiveness and severity of the insults is significant and there is no 
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meditational effect of the latter variable6. These findings are all in line with our 
hypothesis that the extent to which high honor participants consider an insult to 
be more strongly damaging for their sense of morality rather than competence is 
due to the fact that they consider the insults more offensive, but not because they 
consider them more severe.  
 
Table 2.4  
Mediational effect of honor concerns on immorality-incompetence through 
offensiveness and severity of insults 
 B SE t p BCa 95 % 
CI 
Total effect ..08 .04 2.00 .04  
Indirect effect of Offensiveness .08 .04 2.07* .03 .02 - .23 
Indirect effect of Severity -.05 .04 -1.26* n.s. -.24 - .02 
Contrast  .13 .08 1.73* .08 .01 - .47 
Direct effect .05 .04 1.14 n.s.  
Note. n = 61; Bootstrap = 5000, BCa = Bias Corrected and accelerated, 
* = Sobel Z 
 
Avoidance and Aggression. As can be expected, the correlation between 
the behavioral inclinations of avoidance and aggression was significantly 
negative (see Table 2.3). Moreover, it is clear that participants indicated a 
                                                 
6 Additional analyses showed that competence and morality evaluations separately did not 
correlate with the proposed independent variable, honor concerns (rs < .18, ps > .15). This 
means that the significant correlation between honor concerns and the morality vs. 
incompetence measure is really due to the difference between those two domains and not due 
to one or the other. Also as can be expected from the mediation analysis, only the correlation 
between morality and offensiveness was significant (r = .37, p = .003). The correlation with 
competence was not significant (r = .21, p = .11). 
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stronger preference for avoidance in response to more severe and offensive 
insults, while there was no relation between these two appraisal dimensions and 
aggression. However, we did not find a significant correlation between the 
measure of honor concerns and participants’ behavioral inclinations. This means 
that honor concerns did not affect our participants’ preference to either aggress 
or avoid after being insulted.  
Discussion 
In Study 2.2, insults collected in Study 2.1 were used to examine the 
different emotional and behavioral responses participants would report in 
reaction to these insults. Responses were compared between participants with 
respect to their honor concerns. High-honor participants reported stronger 
negative emotions such as being hurt and offended after being insulted than low-
honor participants. These findings highlight the notion that the maintenance of a 
positive social image is considered more important in honor cultures and 
offenses to one’s image harm a person’s feelings (Beersma, et al., 2003).  
Interestingly we found that the behavioral responses to the insult do not 
necessarily align with the appraisals. Despite the fact that they were more 
offended, participants in the high-honor group were not more likely to indicate 
to engage in aggressive behavior, nor would employ more avoidant strategies. It 
is possible that we did not find any differences on the behavioral scales, because 
participants only rated the insults without a specific context or scenario in which 
they would be expected to respond to the insult. However, it might also be that 
those high in honor inhibited their initial behavioral tendencies as a way to 
prevent possible escalation (see also Cohen, et al., 1999). We will return to this 
issue in the General Discussion. 
More relevant to our hypotheses, we found that honor values influence the 
way participants interpret the insult. After being insulted, high-honor 
participants experience a stronger sense of immorality than a lack of 
competence, compared to low-honor participants. Moreover we demonstrated 
that this difference between high and low-honor participants was due to the fact 
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that the same insult is considered more offensive to high-honor participants. 
This finding supports the results of Study 2.1 and our notion that moral concerns 
have more primacy in relation to competence among high-honor people, because 
of their heightened concern for being treated with respect and not be offended.  
General discussion 
In our research, we focused on two central domains of judgment 
formation, morality and competence (Wojciszke, 2005) and we elaborated on 
the notion that morality generally plays a more central role in social evaluations 
than competence (Ellemers, et al., 2008; Leach, et al., 2007; Wojciszke, et al., 
1998). We hypothesized that, given their heightened concerns for the prevention 
of offensive behavior and the preservation of honor, respect, and social image, 
people with high honor values will consider morality even more central than 
competence, compared to those with low honor values. We examined this 
hypothesis by investigating both intercultural and interpersonal differences in 
honor values across two studies.  
Results of both studies indicated that when confronted with a norm 
transgression, be it cutting in line or insolence, this leads to a stronger feeling of 
being offended if one adheres more strongly to honor values. These findings are 
in line with some of the previous research in which it has been demonstrated that 
some insults elicit more shame in those high in honor compared to those low in 
honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b).  
Both studies also revealed that when honor plays an important role — as 
cultural or interpersonal variable — people tend to give precedence to norms 
relating to morality than to competence when judging others and themselves 
after being insulted. When confronted with an offensive transgression (Study 
2.1), high-honor participants considered the same transgressor to be more 
immoral than incompetent when compared to low-honor participants. Moreover, 
after receiving insults themselves (Study 2.2), high-honor participants reported 
to perceive themselves as more immoral than incompetent, compared to low-
honor participants. Further analyses demonstrated that the offensiveness of the 
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insult accounts for why people with high honor values consider the same offense 
to indicate immorality more than incompetence. This was found for judging both 
others as the self. 
These findings have implications for a better understanding of honor 
related differences in social evaluations and responses to insults. Our results 
indicate that there is truly more at stake for high-honor people in the face of 
insults. They not only have to endure more negative emotional consequences 
when they are insulted such as feeling offended. They also are more likely to 
consider the matter to be a case of moral failure. A cautionary conclusion might 
be that aggressive responses to an insult may thus be a way of maintaining moral 
standards, since evaluations on this domain have important implications for 
emotions and behavior in many contexts (Ellemers, et al., 2008; Leach, et al., 
2007). We know from recent research that shame following moral failure results 
in self-defensive motivation and other-condemnation when people are concerned 
with their social image (Gausel & Leach, 2011). Additionally, conforming to 
moral group norms is an important way to secure in-group respect (Pagliaro, et 
al., 2011), which is particularly important for those high in honor. Although our 
data do not clearly link moral failure to behavioral tendencies, they are a first 
step in more clearly understanding and classifying honor-related behaviors and 
motivations in response to insults. 
Our results also indicate that after an insult, a dispute might more readily 
develop into a matter of what is good or bad instead of who is right or wrong. 
We know from previous research that disputes that revolve around differing 
values and moral convictions — as opposed to conflict of interest — are more 
detrimental and harder to resolve (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Kouzakova, et al., 
2012). Research on moral value conflicts may thus better inform us on how to 
prevent honor related conflicts from emerging and how they can be resolved 
once they have arisen. 
Another implication of the current findings is that interventions aimed at 
buffering a person's moral concerns might be effective in countering the 
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negative consequences associated with being insulted among those high in 
honor. This knowledge might be particularly relevant for interventions during 
intense conflicts, in which parties are likely to express negative or demeaning 
views towards each other. For example, prior to negotiations, mediators might 
employ such interventions to buffer moral concerns and prevent the need to 
aggress or retaliate when confronted with an insulting counterpart. A final 
implication of these studies is that the interplay of honor and insults are not only 
restricted to culture or ethnicity. Even among Dutch participants, we were able 
to show that those who endorsed honor to a greater extent reported more 
negative experience and moral devaluation than those who endorsed honor to a 
lower extent. As a result, concerns for the maintenance and protection of one’s 
social image, reputation, and honor are relevant for conflict development and 
conflict resolution across different contexts.  
Interestingly, our results also indicate that mere negative experiences do 
not directly lead to more aggression. These findings may at first seem 
irreconcilable with general findings in previous research demonstrating that 
honor culture members show more vigorous responses to confrontational 
episodes and offenses (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2008). However, these earlier findings too are not completely 
consistent, as in some studies honor culture members responded more 
vigorously to insults than non-honor culture members, but also seemed to 
demonstrate less confrontational behavior before an insult was uttered or at least 
in the initial stages of conflict (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1999; 
Harinck, et al., 2013). For example, Beersma and colleagues (Beersma, et al., 
2003) found that insults lead to more aggressive behavior in high-honor 
participants than in low-honor participants. However, this effect was mostly 
driven by the observation that high-honor participants were much less likely to 
react aggressively than low-honor participants when they were not insulted. 
Interactions reported by Cohen and colleagues on measures of dominance and 
aggression — firmness of handshake, distance at which subjects give way — 
56 | Chapter 2 
 
also show this similar pattern (Cohen, et al., 1996). They seem to be at least 
equally driven by less dominant and aggressive behavior of the honor culture 
participants when they are not insulted. Moreover, in some previous studies, 
participants were asked to think back to specific situations in which their honor 
had undeniably been harmed (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008), while in our 
studies participants might have chosen to distance themselves from the situation 
by opting to ignore the insults or walk away, before sufficient harm was done to 
their honor.  
It is important to realize that we do not state that high-honor culture 
members are more moral than low-honor culture members. Most of the research 
on the relation between social identity concerns and the primacy of morality is 
conducted in what we in this study consider low-honor cultures, confirming the 
primacy of morality in these cultures as well (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; 
Ellemers, et al., 2008; Leach, et al., 2007; Pagliaro, et al., 2011). We underline 
these notions, and we argued and demonstrated that the primacy of morality in 
relation to competence is even stronger in high-honor cultures compared to low-
honor cultures following an insult. We also demonstrated that this primacy is the 
result of the greater vigilance towards offenses and higher concerns for treating 
and being treated with honor and respect.  
Strengths and limitations 
In two studies we demonstrated that when honor concerns are high, 
people tend to devalue others and themselves more readily in terms of morality 
than competence after being insulted. Thus we were able to take two different 
perspectives in order to disentangle the effect of insults on social judgment 
formation. By using insults produced in Study 2.1 by a culturally diverse 
sample, we were also able to present participants in Study 2.2 with stimuli 
which were genuine and fitting in a confrontational episode. Moreover, the fact 
that we used a community sample in this study adds to the possibility to 
generalize these findings.  
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Another strength of this research is that in Study 2.1 group membership 
(high vs. low honor) was confirmed by differences on the honor concerns 
questionnaire, corroborating ethnic differences in honor endorsement. However, 
the use of different cultural samples may also limit the accuracy of the reported 
results, as there is less control over other variables that covary with culture 
which may contribute to the differences we found. Moreover, we did not assess 
dignity values of our low-honor culture sample in order to distinguish the two 
cultural groups more evidently.  
Therefore, in Study 2.2, we used the honor scale as an individual-
difference variable within one culture. By using this latter method, we can more 
effectively show that indeed differences in honor values drive the effect. The use 
of a mono-cultural sample by itself does not necessarily inform us on cultural 
differences based on ethnicity. However, endorsement of honor is not 
necessarily tied to cultural ethnicity but can also develop at the meso level. Two 
examples are the culture of honor in the US South (Cohen, et al., 1996), and the 
Street culture in inner cities (Anderson, 1994). In both cases, a subculture of 
honor has developed within a broader cultural system, but as a result of the same 
contextual factors (i.e., limited resources, competitiveness, lack of central law 
enforcement). Second, as argued in previous studies (e.g. Rodriguez Mosquera, 
et al., 2002a) and in the current paper, honor concerns are prevalent in all 
cultures, but there are cultural differences in the way they are construed and in 
their relative importance. Thus, by using one cultural sample, we can more 
effectively show that indeed differences in honor values drive the effect.  
Conclusion 
Through the examination of social evaluative domains after an offensive 
episode, our studies reveal that morality and competence play different roles for 
different people in the same situation. People who adhere to honor judge more 
readily in terms of morality than people who adhere to a lesser extent to honor, 
as is apparent by their responses to and evaluations of norm-transgressing 
behavior and after verbal abuse. These findings advance our theoretical 
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knowledge of intercultural differences and contribute to conflict prevention and 
intervention by demonstrating that abusive behaviors and verbalizations may be 
moralized less among people with low honor values. For those who are 
concerned with their honor however, these insults have a more profound and 
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Abstract 
To investigate the link between honor vs. dignity ideals and reaction to 
insults regardless of a specific cultural context, we experimentally induced 
honor en dignity concerns in participants within one cultural context. Then, 
participants were insulted (or not) during an ostensibly cooperative computer 
task after which cardiovascular indicators of threat and challenge were 
measured. In a following task, participants were given the opportunity express 
their aggression towards the same opponent during a Competitive Reaction 
Time task. When honor was activated, participants experienced threat after 
being insulted and expressed more aggression. When dignity was made salient, 
participants experienced challenge after being insulted and expressed less 
aggression. These results empirically demonstrate that insults instigate a sense 
of threat among those high in (experimentally-induced) honor. 
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Previous research on the way cultural values affect interpersonal behavior 
has shown that people from an honor culture tend to respond with more anger 
and aggression to an offense compared to people from a dignity culture (Cohen, 
et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 1999; Henry, 2009). This pattern is not restricted to 
cultural differences; even within one cultural context, people who strongly 
adhere to honor ideals tend to respond more vigorously to insults and 
provocation, compared to people adhering less to honor (Beersma, et al., 2003; 
IJzerman, et al., 2007). However, little is known about the underlying 
psychological mechanisms driving these effects.  
In the current study, we approach honor-related differences in response to 
insults from a novel perspective by turning to the biopsychosocial model of 
arousal regulation (Blascovich, 2000; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). This model 
distinguishes between two psychological states— challenge and threat — and 
their accompanying physiological states of arousal regulation. In this study we 
examine how insults affect people’s arousal regulation when they are or when 
they are not concerned with honor, by assessing cardiovascular indicators of 
threat and challenge following an encounter in which people received either 
negative or insulting feedback. By doing so, we aim to get a better 
understanding of why people respond more vigorously to insults when their 
honor is at stake.  
Honor 
Honor plays an important role in many societies in how people define 
themselves, the extent to which they are valued by their group and the way they 
interact with other people. Honor is defined as the value of an individual in his 
own eyes, and in the eyes of his society (Pitt-Rivers, 1965). As such, honor — 
besides representing an internal quality — is a social construct. Honor not only 
communicates the esteem of an individual, bestowed upon him or her by others, 
it also communicates the sensitivity of the individual for that same public 
opinion (Gilmore, 1987). Maintaining a positive social image and protecting 
one’s reputation to ensure favorable evaluations is considered key among those 
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adhering to honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000, 2002a). The necessity to 
maintain an honorable reputation and vigilance towards threats to that image is 
something that all honor cultures share.  
Dignity  
 Honor is often contrasted to dignity. Dignity is defined as the value of an 
individual, least equal to that of every other person (Ayers, 1984; Leung & 
Cohen, 2011). Dignity pertains to an internalized sense of moral values and 
guidelines, and less strict social norms. In dignity cultures, it is believed that the 
worth of each individual is intrinsic and stable. People are born with dignity and 
it cannot be taken away by others. Dignity thus entails not having to rely on 
others’ approval in order to be valued. Correspondingly, people are less worried 
about others disapproval to jeopardize their worthiness. People in dignity 
cultures operate more autonomously and are less likely to be influenced by 
others’ opinion than people in honor cultures (Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Leung 
& Cohen, 2011).  
For example, research has shown that in dignity cultures — commonly 
found in western, individualized societies such as the northern parts of the USA 
and Western Europe — a person’s pride is associated with achievement and 
autonomy rather than social interdependence and family reputation (Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002a). Additionally, compared to honor cultures, people in 
dignity cultures tend to show less sensitivity to insults and threats to their honor 
in terms of anger, aggression and the need to restore one’s social image (Cohen, 
et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Van Osch, et al., 2013).  
It is important to note that both ideals of honor and dignity play a part in 
defining their sense of self-worth for most people, regardless of cultural 
background. For example, upholding moral standards (personal integrity) is very 
important for people in both honor and dignity cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, et 
al., 2002b). Additionally, self-esteem has been shown to be linked to social 
evaluative cues such as the sense of being included or excluded, even in dignity 
cultures (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Thus, honor and dignity are 
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both important concepts, though there are differences in the extent to which each 
is considered principal in different cultures. A number of studies have provided 
evidence for the notion that honor is associated with higher sensitivity to self-
threatening situations such as being insulted (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et 
al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). The aim of the current research is 
to identify the psychological impact of such conditions when either honor or 
dignity concerns are salient, in order to better understand how such sensitivity 
can be explained. In particular, we aim to investigate whether a potentially 
offensive situation is considered more threatening by those concerned with 
honor compared to those concerned with dignity.  
Threat vs. Challenge 
According to the psychosocial model of arousal (Blascovich & Tomaka, 
1996), people respond differently to tense situations based on the inference of 
the demands and available resources to cope with said situation. For example, 
when people make the appraisal that they have enough resources to cope 
adequately with the demands of a tense situation, they are more likely to be 
challenged by that situation. However, when people make the appraisal that the 
available resources do not meet the demands required to cope adequately with 
that situation, they will more likely be threatened by the situation.  
The psychosocial model of arousal also posits that each of these 
psychological states is associated with a specific cardiovascular reaction. A 
psychological state of challenge is associated with the activation of the 
sympathetic-adrenal-medullary axis (SAM) resulting in increased cardiac 
performance and decreased vascular resistance. A psychological state of threat is 
also associated with SAM axis activation, accompanied by pituitary-adrenal-
cortical (PAC) axis activation, resulting in increased cardiac performance but 
little to no change or even an increase in vascular resistance (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996; Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002).  
Assessment of cardiovascular indicators of challenge and threat is useful 
in understanding honor-related responses to insults for several reasons. While 
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challenge and threat are both adaptive ways to cope with stress, they result in 
different short-term and long-run outcomes. For example, challenge has been 
linked to performance-approach motivation leading to mobilization of cognitive 
and physical resources and enhanced performance (Chalabaev, Major, Cury, & 
Sarrazin, 2009; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993). On the other 
hand, threat is associated with higher levels of subjective stress, a decrease in 
performance and rigid conflict management (de Wit, Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012; 
Mendes, et al., 2002). Thus, appraising a conflict as a threat may have a very 
different and possibly detrimental effect on the way people manage the situation 
compared to when they experience challenge.  
Cardiovascular measures also have merits beyond traditional self-reports 
and behavioral indicators. First, cardiovascular indicators provide us with online 
measurements which can be assessed right at the relevant moment. This allows 
us to gauge appraisals during tense and complex situations such as possibly 
offensive interaction. Second, cardiovascular indicators are gathered 
unobtrusively; because participants are unaware of the exact moment of 
measurement, they are less able to manipulate or inhibit their response (Mendes, 
et al., 2002). Third, threat and challenge are motivational indicators, indicating 
why people respond in a certain way.  
Study 3 
The aim of the current study was to examine the effect of honor concerns 
on psychophysiological indicators and aggression. Previous studies have 
examined these effects more indirectly. For example, there is research linking 
differences in cortisol and testosterone levels to honor, while honor endorsement 
was not assessed (Cohen, et al., 1999). Other studies have assessed honor 
endorsement, but do not report about the direct link between measures of honor 
ideology and aggressive responses to insults (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). 
Moreover, in cross-cultural research, it is often not possible to exclude other 
ethnicity-related factors (such as language barriers and socio-economic status of 
ethnic minorities) as alternative explanations for the results. Therefore, we 
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decided to experimentally activate honor concerns within a single cultural 
setting in order to establish a direct causal link between honor concerns and 
responses to insults.  
We hypothesized that when honor is made salient, insults instigate a sense 
of threat because they are considered a threat to honor (Cohen, et al., 1996). 
Therefore, these participants were expected to show a cardiovascular response 
associated with threat and higher levels of aggression after being insulted. When 
dignity is made salient, we expect a pattern associated with challenge rather than 
threat. Because dignity is associated with less sensitivity toward external 
judgments and evaluations (Kim, et al., 2010), these participants are more likely 
to remain challenged during a demanding task and demonstrate lower levels of 
aggression.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 114 social sciences undergraduate students participated in this 
study. Since it was our aim to activate honor and dignity concerns in one 
cultural setting, 16 nonnative Dutch participants were excluded from analysis. 
Additionally, four participants were excluded because they did not believe our 
cover story that they were working together with a second participant. This 
resulted in a total of 94 participants with gender and age distributed equally 
among conditions (76 female, age M = 19.35, SD = 1.87). The study had a two 
(ideal condition: honor vs. dignity) by two (feedback condition: insult vs. 
control) between subject design.  
Instruments and procedure 
After entering the lab, participants were informed about the nature of the 
study and the additional measurement of cardiovascular indicators. To avoid 
suspicion about the actual procedure, we informed them that the study 
concerned the effect of digital communication on cooperation. Participants were 
told that they would be paired with a random second participant whom they did 
not know, and would perform two tasks together. After consenting, participants 
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were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, placed in individual cubicles 
and ECG (cardiac performance), ICG (impedance) and blood pressure sensors 
were attached to them. During the first five minutes of the experiment, 
participants were told to relax and watch a short clip while baseline measures 
were collected.  
Next, to make participant’s honor vs. dignity concerns salient, we used an 
experimental manipulation. Participants first responded to a set of leading 
questions (see also Libby & Eibach, 2002; Shafa, Harinck, Ellemers, & 
Beersma, under review) to invoke agreement with honor vs. dignity ideals. The 
topic of each question was matched in both conditions, but the formulation of 
the question was such that it would either represent an honor ideal in the honor 
condition (e.g., My value as a person also depends on how others value me) or a 
dignity ideal in the dignity conditions (e.g., Other people cannot take away my 
value as a person). Next, participants were asked to think about and describe a 
personal situation in which they needed to maintain a positive reputation in the 
honor condition and a positive self-image in the dignity condition. A similar 
versions of this manipulation has been used previously to successfully activate 
or deactivate honor concerns in a Dutch sample (Shafa, et al., under review). 
Additionally, we pretested the current manipulation in a pilot study. Results 
indicated that participants in receiving the honor manipulation scored 
significantly higher (M = 5.07, SD = .86) on a questionnaire assessing family 
honor, F(1, 28) = 4.27, p = .05, ηp
2 = .14 (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b) 
than participants receiving the dignity manipulation (M = 4.16, SD = 1.41), but 
were not affected in their level of self-esteem, F(1, 28) = .33, p = .57 
(Rosenberg, 1979).  
 This ideal manipulation was followed by the first cooperation task, which 
consisted of three rounds. In each round, participants were (supposedly 
randomly) assigned to solving a series of ten word puzzles and forwarding their 
answers to their collaborator via a network connection, who had to use these 
answers to solve a mystery question. Participants were told that, to mimic the 
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restriction of real digital communication, interactions were limited to two 
instances of feedback per round from the question solver to the puzzle solver 
through an internal chat system. Participants were in fact not matched to another 
participant, but received preprogrammed responses. This way, participants were 
always at the receiving end of six instances of feedback. Two of these instances 
(first and third instance) were equal for both feedback conditions and reported 
what the mystery questions were. The other four instances varied across 
feedback condition. In the control condition, participants received neutral 
feedback about their performance (e.g., “Are you managing?”). In the insulting 
feedback condition, participants received four instances of offensive feedback 
about their performance (e.g., “You’re turning this into a fucking mess.”). Some 
of the word puzzles were fairly difficult to answer correctly, so all participants 
were bound to make mistakes, which made the negative feedback more credible.  
Directly after the first task, participants were asked to evaluate this part of 
the cooperation by recording a video message using the webcam. The goal of 
this task was to create a motivated performance situation in order to assess 
cardiovascular indicators (Blascovich, 2000; de Wit, et al., 2012; Scheepers, 
2009). After one minute, a ‘continue’ button appeared at the bottom of the 
screen so participants were able to continue with the experiment when done 
recording. If not stopped by the participants, the recording would continue for a 
maximum duration of three minutes.  
After the speech task, participants started the second cooperation task 
with the same supposed collaborator. This was in fact the Competitive Reaction 
Time Task (CRT; Meier, Robinson, & Wilkowski, 2006; Taylor, 1967). This 
task is played over 25 trials, in which participants have to react as quickly as 
possible to a stimulus appearing on the screen. Whoever responds quicker in a 
trial is allowed to send a dose of white noise to the opponent, which is played 
back through a headphone. Participants select the intensity of each noise burst – 
from 60 dB to 105 dB with increments of five dB - at the beginning of each 
round. The intensity selected by participants has been validated as a measure of 
68 | Chapter 3 
 
aggression against the opponent (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Meier, et al., 
2006). Participants always win the first trial of this task and then randomly win 
or lose the following 24 trials. We programmed the noise intensity as such that 
after losing, participants would receive a steadily climbing noise level over the 
course of the task, in order to mimic conflict escalation (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998).  
After completion of the second task, the network connection was 
supposedly terminated and participants continued individually. At this point, the 
effectiveness of the honor/dignity manipulation and participants’ self-esteem 
was assessed, followed by an open-ended question allowing for the participants 
to make comments on the previous tasks. Participants who were suspicious 
about the actual existence of another participant were excluded from analyses. In 
the end, participants were fully debriefed, thanked and rewarded (€ 5 or course 
credits).  
Measures 
Physiological indicators. Cardiovascular signals were recorded at 1000 
Hz using a Biopac MP150 system (Biopac Systems Inc., Goleta, CA). ECG 
signals were recorded with two spot electrodes on the anterior torso using an 
EKG100C amplifier (Biopac Systems Inc., Goleta, CA). ICG signals were 
recorded with four spot electrodes on the posterior torso using a NICO100C 
amplifier (Biopac Systems Inc. Goleta, CA). Systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure were measured with an inflatable finger cuff around the middle phalanx 
of participant’s non-preferred middle finger using a Nexfin HD system (Bmeye 
B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands). The ECG, ICG and blood pressure signals 
were recorded with Acknowledge software (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA). All 
data were scored blind to condition using Matlab and AMS-IMP software (Free 
University, The Netherlands). After first inspection of the data, signals that 
could not be scored due to movement artifacts or measurement error were 
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rejected7. In order to ascertain the required engagement in the motivated 
performance task, we recorded the number of heart beats per minute and (HR) 
and calculated pre-ejection period (PEP, interval between electrical stimulation 
and opening of the aortic valve) by determining the time between the Q-point in 
the ECG and the B-point in the ICG (de Wit, et al., 2012). The combination of a 
significant rise in HR and a significant drop in PEP during a task (compared to a 
baseline measure) indicates motivated performance.  
To assess challenge and threat, we also calculated cardiac output (CO, 
volume of blood pumped by the heart in one minute), and total peripheral 
resistance (TPR, overall vascular resistance), following a standard procedure 
(Sherwood, et al., 1990). In line with standard practice (Blascovich, 2000; 
Scheepers, 2009; Sherwood, et al., 1990), cardiovascular indicators of threat and 
challenge were assessed after subtracting the final minute of the baseline 
measure from the first minute of the video speech task, which was our motivated 
performance situation. These measures were then used to calculate a Threat 
Challenge Index (TCI). To do so, z-scores were calculated for both measures at 
first. Next, we gave CO a weight of 1 and TPR a weight of -1 and calculated the 
sum of these two figures. As such, a positive score on this index indicates a 
challenge response while a negative score indicates a threat response (de Wit, et 
al., 2012; Seery, Weisbuch, Hetenyi, & Blascovich, 2010).  
Aggression. The level of noise bursts administered during the 
Competitive Reaction Time task (Taylor, 1967) were used as an indication of 
participants’ aggression towards their supposed opponent. This measure varied 
between 60 dB and 105 dB. In some research the first noise burst is analyzed 
separately from the remaining 24 noise bursts while in other research all trials 
                                                 
7 The cardiovascular data of 15 participants could not be scored reliably due to poor ICG or 
blood pressure signals. Four participants were removed from analysis because their HR or 
TPR reactivity scores differed more than 3,5 standard deviations from the mean. This resulted 
in 75 participants’ whose physiological data could be analyzed reliably.  
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are averaged. (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Meier, et al., 2006). For the 
purpose of conciseness, we will only discus the results pertaining to the average 
measure. The reported results were similar in the first trial and approached 
significance. However, neither including nor excluding the first trial affected the 
significance of the findings for the average noise administered.  
Anger. Four items were used to measure how angry participants were 
during the task (e.g., To what extent were you upset, angry, annoyed, 
aggravated?) as a way to assess their response to the feedback they received. 
This scale (α = .85) was measured on seven-point scales (1= not at all; 7 = very 
much).  
Honor concerns. Three items of the family honor concerns questionnaire 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b) were used to assess participants honor 
values (α = .50). For example, an item in this honor domain was: To what extent 
would it harm your self-worth if you were known as someone who is not able to 
protect your family’s reputation. Answers were given on seven-point scales (1= 
not at all; 7 = very much). We focused on this domain because previous research 
has shown that this domain is most likely to differentiate between honor and 
dignity culture values (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; Rodriguez Mosquera, 
et al., 2002b).  
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1979). This scale consists of ten items (α = .93) and measures 
self-esteem with both positively and negatively worded items (e.g., On the 
whole, I am satisfied with myself). This scale was measured using seven-point 
scales (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree). We added this measure to control 
for possible interfering effects of our experimental manipulations and the 
offensive remarks. 
Additionally, participant’s gender, age and place of birth were recorded. 
All control variables were measured at the end of the procedure. 
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Results 
Unless reported otherwise, we analyzed data using ANOVA, with ideal 
condition and feedback condition as independent variables. Results are 
discussed in chronological order; descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.1.  
Motivated performance. We assessed engagement during the video task 
by contrasting the HR and PEP scores of the baseline measure to the HR and 
PEP scores of the video task using dependent sample t-tests. During the speech 
task, HR rose significantly t(74) = -8.89, p < .001, r = .72 and PEP dropped 
significantly t(74) = 8.90, p < .001, r = .72 compared to the baseline. These 
results indicate that the speech task was indeed a motivated performance task, 
enabling us to assess cardiovascular indicators of threat and challenge during 
this period.  
 
Figure 3.1 
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(see Figure 3.1) show that, as expected participants in the honor condition who 
were insulted showed cardiovascular reactivity associated with a threat state (M 
= -0.25, SD = 1.77), while those who were not insulted appeared to be more 
challenged (M = 0.25, SD = 1.72). Interestingly, and according to our 
expectations, this pattern was reversed in the dignity condition, where insulted 
participants seemed more challenged (M = 0.37, SD = 1.01) compared to the not 
insulted participants who were more threatened (M = -0.48, SD = 1.38).  
Aggression. There was a significant interaction effect, F(1, 90) = 3.99, p 
= .049, ηp
2 = .04 on the noise level administered by participants. Inspection of 
the means (see Table1) using simple effect analyses indicated that insulted 
participants in the honor condition administered higher levels of white noise (M 
= 75.94, SD = 12.89) compared to not insulted participants (M = 68.81, SD = 
11.43; F(1, 92) = 3.83, p = .053, ηp
2 = .04). This difference between insulted (M 
= 70.11, SD = 11.89) and not insulted participants (M = 72.50, SD = 9.29) was 
not present in the dignity condition F(1, 92) = .60, p = .44. As expected and in 
line with previous research, the honor group responded with more aggression 
after an insult, while an insult had little impact on aggression among those in the 
dignity group.  
Anger. We assessed group differences in the extent to which participants 
reported anger after the procedure. There was a significant interaction effect of 
ideal and feedback F(1, 90) = 4.49, p = .037, ηp
2 = .05 (see Table 4.1). 
Interestingly, simple effect analyses showed that participants in the honor insult 
condition reported to be less angry (M = 3.03, SD = 1.28) compared to 
participants in the honor control condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.37; F(1, 92) = 
5.95, p = .017, ηp
2 = .06 ). This difference was however not present between the 
dignity insult condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.31) and the dignity control condition 
(M = 3.51, SD = 1.16; F(1, 92) = .15, p = .69)8. There were no significant main 
effects (all Fs < 2.56, ps > .11).  
                                                 
8 Adding the anger scale to the analyses of aggression or cardiovascular indicators as a 
covariate resulted in similar outcomes.  
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Honor concerns. We did not find any significant effects on the honor 
concerns scale (all Fs < 1, ps > .43). Contrary to expectation, participants in the 
honor condition did not report higher honor concerns (M = 4.74, SD = .89) 
compared to participants in the dignity condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.02).  
Self-esteem. We did not find any differences on the self-esteem scale. 
The analysis yielded no significant effects (all Fs < 1.22, ps > .27), indicating 
that the ideal manipulation nor the type of received feedback affected 
participants’ self-esteem.  
Discussion 
In the current study, we experimentally activated honor or dignity 
concerns in a group of (dignity-culture) participants and we assessed 
cardiovascular indicators of threat and challenge as well as behavioral indicators 
of aggression in response to insulting feedback. Assessment of cardiovascular 
indicators demonstrated that when honor was made salient, a tense situation 
such as an offensive encounter is more likely to instigate a threat response. On 
the other hand, when dignity is made salient, offensive remarks rather instigate a 
challenge response. These findings are novel because they are one of the first to 
establish a direct link between activation of honor concerns and the differential 
appraisals of insults, even when a sense of honor is experimentally activated.  
Surprisingly, the effects on the cardiovascular indicators reversed in the 
control condition, where participants received critical—but not insulting—
feedback. While participants in the honor-control condition showed a challenge 
response, participants in the dignity-control condition showed a threat response. 
This pattern might be explained by the specific characteristics of the task, 
combined with the way participants interpret the feedback depending on whether 
honor or dignity was made salient. The feedback conveyed two messages; a 
content-related evaluation about the participants’ performance on the task, and a 
social evaluation of the participant by the other person. Participants in the honor 
condition were supposed to rely more on the social evaluation and where thus 
threatened by the insulting feedback and challenged by the non-insulting 
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feedback. Participants in the dignity condition were supposed to focus more on 
the content-related evaluation. As a result, they may have experienced threat in 
the critical condition when they realized they were performing poorly on the 
task. However, they became challenged in the insult condition, perhaps because 
this type of negative social evaluation is considered ‘over-the-top’ and 
inappropriate, so they may have discounted the insulting feedback.  
As expected, when honor was made salient, participants responded with 
higher levels of aggression towards a supposed antagonist who insulted them 
compared to when they received non-insulting feedback. These results are 
indirect evidence for the effectiveness of the honor manipulation and in line with 
previous research on honor. These results not only conceptually replicate the 
finding that insulting honor results in more aggression, but also corroborate that 
the lowest levels of aggression are found in the honor-no-insult condition (see 
also Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). This reoccurring 
observation has nevertheless received very little attention so far.  
A surprising finding was the low amount of anger in the honor-insult 
condition. Since participants in this condition felt more threatened and expressed 
more aggression, one would also expect higher levels of anger. However, there 
is prior research showing that anger following offensive encounters subsides 
more quickly among those from an honor culture, once the anger has been 
expressed, while it tends to linger when it is not expressed (Cohen, et al., 1999). 
It might be the case that participants in the honor-insult condition let go of their 
resentment once they had to chance to express it by administering higher levels 
of white noise.  
The current study adds to previous research on honor and dignity by 
establishing a more direct link between both honor and dignity ideals and 
responses to insults. By using a manipulation of honor and dignity concerns, 
rather than comparing people with different cultural backgrounds, we can 
discard interfering effects of differences associated with regional background or 
societal position. Additionally, we incorporate for the first time cardiovascular 
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measures of arousal regulation into the honor-dignity framework, demonstrating 
that insults instigate a threat response when someone’s honor is at stake. As 
previous research has shown, a state of threat is associated with numerous 
detrimental consequences such as higher levels of subjective stress, diminished 
performance, and the tendency to behave rigidly in the course of conflicts 
(Chalabaev, et al., 2009; de Wit, et al., 2012; Mendes, et al., 2002; Tomaka, 
Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997).  
Additionally, we were able to activate honor concerns and evoke 
aggression to insults among a group of people who all live in a dignity culture 
and who are generally less affected by insults. It would be interesting to also 
consider the alternative; whether it is possible to create an experimental 
manipulation for people from an honor culture to become less sensitive to 
insults. Such a manipulation is not only interesting from a theoretical or 
experimental perspective, but it may also form the basis for an intervention that 
can be used to ease conflict management and negotiation in potentially honor-
threatening situations.  
 However, there are also some limitations to this study. For example, we 
did not find any significant correlations between the behavioral measure of 
aggression and the cardiovascular indicators. This lack of covariance between 
physiological indicators and traditional — behavioral or self-report — measures 
is not uncommon in psychophysiological research (Mendes, et al., 2002; 
Scheepers, 2009), but does not necessarily invalidate each of the two types of 
measures. As Scheepers concludes, cardiovascular indicators are unconscious 
markers of a certain psychological states, but they do not necessarily have to 
lead to other outcomes associated with these states. Additionally, the reported 
effects on the cardiovascular indicators were largest in the dignity condition. 
This might be due to the fact that we employed a dignity manipulation as well, 
to activate dignity ideals in a group of participants that are known to endorse 
dignity ideals by default. Possibly, re-emphasizing these concerns amplified the 
outcomes in that condition.  
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Conclusion 
Experiencing an offensive encounter has a different impact on people who 
are concerned with honor compared to those who are concerned with dignity. 
People who are concerned with honor show a physiological threat reaction and 
approach an insulter more aggressively —compared to people who are 
concerned with dignity. Interestingly, once this aggression was expressed and 
had served its function, participants were more likely to let go of their 
resentment. These findings inform us about the underlying psychological 
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“Honor is like an island, rugged and without a beach; 









This chapter is based on: Shafa, S., Harinck, F., Ellemers, N., & Beersma, B. (under review). 
Regulating honor in the face of insults.
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Abstract 
Previous research has examined honor-related responses prior to and after 
an insult but little is known about what underlying mechanisms explain this 
behavior. We connect honor concerns to Self-Regulation Theory and we argue 
that honor is associated with prevention focus in an escalatory setting. In three 
studies, we investigated the role of prevention focus as a motivator of obliging 
behavior prior to and aggressive behavior after conflict escalation among those 
high in honor. In Study 4.1 we found higher levels of prevention focus among 
high-honor participants, compared to low-honor participants, in a community 
sample. In two following studies we experimentally activated honor concerns 
and demonstrated that indeed, those high in honor were more accommodating in 
their initial approach to a conflict (Study 4.2), but showed more aggression once 
they engaged in an actual insulting interaction (Study 4.3). Additionally, both 
types of responses proved to be (at least partially) driven by higher levels of 
prevention focus. Our findings provide initial empirical support for the idea that 
when honor is at stake, prevention concerns relate to obliging responses before 
as well as aggressive responses after conflict escalation following insults.  
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In Western culture, honor is considered a somewhat archaic concept, 
mostly applicable to very specific groups or organizations such as the military. 
However, in many cultures, honor is a very important societal concept, 
prescribing normative behavior and guiding social conduct in all levels of 
society (Peristiany, 1965). In these so-called honor cultures, grave importance is 
attached to social image and reputation of the individual as well as the family 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000, 2002a).  
Previous research has focused on the influence of honor-culture 
endorsement and the way people respond to insults. After being insulted, 
members of honor cultures tend to become angrier and show more aggression 
than members of non-honor cultures (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Cohen, et al., 
1996; Van Osch, et al., 2013). This response is not limited to cultural 
differences. Even within the same cultural context, people who are more 
concerned with honor tend to respond more vigorously and competitively to 
insults (Beersma, et al., 2003; IJzerman, et al., 2007). Most studies report that 
those who adhere strongly to honor are not only more antagonistic after an 
insult, but also more friendly or cooperative when there is no insult (see also 
Harinck, et al., 2013); however, this latter observation has attracted less 
attention. Moreover, the effect of insults on cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
responses has been documented extensively, yet it is still unknown which 
underlying psychological mechanisms might explain these effects.  
The goal of the current research is to provide a new perspective on honor-
related conflict escalation after an insult by connecting it to Regulatory Focus 
Theory (Higgins, 1997). In this paper we present both correlational and 
experimental research to assess this mechanism. Moreover, by experimentally 
inducing salience of honor concerns in participants with a similar cultural 
background, we isolate the effect of honor from other cultural differences. This 
allows us to examine the processes of maintaining and protecting honor in the 
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face of insults and specify the role of the underlying psychological mechanisms 
involved.  
Honor 
Traditionally, cultural psychologists differentiate between cultures on the 
basis of seminal international value research by Hofstede and colleagues 
(Hofstede, 1980; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007a; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; 
Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). This line of work examines differences in cultural 
values such as individualism vs. collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power 
distance. More recently, there is more focus on an alternative approach that 
emphasizes cultural logics rather than values. These logics may be particularly 
informative because they weave together a “constellation of shared beliefs, 
values, behaviors, practices, and so on that are organized around a central 
theme” (Leung & Cohen, 2011, p. 508).  
One such theme is the logic of honor. Based on anthropological research, 
honor has been defined as ‘the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the 
eyes of his society’ (Pitt-Rivers, 1965, p. 21). In honor cultures, a person’s 
worth is defined in terms of his claim to honor but also the extent to which he is 
considered honorable by his society (Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965). This 
means that honor has both an internal and an external component. Honor cannot 
be claimed unless it is acknowledged by others – likewise it can be taken away 
if it is challenged by others (Miller, 1993). Therefore, members of honor 
cultures particularly strive for positive social evaluations and a good reputation, 
because positive social evaluations are an important source of their sense of 
worthiness. 
Research has also shown that honor can refer to different personal and 
relational domains, such as personal integrity, masculine, and feminine honor 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a, 2002b). Nevertheless, the domain that is 
especially relevant to people’s worth in honor cultures is family honor 
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(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000, 2002b). In the current research, we focus on 
this domain, because previous research has demonstrated that this domain is 
culturally the most central part of honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Additionally, recent research has 
demonstrated that it is not masculine honor but family honor that predicts 
aggressive responses towards insults in Mediterranean cultures (Van Osch, et 
al., 2013).  
Honor and insults 
Previous research has examined honor-related responses to insults. This 
work demonstrated that high-honor participants become more upset, are 
physiologically more primed for aggression, and respond more vigorously and 
more competitively after being insulted compared to low-honor participants 
(Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; IJzerman, et al., 2007; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2008). These results clearly illustrate that people who endorse 
honor are more inclined to react strongly to insults. Nevertheless, there is also 
evidence that prior to or in the absence of an insult the pattern is reversed. For 
example, in their study Cohen and colleagues observed that, prior to being 
insulted, honor culture members were more polite and friendly than non-honor 
culture members (Cohen, et al., 1996). Whereas this line of research has 
traditionally focused on the finding that honor culture participants respond more 
aggressively after being insulted, the differences obtained can also be explained 
by the obliging behavior of the honor culture participants who were not insulted. 
Moreover, Beersma and colleagues (2003) also highlight that relative 
cooperativeness is observed among those high in honor. In their study, honor 
concerns were negatively correlated with competitive conflict intentions. 
Additionally, recent research by Harinck and colleagues corroborates that in the 
absence of an insult, honor-culture members handle a conflict situation more 
constructively than non-honor culture members (Harinck, et al., 2013).  
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Thus, although most researchers have emphasized that honor endorsement 
can elicit aggression-related outcomes, we also focus on the other side of the 
same coin, by examining whether the absence of insults is associated with more 
obliging and constructive behavior among honor culture members (Harinck, et 
al., 2013). We also argue that these seemingly incompatible responses actually 
result from the same underlying psychological mechanism, relating to the way in 
which people strive to achieve or maintain their honor-related goals. Thus, our 
aim is to identify the motivational inclinations that drive obliging as well as 
aggressive behavior and why those concerned with honor respond so differently 
prior to and after an insult.  
Preventing loss of honor 
We propose that when honor is salient, preventing loss of honor is the 
reason why people respond more obligingly prior to an insult, while this also 
explains why they respond more vigorously after an insult. This notion can help 
reconcile seemingly inconsistent results to date. As stated before, preventing 
loss of honor is an important concern among those who endorse honor values. 
Because honor is transient and relies on social affirmation, people concerned 
with their honor and reputation may experience that they have more to lose than 
people who are less concerned with their honor. In fact, Leung and Cohen 
(2011) argued that in honor cultures, those who are not concerned with opinions 
of others are considered unworthy of honor. Operating obligingly and cautiously 
in interactions can help to remain in other people’s grace as a way to ensure a 
positive evaluation. Accordingly, it has been suggested that norms of 
friendliness in honor cultures effectively prevent unintended threat to other 
people’s esteem resulting in spirals of aggressive responses (Cohen & Vandello, 
2004; Cohen, et al., 1999).  
Conversely, impugning someone’s honor is a sure way to escalate a tense 
situation. Doing so always involves the risk of retaliatory action, as a threat to 
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honor requires restoration, even if this is by means of violence (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that high-honor participants 
tend to react vigorously to insults as a mean to restore their threatened social 
image after an insult (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). These findings thus 
seem to suggest that honor-related aggression can be used as a self-defensive 
strategy, mainly driven by the motivation to prevent an undesired outcome: the 
loss of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Hayes & Lee, 2005).  
If honor indeed activates concerns for the maintenance and protection of 
reputation, this should be apparent in the motivational inclinations that drive 
people’s behavior, especially in a potentially escalatory situation. However, to 
our knowledge most of the prior research has examined outcome behavior 
following an insult. Therefore, little is known about the distinct motives of high-
honor vs. low-honor people in such situations. To shed further light on these 
issues, we build on insights from Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997) to 
inform us on why and how people pursue honor-related goals in the face of 
insults. The novelty of this approach is that it explicates the process of 
maintaining honor in different phases of a possibly insulting situation. 
Regulatory Focus Theory 
According to Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), people are 
motivated to make their current state match a desired end state. However, the 
strategies that people employ to reach desired goal strongly depend on the 
specific characteristics of their goal. Higgins (1997) distinguishes between end 
states that can be characterized as ideal goals (goals associated with nurturance, 
growth and gains) and ought goals (goals associated with safety, responsibility 
and losses). Each type of goal elicits a different focus, which is characterized by 
different strategies, resulting in different emotions when the desired end state is 
or is not achieved. People who strive for ideal goals adopt a promotion focus. 
They eagerly pursue gains and avoid non-gains, are willing to take risks to 
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achieve their desired outcome and they experience elation when they reach their 
goal and dejection when they do not. In contrast, people striving for ought goals 
adopt a prevention focus as they pursue non-losses and avoid losses, and are 
cautious and vigilant to prevent the undesired outcome. They experience 
quiescence when they reach their desired end state and agitation when they do 
not. Thus, Regulatory Focus Theory informs us on the motivational inclinations 
that people employ to pursue specific end states that are construed as ideal vs. 
ought goals (Higgins, 1996, 1997). It also specifies between cognitive as well as 
emotional indicators of both foci.  
In the context of the present research, goal achievement through 
prevention focus is particularly relevant. Activation of prevention focus strongly 
motivates people to prevent negative outcomes. They are prepared to go to great 
lengths to achieve such goals, because prevention goals are more likely to be 
considered a necessity (Zaal, Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). Thus, this 
focus elicits strong negative feelings when prevention goals are thwarted, and 
can even result in risky or destructive behavior (Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007; 
Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). We argue that in the context 
of a conflict, a prevention focus should elicit behavior aiming to prevent conflict 
escalation. Demonstrating obliging or cooperative behavior is a safe way to 
avoid an overt confrontation, because it shows good will and is more likely to be 
reciprocated with cooperation compared to competitive or dominating behavior. 
However, once the tension reaches a point where threat becomes imminent, 
people with strong prevention focus would be inclined to do whatever it takes to 
limit the negative consequences, even by lashing out (see also Keller, Hurst, & 
Uskul, 2008; Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007; Zaal, et al., 2011).  
Only a few scholars to date have addressed the link between regulatory 
focus theory and cultural values, so that empirical evidence supporting our 
reasoning is scarce (see also Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, & Hori, 2009; 
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Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). Nevertheless, considering the particular concerns 
associated with the maintenance and protection of honor, our central hypothesis 
is that those who endorse honor to a greater extent will also be more prevention 
focused, especially in situation where honor is under threat, such as during an 
emerging conflict. That is, as honor seems a necessary commodity that is hard to 
gain but easy to lose, we expect that concerns for honor will prompt a 
prevention focus (the primary goal being maintaining honor and avoiding the 
loss of honor) during conflicts. In the present research, we investigate how 
honor relates to regulatory focus, emotions, and behaviors in different types of 
escalatory situations. By doing so, we hope to clarify why people who are 
concerned with honor react so differently in non-offensive and offensive 
situations.  
We emphasize that our reasoning applies to possibly offensive situations 
in particular. Indeed we do not wish to suggest that honor always instigates 
prevention focus. While honor concerns can certainly raise promotion goals, we 
argue that the salience of honor is relatively likely to raise a preoccupation with 
prevention of loss of honor especially in potentially offensive social interactions.  
Present research 
In three studies, we examined the predicted link between honor concerns 
and prevention focus, and how this impacts on emotions and behavior in 
different stages of conflict escalation. In a first exploratory study, we compared 
individuals from an honor-culture to individuals from a non-honor culture to 
relate cultural differences in honor endorsement to regulatory focus preferences. 
In the second study, we examined how honor affects initial approaches to 
possibly escalatory situations. We connected the salience of honor to emotions 
and conflict intentions to examine responses in a setting that had the potential to 
escalate but had not escalated yet. In the third study, we immersed participants 
in an escalatory situation to assess resulting emotions and behavioral indicators 
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of aggression (administration of white noise). By separating responses to pre-
offensive situations from those to explicitly offensive interactions, we aim to 
shed light on the process of conflict development and reveal whether the same 
underlying mechanisms could account for different responses in each phase.  
Study 4.1 
In the first study we assessed honor-related differences in regulatory focus 
among a community sample of honor culture and non-honor culture members. 
We hypothesized that participants from an honor culture should endorse honor 
concerns to a greater extent than non-honor culture participants. We also 
expected honor-culture members to subscribe to prevention focus goals more 
than non-honor culture members and that honor concerns would relate to 
prevention focus, but we did not expect any differences on promotion focus.  
Participants and Design 
Participants were recruited in public spaces around Leiden Central Station 
in The Netherlands to take part in a larger general web survey on cultural 
differences in conflict behavior. In order to do so, they wrote down their email 
address and the link to the online survey website was emailed to them. A total of 
186 participants took part in the survey, but only 128 participants fully 
completed the survey (68.8%). For the purpose of the current study we only 
analyzed the responses of participants that could clearly be classified as 
representatives of a low-honor or high-honor culture group. Participants from 
Middle Eastern (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; n = 8; 8 %) or 
Mediterranean (e.g., Turkey and Morocco; n = 34; 34,4 %) origin were 
classified as high-honor. Dutch participants (n = 57; 57.6 %) constituted the 
low-honor group. It is common practice to use this group as a control sample 
when examining honor concerns (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a, 2002b). This 
procedure resulted in ninety-nine participants whose further response could be 
Regulating honor in the face of insults | 89 
 
related to honor concerns. Honor vs. non-honor participants did not differ in 
terms of age (M = 24.18, SD = 7.62) and gender (Female N = 64; 64,6 %). We 
employed a between-participants design, comparing high-honor culture 
participants to low-honor culture participants. 
Procedure 
Participants were briefed about the goal of the survey and consented to 
voluntary participation. They were also informed that those who completed the 
full survey, could contend in a lottery to obtain one of five gift certificates worth 
€50, -. Winners were contacted via email and the gift certificates were mailed to 
them. The measures of interest for this study (except for demographics) were 
gathered at the beginning and thus they were not influenced by the content of the 
survey. All items were measured using seven point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). 
Measures 
Honor concerns. Honor concerns were measured by a truncated version 
of the family honor concerns scale (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). This 
scale consisted of three items (α = .76) and measured concerns for the central 
domain of family honor. For example, an item in this honor domain was: To 
what extent would it harm your self-worth if you were known as someone who is 
not able to protect your family’s reputation
9.  
                                                 
9 In all three studies, we also included three other honor domains (social integrity, masculine 
honor, and feminine honor). In general, the effects for these domains were not as strong and 
as consistent as those on the family honor domain. This in line with previous research on 
honor concerns indicating that particularly the concern for family honor distinguishes non-
honor cultures such as the Netherlands from honor cultures in Middle-Eastern and 
Mediterranean countries (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 
2002a, 2002b). Additional results concerning other honor domains are available upon request.  
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Regulatory focus. Prevention focus (I do not take risks often, security is 
a core criterion I care for and I always follow rules and regulations, α = .57) 
and promotion focus (e.g., For me the big picture is more important than the 
details, If I really want to achieve a goal, I’ll find a way and I like trying out new 
things, (α = .24) were assessed with three items derived from a recent measure 
developed by Sassenberg and colleagues (Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 
2012).  
Results 
Honor concerns. Analysis of variance of the honor concerns scale 
yielded a significant culture effect, F(1, 97) = 15.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10. 
Participants in the high-honor cultural group indeed reported being more 
concerned about their honor (M = 5.72, SD = 1.10) than participants in the low-
honor cultural group (M = 4.84, SD = .75).  
Regulatory focus. Results of an ANOVA revealed that there was a 
significant difference in the amount of prevention focus reported, F(1, 97) = 
4.70, p = .033, ηp
2 = .05. These results indicate that as expected, high-honor 
culture participants (M = 5.23, SD = .88) were more prevention-focused than 
low-honor culture members (M = 4.79, SD = 1.05). There was no difference 
between the two groups on the promotion focus measure (high honor M = 4.90, 
SD = .89; low honor M = 4.90, SD = .93; F < 1).  
Honor and regulatory focus. We assessed the direct relationship 
between honor concerns and regulatory focus. For that purpose we calculated 
the correlations between honor concerns and the two regulatory foci separately. 
Results indicated that honor concerns were positively correlated with prevention 
focus (r = .27, p = .007), while the correlation between honor concerns and 
promotion focus was not significant (r = .14, n.s.). As predicted, these results 
indicate that higher levels of honor concerns are associated with higher levels of 
prevention focus, but not necessarily different levels of promotion focus.  
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Discussion 
Results of this first study offer preliminary evidence in line with our 
reasoning. Participants from an honor culture reported more prevention focus, 
confirming our hypothesis that honor is associated with prevention focus. 
Interestingly, honor concerns correlated with prevention focus but not with 
promotion focus, but this might also be due to the fact that the honor concern 
items were formulated in terms of undesirable outcomes. In general, the 
outcomes are in line with the idea that, on a cultural level, honor concerns are 
associated with a heightened prevention focus.  
One limitation of this study however, was the low internal consistency of 
the regulatory focus measures, particularly for promotion focus. This measure 
has been validated in previous research (Sassenberg, et al., 2012). However, our 
decision to use a truncated form to keep the length of the survey to an acceptable 
level for a community sample, might have diminished the scale's internal 
consistency. Therefore, we used alternative scales to measure regulatory focus in 
Study 4.2.  
Furthermore, although comparing cultural groups in a community sample 
allows for a comparison with high ‘face validity’, it is difficult to rule out the 
contribution of other possible factors (e.g., language deficiency or societal status 
of minority groups). Therefore, in studies 2 and 3 we used an experimental 
manipulation to make honor concerns more salient within participants from a 
similar cultural background in order to exclude other cultural differences as 
possible explanatory factors and to validate our causal predictions. To our 
knowledge, this is a new method in honor research which allows us to eliminate 
confounding aspects of cultural differences that are not honor related (see also 
IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
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Study 4.2 
In Study 4.2, we set out to investigate the connection between honor 
concerns, emotional responses, and behavioral inclinations in a situation which 
has the potential to escalate but has not escalated yet. In this study, we only 
selected non-honor culture members of Dutch origin. Because the Netherlands is 
known as a prototypically Western and individualistic culture the Dutch seem to 
embrace the ideal of dignity rather than honor (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011). 
Dignity pertains to someone’s internally defined worth, something that cannot 
be taken away by others (IJzerman & Cohen, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
Within dignity cultures, honor concerns are generally less salient. Nevertheless, 
research has shown that the notion of honor does exist in such cultures and may 
be activated under certain circumstances (Beersma, et al., 2003; IJzerman, et al., 
2007; Shafa, Harinck, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2014). We take advantage of this 
possibility by making honor concerns more salient using an experimental 
manipulation, to pinpoint the psychological implications of honor concerns 
while ruling out other cultural artifacts. 
We assessed how participants with experimentally induced honor 
concerns would approach a possibly escalatory situation and we considered the 
role of prevention focus in this process. We expected that high-honor 
participants would adopt a more de-escalatory approach to a possibly escalatory 
situation, particularly if the possibility of escalation is implicit rather than 
explicit. We also expected prevention focus to mediate this effect.  
Participants 
Ninety students of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Leiden University 
participated in this study. After first inspection of the data, 11 participants were 
identified as having an ethnic background associated with an honor culture. To 
maintain the cultural homogeneity of our sample and prevent confounding 
effects of different cultural backgrounds on the honor manipulation, they were 
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excluded from analysis. Additionally, five participants were excluded from 
analysis because they did not comply with the instructions of the experimental 
manipulation. The final dataset consisted of seventy-four non-honor culture 
participants (56 female, 75.7 %, Mage = 20.85, SDage = 3.37). Gender and age 
were equally distributed among conditions.  
Design 
The study had a 2 (honor condition: low honor vs. high honor) by 2 
(response condition: explicit escalation vs. implicit escalation) factorial design 
and was conducted using a paper and pencil survey and conflict scenarios.  
Materials and Procedure 
This study was part of a series of unrelated lab experiments. After 
consenting, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions 
and received a booklet containing the questionnaire. All measures were assessed 
using seven point scales, unless stated otherwise. 
Honor manipulation. The first part of the survey consisted of a 
manipulation to activate low honor vs. high honor in participants (see Appendix 
4.1). According to theory, the value of people in an honor culture is 1) based on 
the personal adherence to the honor code and 2) depends on their social value in 
the eyes of others (Beersma, et al., 2003; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). 
The manipulation was developed to capture both these aspects of honor 
concerns. To this effect, we first asked participants to indicate their agreement 
with a series of honor code related statements. To make honor more or less 
salient, the items were identical in content across the conditions, but phrased in 
such a way that participants would be inclined to indicate agreement (high-
honor) or disagreement (low-honor) depending on the experimental condition 
('leading questionnaire', see also Libby & Eibach, 2002). For example, in the 
high-honor condition, statements were formulated moderately, such as Values 
such as honor and respect are important. This statement should elicit some 
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agreement even among non-honor culture participants. Conversely, the same 
statement was formulated very extremely in the low-honor condition as Values 
such as honor and respect are more important than the law, which should elicit 
general disagreement among non-honor culture participants. Thus, by phrasing 
honor statements such that participants would be inclined to endorse or reject 
them, we intended to activate or deactivate their endorsement of the honor code. 
The second step of the manipulation aimed to activate or deactivate 
socially conferred worth in participants (Lee, et al., 2000). Participants in the 
high-honor condition were asked to think about a situation in which their 
primary concern was to maintain a positive social image. Participants in the low-
honor condition were asked to recollect a personal situation in which it was very 
important to them to maintain a positive self-image. Participants were instructed 
to describe the situation and explain why it was important for them to maintain 
their reputation or self-image. In summary, 1) elicited agreement with honor 
statements and 2) a focus on reputation were used to activate honor concerns. 
On the other hand 1) elicited disagreement with honor statements and 2) a focus 
on self-image were used to suppress honor concerns .10  
We note that both elements are part of this manipulation to reflect the 
consequence of honor concerns in full. Thus, we did not aim to establish their 
                                                 
10 In both Study 4.2 and 4.3, participants in the high-honor condition indeed tended to agree 
with the moderate honor statements (means between 5 and 6), while participants in the low-
honor condition mostly disagreed with the extreme honor-statements (means between 2 and 3; 
ps < .001). The reported situations in response to the open manipulation questions in both 
studies concerned mostly academic performance or relational struggles. However, as 
instructed, in the high-honor condition, people reported concerns in terms of social pressure 
(appearing competent, impressing colleagues or parents, maintain ‘playboy’ reputation); while 
in the low honor-condition, concerns were related to maintaining a positive self-image 
(maintaining confident, being perseverant, not becoming insecure) 
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separate effects in this study. Additionally, there is little construct validity in 
separating the two steps. Emphasizing socially conferred worth without the 
honor statements may also activate ‘face’ ideals (Leung & Cohen, 2011), while 
only eliciting agreement with honor statements would not activate honor as 
effectively if socially conferred worth was not made salient.  
Vignettes and response manipulation. In the next part of the survey, 
participants read a description of an argument. We randomly assigned all 
participants to one of two different versions to make sure our findings were not 
restricted to one particular conflict situation. Half of the participants were asked 
to imagine getting into an argument with a neighbor, who made noise playing a 
musical instrument while they were studying. The other half of the participants 
were invited to imagine getting into an argument with a fellow student who had 
not completed his/her part of an assignment while the deadline was approaching. 
After reading the scenario, we measured participants’ regulatory strategy to deal 
with the situation (Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah, & Brazy, 2007). 
We then introduced the response manipulation. In the scenario involving 
the noisy neighbor, the neighbor’s alleged response was: “Why don’t you go 
study in the library?” in the implicit escalation condition. In the explicit 
escalation condition the same response was presented, followed by the insult 
“sourpuss” (“zeurpiet” in Dutch). In the student scenario, the student allegedly 
responded: “I thought we were supposed do this together.” in the implicit 
escalation condition. In the explicit escalation condition, the same response was 
presented, followed by the insult “backstabber” (“matennaaier” in Dutch).  
Directly after reading this response we assessed management intentions 
and the perceived offensiveness of the response. Next, we assessed participants’ 
regulatory focus after the opponent’s response by asking them to indicate to 
what extent they experienced emotions associated with prevention and 
promotion focus (Higgins, 1997; Shah & Higgins, 2001). Finally, we assessed 
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the effectiveness of the honor manipulation with the honor concerns scale and 
collected demographics (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). Participants were 
then debriefed, thanked, and rewarded course credit for their cooperation. 
Measures 
Honor manipulation check. For reasons discussed in Study 4.1 and in 
order to be consistent over the three studies, we focused on the same three-item 
scale as in Study 4.1 (α = .79), to assess the effectiveness of the honor 
manipulation (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b).  
Regulatory strategy. We asked participants which strategy they were 
likely to adopt in such a situation, using the Regulatory Strategy scale 
(Sassenberg, et al., 2007) with five bipolar items measured on nine-point scales 
(α = .68). Each item was represented by a promotion focus strategy at one end 
and a prevention focus strategy at the other end (e.g., 1 = take risks, 9 = be 
cautious or 1 = go for security, 9 = go for success (r)). The closer a participant’s 
score to the promotion end of the scale, the higher their reported inclination 
towards promotion strategy and vice versa. The midpoint of the scale indicated 
that participants did not prefer one type of regulatory strategy over the other. 
Items were recoded so that higher scores always indicated a stronger preference 
for prevention strategies. 
Response manipulation check. Three items were used to test the 
effectiveness of the response manipulation (α = .68). These items measured to 
what extent participants would be offended, experienced conflict, and 
experienced disagreement after their opponent’s response.  
Conflict management. We used the DUTCH (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, 
Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001) to assess participants’ conflict management intentions. 
This questionnaire measures the preference for the conflict management 
strategies of avoiding (e.g., I avoid a confrontation on our disagreement, α = 
.68), dominating (e.g., I pursue my own goal, α = .79), compromising (e.g., I 
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insist on compromising, α = .80), integrating (e.g., I work towards a solution 
that serves both our purposes, α = .82), and accommodating (e.g., I try to 
accommodate my opponent, α = .81). Each subscale consists of four items (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much). 
Regulatory emotions focus emotions after response. We measured 
emotions associated with regulatory focus using four items per focus. 
Participants were asked to what extent they would experience each emotion in 
the given situation (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The prevention focus 
emotions were calm(r), at ease(r), nervous, and agitated (α = .80). The 
promotion focus emotions were content(r), joyful(r), discouraged, and upset (α 
= .61). Because the emotions pertained to a possibly offensive and therefore 
negative context, items were recoded as such that higher scores indicated more 
negative emotional response11.  
Results 
Controlling for the type of conflict scenario participants received did not 
affect any of the results reported below. Therefore, data were collapsed across 
the two scenarios for further analysis. We performed ANOVAs on all dependent 
variables with honor condition and response condition as independent variables, 
unless stated otherwise. 
Honor manipulation check. There was only a significant effect of honor 
condition on activation of honor concerns, F(1, 70) = 4.41, p = .039, ηp
2 = .06. 
Participants in the high-honor condition reported having significantly higher 
honor concerns (M = 4.78, SD = 1.38) than participants in the low-honor 
                                                 
11 A factor analysis for all eight emotion items resulted in two factors separating the positive 
valence items from the negative valence items. However, a factor analysis for the positive 
valence and negative valence items separately clustered the promotion emotions into one 
category and the prevention emotions into another for both the positively-valenced and the 
negatively-valenced items. This was the case for both Study 4.2 and 4.3. 
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condition (M = 4.13, SD = 1.23); the honor manipulation thus proved to be 
effective. No other effects were significant (Fs < 1.68, ps > .21)  
Regulatory strategy. After reading the scenario, but before reading their 
opponent’s response, participants were asked to report their initial regulatory 
strategy to deal with the conflict at hand. There was a significant main effect of 
honor condition on regulatory strategy, F(1, 70) = 6.29, p =.014, ηp
2 =.08. 
Participants in the high honor condition (M = 5.12, SD = 1.34) reported a 
stronger inclination to adopt a prevention strategy than participants in the low 
honor condition (M = 4.35, SD = 1.28). The main effect for response condition 
and the honor by response interaction were not significant (Fs <1). These results 
also exclude possible pre-existing regulatory strategy differences in the response 
conditions before the opponent’s response. 
Response manipulation check. There was a main effect of response on 
this measure F(1, 70) = 7.27, p =.009, ηp
2 =.09. Participants in the explicit 
escalation condition took more offense to the conflict (M = 5.24, SD = 1.02) 
than participants in the implicit escalation condition  (M = 4.65, SD = 1.06). The 
main effect of honor condition and the honor by response interaction were not 
significant (Fs < 1). These findings confirm that, as intended, participants in 
both honor conditions considered the explicit response to be more offensive than 
the implicit response.  
Conflict management. We only found significant main effects for honor 
condition on the accommodating and dominating conflict strategies. Participants 
in the high-honor condition reported more accommodating conflict intentions 
(M = 3.64, SD = 1.16) than participants in the low-honor condition (M = 3.01, 
SD = 1.21), F(1, 70) = 3.98, p =.05, ηp
2 =.05. Additionally, participants in the 
high-honor condition reported less dominating conflict intentions (M = 3.43, SD 
= 1.06) than participants in the low-honor condition (M = 4.09, SD = 1.19), F(1, 
70) = 5.79, p =.019, ηp
2 =.08. These results are in line with the reported 
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regulatory strategy and indicate that in general, participants in the high-honor 
group favored a more accommodating and less dominating conflict strategy. No 
other effects were significant (Fs < 2.48, ps > .12)  
Mediating effect of regulatory strategy. We then assessed the mediating 
effect of regulatory strategy on the accommodating and dominating conflict 
strategies, using bootstrapping (1000 samples) as recommended by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004), with honor condition as predictor and regulatory strategy as 
mediator. Regulatory strategy mediated the effect of honor on accommodating 
conflict strategies (point estimate of .16, p = .02, 95% CI = .01 - .52) 
significantly, rendering the original effect of honor on accommodating conflict 
styles non-significant (p = .13). Regulatory strategy did not mediate the effect of 
honor condition on the dominating conflict intentions because regulatory 
strategy did not correlate significantly with this conflict handling style.  
 
Figure 4.1 
 Honor by insult interaction effect on prevention focus emotions 
 
 
Regulatory focus emotions after response. There was a marginally 
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emotions, F(1,70) = 3.83, p = .054, ηp
2 = .05. Simple effect analyses revealed 
that prevention focus emotions were higher among high-honor participants than 
low-honor participants in the explicit escalation condition, F(1,70) = 5.07, p = 
.027, ηp
2 = .07, (Figure 4.1), but equal among high honor and low honor 
participants in the implicit condition, F = .265, ns. Thus the explicit response led 
to more prevention focus emotions, but only in the high-honor condition. As in 
Study 4.1, there were no significant effects of experimental manipulation on 
promotion focus emotions. Means (SD) for the promotion focus emotions were 
M = 5.48 (.72) in the high-honor condition and M = 5.56 (.70) in the low-honor 
condition. None of the other effects were significant (Fs < 1.51, ps > .22).   
Discussion 
In the second study, we effectively manipulated participants’ honor concerns 
within a single cultural setting to disentangle honor concerns from other possible 
cultural differences. We then assessed participant’s regulatory strategy in a 
possibly escalatory situation. Results revealed that activated honor concerns 
elicited the adoption of prevention strategies. In line with previous work on 
honor and conflict management (Beersma, et al., 2003; Harinck, et al., 2013), 
results of this study also showed that those high in honor initially favored a more 
de-escalatory approach (more accommodating and less dominating tactics) to 
deal with a possibly escalatory situation. 
The current findings add to this work by elucidating the underlying 
psychological mechanism, since the difference on the accommodating conflict 
management style was mediated by high honor participants’ tendency to adopt a 
prevention strategy to deal with the situation. Interestingly, we also observed 
higher levels of prevention focus emotions after the explicit response among 
those with high honor concerns than those with low honor concerns. This 
difference was not found in the implicit escalation condition, indicating that the 
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focus on preventing undesired outcomes becomes even more intensified when 
possible conflict escalation is more explicit.  
We did not find the expected interaction effect indicating more forceful 
conflict intentions among those high in honor after a disparaging comment was 
made. Possibly, the negative remark was not strong enough to be highly 
offensive. According to recent findings, a mild slight is not likely to elicit a 
hostile response even among those from an honor culture (Cross, et al., 2013).  
The current findings are a first step in better understanding the 
motivations underlying the processes of escalatory vs. de-escalatory behavior 
among those high in honor. Results point out that when honor concerns are high 
people initially favor a more de-escalatory approach to a possibly conflictual 
situation because they want to prevent undesirable outcomes, i.e. conflict 
escalation and the possible loss of one’s honor. Notably, the reported effects 
were found on two different measures of regulatory focus, across two different 
conflict scenarios, and both before and after the opponent’s response, thereby 
validating our findings beyond one particular setting.  
Study 4.3 
Results of Study 4.2 demonstrated that, when honor concerns are salient, 
the initial approach to a possibly escalatory situation is more likely de-escalatory 
than when honor is not salient. In Study 4.3 we set out to examine the dynamics 
of conflict escalation and to identify whether higher levels of aggression are 
driven by the same mechanism that drives de-escalatory behavior in the earlier 
stages of conflict. Therefore, in our third study we exposed participants to a 
more immersive situation in an interactive experiment with multiple insults and 
actual indicators of aggression. We contrasted responses to insulting feedback 
with responses to critical but non-insulting feedback as well as with a control 
condition with neutral feedback. The purpose of this design was to distinguish 
the effect of insulting feedback from the effect of general negative evaluations. 
102 | Chapter 4 
 
Because insults are especially harmful for a person’s honor (Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002b), we predicted that when honor concerns were activated, 
participants would respond particularly aggressively to an insult and less so 
towards general (non-insulting) negative or neutral feedback. On the other hand, 
when honor concerns were deactivated, participants would consider negative 
and insulting feedback both as equally negative, and thus respond with equal 
levels of aggression, but more so than when receiving neutral feedback.  
Participants 
A total of 136 students were recruited at the Faculty of Social Sciences of 
Leiden University to participate in this study. An inspection of the demographic 
information revealed that eight participants originated from an honor culture. 
They were excluded from the analysis because of confounding effects of their 
cultural background with the honor manipulation. Additionally, six more 
participants were excluded because they expressed explicit suspicion about 
being paired with an actual participant. Thus, the final data set consisted of 122 
participants (89 female, 73 %, Mage = 20.81, SDage = 4.32). Gender and age were 
equally distributed among all four experimental conditions.  
Design 
This experiment had a 2 (honor condition: low honor vs. high honor) by 3 
(feedback condition: neutral vs. negative vs. insulting) between subject design. 
Procedure 
After consenting, participants took place in a cubicle in the lab and were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions. The cover story of this experiment 
was that participants were taking part in an experiment investigating digital 
cooperation, for example over email or instant messaging. They were told that 
they would be randomly paired to another participant, perform two tasks 
together and answer questions about their performance. We then followed a 
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similar procedure as in Study 4.2 to manipulate participants’ honor concerns, 
using the two-stepped manipulation.  
Task 1: feedback. After the honor manipulation participants performed 
two ‘cooperation’ tasks. The first task was a word game during which 
participants received either neutral, or negative, or insulting feedback about their 
performance, supposedly from a participant they were randomly paired with. In 
this task Participant A had to solve ten consecutive word puzzles and send the 
answers to Participant B. Participant B then used those answers as hints to 
answer the questions s/he had received. This game was played on three rounds. 
Participants were told that, in order to replicate the limitations of digital 
communication, Participant A could only communicate to Participant B by 
forwarding his or her answers to Participants B. Participant B could only 
communicate to Participant A by sending feedback to Participant A two times 
during each series of word puzzles. They were told that assignment to be either 
Participant A or B was random. However, participants were in fact playing 
against the computer. All participants were assigned to be Participant A, solve 
the word puzzles and be on the receiving end of feedback. This cover story was 
created to have participants believe they were actually working with someone 
else on a task and to have a credible reason for why they only received 
(insulting) feedback but were not able to give feedback.  
During each series of ten word puzzles participants received feedback 
twice, adding up to a total of six times. In all feedback conditions, the first and 
third instances of feedback were task related and similar, indicating what the 
question was Participant B had to answer. In the remaining instances, 
participants received either neutral feedback (e.g., “Are you managing?”), or 
negative feedback (e.g., “This is of no use to me.”) or insulting feedback (e.g., 
“You’re turning this into a fucking mess.”). The offensiveness of the feedback 
was assessed in a pilot study.  
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Task 2: white noise. The amount of aggression participants displayed 
was measured during the second task of the study. This task, the Competitive 
Reaction time Task (CRT; Meier, et al., 2006; Taylor, 1967), followed directly 
after the first task and was ostensibly performed with the same collaborator. 
Effectively, in this task participants are able to select the intensity of noise they 
want to administer to their opponent through a headphone (dB 60 – dB 105) 
over 25 trials. This task has been validated as a direct measure of aggression in 
previous studies (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Meier, et al., 2006). We 
specifically chose this task because it gives a clear indication of the process of 
escalation as the result of repeated exchanges of aggression over time. We 
followed the same procedure as outlined by Meier and colleagues (Meier, et al., 
2006).  
Next, we assessed participants’ regulatory-focus-related emotions and the 
effectiveness of the honor manipulation. To probe for suspicion about the 
procedure, we included an open-ended question where participants were invited 
to freely comment on their counterpart and the cooperation tasks. Participants 
who indicated doubting the credibility of their counterpart were excluded from 
analysis. Next, participants’ demographics were gathered. Finally, participants 
were debriefed about the actual goal and procedure of the study and rewarded 
with either course credits or € 3, - for their cooperation.  
Measures 
Honor manipulation check. For reasons discussed in Study 4.1 and in 
order to be consistent, we used the same three-item scale as in the previous two 
studies to assess the effectiveness of the honor manipulation (α = .78).  
Noise level. The first noise burst administered usually conveys the initial 
level of aggression, while the level of noise set during the remaining 24 trials 
indicates the level of aggression displayed by participants in response to the 
following interaction during the course of the CRT (Bushman & Baumeister, 
Regulating honor in the face of insults | 105 
 
1998). Therefore, we analyzed the mean noise levels set by participants during 
the first round and throughout the 24 consecutive rounds as separate indicators 
of aggression. Both indicators varied between dB 60 (normal conversation level) 
and dB 105 (fighter jet at 500 feet). In some studies, participants also have the 
option of selecting zero dB of white noise in case they do not want to administer 
any white noise at all (Meier, et al., 2006). In our design the minimum level of 
noise that could be selected was 60 dB. To assess the amount of aggression 
displayed, we only included responses of those participants who at least once set 
the noise level above the bare minimum of 60dB12. 
Regulatory focus emotions. We used the same items as in Study 4.2 to 
measure promotion focus emotions (α = .83) and prevention focus emotions (α = 
.85). Although these emotions were measured after the supposed cooperation 
tasks, we specifically asked participants to what extent they had experienced 
these emotions during the tasks.  
Results 
Honor manipulation check. An ANOVA with honor condition and 
feedback condition as independent variables on the honor concerns scale 
confirmed the effectiveness of the honor manipulation. Participants in the high-
honor condition reported having significantly more honor concerns (M = 5.22, 
SD = 1.06) than participants in the low-honor condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.32); 
F(1, 116) = 6.67, p = .011, ηp
2 = .05. As intended, the main effect of the 
feedback condition and the honor by feedback interaction effect were not 
significant (Fs < 1.43, ps > .25). 
                                                 
12 Analysis of the results including the 19 participants (9 in the high-honor condition), who 
did not administer any white noise above the minimum 60 dB level revealed similar 
outcomes, though the contrast effect on white noise in the honor condition (insult vs. negative 
and neutral feedback) was no longer significant F(1, 57) = 1.70, p = .19, ηp
2 = .03. 
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Noise level. Because of our specific predictions regarding honor-related 
responses, we assessed à priori interaction contrasts, comparing the insult 
condition to the negative and neutral feedback condition in the high-honor 
group, and comparing the insult and negative feedback condition to the neutral 
feedback condition in the low-honor group. The average noise levels set in the 
first and the remaining 24 trials are presented in Table 4.1.  
1
st
 trial. We first analyzed the noise level set by participants during the 
first round of interaction with ANOVA and honor condition and feedback 
condition as independent variables. Neither the main effects, nor the interaction 
contrasts were significant (Fs < 1.99, ps > .14). These results seem to suggest 
that at first, the different kinds of feedback elicit similar kinds of responses in 




Mean dBs of white noise  
  1st trial Remaining 24 trials 
  High-honor Low-honor High-honor Low-honor 
Insult M 72.78 75.53 79.92
a 75.64a 
 (SD) (16.99) (16.40) (12.27) (11.78) 
Negative M 73.61 70.88 72.19
b 76.04a 
 (SD) (9.20) (11.35) (9.78) (12.05) 
Neutral M 69.38 66.33 74.17
b 70.69b 
 (SD) (12.50) (9.35) (7.42) (7.66) 
Note. Means within columns with different superscripts differ significantly. 
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Remaining 24 trials. We then analyzed the average level of noise 
administered throughout the task using ANOVA with honor condition and 
feedback condition as independent variables. The main effects of honor and 
feedback were not significant, although there was an overall trend suggesting 
that the participants in the insult condition (M = 77.72, SD = 12.05) maintained a 
heightened level of aggression throughout the task while this was not the case 
for participants in the neutral feedback condition (M = 72.49, SD = 7.62), F(2, 
97) = 2.34, p = .10, ηp
2 = .05; LSD Post-hoc p = .04. The negative feedback 
condition (M = 74.06, SD = 10.99) did not differ from the other two conditions.  
Even though the overall two-way interaction was not significant F(2, 97) 
= 1.59, p = .21, we proceeded by assessing the predicted honor by feedback 
interaction because we had specified a predicted pattern of mean differences in 
which specific conditions should deviate from the overall pattern. The results of 
this analysis was consistent with our hypotheses. Most clearly, in the high-honor 
group the predicted contrast was significant, indicating that those in the insult 
condition administered significantly higher levels of white noise than those in 
the negative feedback condition and in the neutral feedback condition, F(1, 48) 
= 5.18, p = .027, ηp
2 = .10, (see Table 4.1). In the low-honor condition there was 
a trend towards our hypothesized outcome, indicating that participants in the 
insult and negative feedback condition selected higher levels of noise than 
participants in the neutral feedback conditions, F(1, 47) = 2.92, p = .094, ηp
2 = 
.06. 
Regulatory focus emotions. We used ANOVAs to assess differences on 
the prevention focus and promotion focus emotions with honor condition and 
insult condition as independent variables. As expected and in line with findings 
in Study 4.2, only the interaction effect of honor by feedback condition on 
prevention focus emotions was significant F(2, 116) = 4.82, p = .01, ηp
2 = .08. In 
the high-honor condition the insulting or negative feedback instigated more 
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prevention-focus emotions, while in the low-honor condition the neutral 
feedback instigated more prevention-focus emotions (see Figure 4.2). Simple 
effect analyses revealed that this effect was particularly driven by differences in 
the neutral feedback condition F(1, 116) = 8.18, p = .005, ηp
2 = .07. There were 
no other significant effects on the prevention focus emotions, nor any significant 
effects on the promotion focus emotions (all Fs < 1). Means (SD) for the 
promotion focus emotions were M = 3.32 (1.12) in the high-honor condition and 
M = 3.45 (1.17) in the low-honor condition. 
 
Figure 4.2 
Honor by feedback interaction effect on prevention focus emotion 
 
 
We also analyzed the correlations between regulatory focus emotions and 
the white noise intensity set by participants in the high and low-honor condition 
separately (see Table 4.2). Interestingly, we found different correlations for the 
two conditions. While promotion focus (but not prevention focus) was positively 
and significantly correlated with the noise level set by participants in the low-
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was positively and marginally correlated with noise levels set by participants in 
the high-honor condition (r = .25, p = .074).  
 
Table 4.2  
Correlations between regulatory focus and level of white noise per honor 
condition 
 High honor Low honor 
 1st trial Average 1st trial Average 
Prevention emotions .15 .25
+ .06 03 
Promotion emotions .08 .16 .07 .29
* 
Note. n = 61 in each honor condition, * p < .05; + p < .1 (two sided) 
 
Discussion 
In this third study, we manipulated both honor concerns and type of 
feedback in a fully experimental setting and measured actual behavior. Our 
results replicated those of the previous study, indicating that our honor 
manipulation successfully activated honor concerns even among participants in 
a non-honor culture setting.  
We used a previously validated aggression measure, that is, administering 
white noise (Meier, et al., 2006; Taylor, 1967), to determine participants’ 
hostility when interacting with a supposed fellow participant, who had given 
them insulting, negative, or neutral feedback during a previous task. As 
hypothesized, we demonstrated that particularly those whose honor concerns 
were activated reacted more aggressively to insulting feedback than to negative 
or neutral feedback. Those whose honor concerns were deactivated reacted 
equally aggressive to both insulting and negative feedback, but displayed more 
aggression in these conditions than after neutral feedback. Additionally, the 
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display of higher levels of aggression did not become apparent in the initial 
responses to the insulting feedback, but after multiple rounds of interaction in 
which different levels of white noise were exchanged.   
The results pertaining to regulatory focus partially corroborated our 
previous findings. As expected, in the high-honor condition prevention focus 
emotions were higher in the insulting and negative feedback condition and lower 
for the neutral condition while this pattern was reversed in the low-honor 
condition. Additionally, in the high-honor group aggressive responses were 
significantly correlated with prevention focus emotions, while in the low-honor 
condition aggression was significantly correlated with promotion focus 
emotions. These findings suggest that different motivational processes drive 
responses to insulting feedback when honor concerns are salient or not.  
General discussion 
In three studies we examined the relation between honor, regulatory 
focus, and responses to different types of feedback, distinguishing insulting 
feedback from general negative or neutral feedback. Across three studies we 
found support for the notion that, particularly in a setting that poses a possible 
threat to one’s social image, honor endorsement is associated with prevention 
focus. We showed that those high in honor reported higher overall levels of 
prevention focus, reported higher levels of prevention strategies before engaging 
in conflict, and reported higher levels of prevention focus emotions after an 
explicit confrontation, compared to those low in honor. Moreover, we found that 
among those high in honor prevention focus was associated with initial de-
escalatory tactics to deal with a situation in Study 4.2, while it was also 
associated with aggressive responses to insulting feedback in an open 
confrontation in Study 4.3.  
In sum, when honor concerns are at play, conflict development and 
escalation consist of two distinct steps. While initial reactions to tensions tend to 
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be cooperative and obliging to avoid further escalation, responses can become 
quite hostile after a certain threshold is exceeded (see also Cohen, et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, we provide initial empirical evidence that the activation of 
prevention focus constitutes one of the underlying psychological mechanisms 
that can account for this dynamic. In Study 4.2, the activation of prevention 
focus strategies mediated the relation between honor activation and 
accommodating conflict intentions in a situation that had not yet escalated. 
However, in a more overt and escalatory context, such as in Study 4.3, 
prevention focus emotions among high-honor participants were correlated to 
more aggressive reactions to insulting feedback.  
These findings have important theoretical implications. To our 
knowledge, these findings are among the first to connect prevention focus with 
honor and (defensive) aggression to social devaluations. More specifically, our 
results provide a possible explanation for seemingly contradictory findings that 
have been reported in previous research on the relation between honor and 
cooperative vs. aggressive reactions in a possibly escalatory setting. It seems 
both types of reactions are prevalent and they are driven by the same underlying 
motivational considerations, that is to either prevent a possibly honor 
threatening situation or to restore one’s honor one’s it has been harmed. As 
such, these findings contribute to a better understanding of how cultural values, 
such as honor, affect interpersonal (and probably intergroup) interactions.  
Our findings also have important practical implications relevant to the 
field of intergroup communication and intercultural conflict management. In line 
with previous research (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; Harinck, et 
al., 2013), we found that among those high in honor, there is a considerable 
difference between the initial approach to possibly insulting situations and 
reactions to the factual experience of insults. We demonstrate that two different 
processes might be in operation before and during conflict escalation when 
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honor is at stake. De-escalatory tactics are adopted at first, but can be followed 
up by more vigorous responses when the confrontation becomes more explicit 
and overt. However, there is a risk that people do not correctly detect or interpret 
these signals during the interaction. Obliging behavior can be misinterpreted as a 
sign that all is well, while in fact it communicates vigilance. On the other hand, 
aggression can be interpreted as competitiveness, while in fact it communicates 
the need to repair one's honor.  
This knowledge also means that different interventions tailored to specific 
stages of conflict might be necessary. For example, affirmation tactics might 
work in order to prevent loss of honor due to insults in the initial stages of a 
confrontation and advance constructive competition. However, these 
interventions probably become useless once conflict has escalated. When this is 
the case, other measures, such as apologies or penalties by a third party might be 
more effective to reduce the need for personal retribution. As societies become 
more and more diverse, and people with different cultural backgrounds meet on 
a day-to-day basis, understanding their perspective in these situations and 
predicting their responses as interaction unfolds can help prevent or reduce 
tensions.  
A strength of the current set of studies is that we employed a multi-
method approach. In Study 4.1, we used correlational data to compare 
participants from honor vs. non-honor cultures, while in Study 4.2 and 4.3 honor 
concerns were experimentally manipulated. Additionally, we used a variety of 
measures to capture cognitive as well as emotional aspects of regulatory focus. 
Our dependent measures included self-reports as well as behavioral indicators, 
enabling us to capture subjective interpretations of the situation and actual 
reactions.  
Notably, we used a newly developed honor manipulation. This 
manipulation did not only activate honor concerns on a cognitive and emotional 
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level, but also affected behavior that has been previously linked to culture-based 
honor endorsement. By using this manipulation within one single cultural group, 
we were able to separate the effect of honor concerns from other cultural factors. 
As a result we were able to uncover the underlying psychological mechanisms 
directly pertaining to honor concerns.  
One important limitation however, is that it proved difficult to measure 
situational variations in regulatory focus following our manipulations by means 
of the standard measures of regulatory focus. As a result, some of the reported 
interactions and correlations were weak at best. However, this limitation is 
common in regulatory focus research (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008; Summerville 
& Roese, 2008), as it is difficult to assess situational variances in a subtle 
indicator such as regulatory focus using self-reports.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, our findings highlight that those high in honor initially 
adopt a more de-escalatory approach to a possible confrontation, but show more 
aggression once they were actually offended. Additionally, both types of 
responses are (at least partially) driven by higher levels of prevention focus, or 
the motivation to prevent an undesirable end-state, the loss of honor.  
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Appendix 4.1 
High honor manipulation 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements 
1. Values such as honor and respect are important.  
2. I can understand that sometimes people take matters in their own hands 
when they suffer grievous wrongs.  
3. Shame is a useful emotion. 
4. It is important that people try and maintain a good reputation.  
5. Modesty and courtesy are still important virtues in the current society. 
6. I don’t want my mistakes to have negative consequences for my family’s 
reputation.  
7. I may get worked up when someone insults me intentionally. 
8. Making my family proud is important for me. 
It is well known that how others think about us greatly affects our self-worth. 
Think back to a situation where it was important to you to uphold your 
reputation. Describe that situation and why it was so important to uphold your 
reputation. 
 
Low honor manipulation 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements 
1. Values such as honor and respect are more important than the law. 
2. Whenever someone treats me unfairly, I take matters into my own hands. 
3. Shame is the most important emotion. 
4. People who are not concerned for their reputation do not deserve respect.  
5. Modesty and courtesy are the most important virtues in the current 
society. 
6. Every choice I make has direct consequences for the reputation of my 
family.  
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7. People will have to answer for the consequences, even in case of the 
smallest insults.  
8. The most important thing is that my family is proud of me.  
It is well known that how we think about ourselves strongly affects our self-
worth. Think back to a situation where it was important to you to maintain a 
positive self-image. Describe that situation and why it was so important to 
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Previous research relating honor concerns to conflict escalation has 
revealed that people from an honor culture are more sensitive to confrontational 
or insulting remarks and can respond more aggressively to offences compared 
to people who are not from an honor culture. To date no substantial attempts 
have been made to examine whether and how it may be possible to prevent 
these negative outcomes. We address this gap in the current research. First, a 
correlational study revealed that insult-elicited confrontation is related to an 
essential aspect of honor — the relative importance of social approval in 
defining one’s worth. In a second study, we examine the effectiveness of a 
social affirmation in reducing insult-elicited aggression in an immersive 
paradigm including real insults and behavioral indicators of aggression. We 
show that among honor-culture members, a social affirmation is effective in 
reducing insult-elicited aggression compared to no affirmation at all, while a 
traditional self-affirmation is not. By doing so, we identify a possible 
intervention for limiting the negative ramifications of insulting feedback among 
those from an honor culture. 
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Previous research examining honor-related differences in the way 
conflicts develop and escalate has mainly established that insults and 
provocations elicit more aggressive responses among people who are high in 
honor (Cohen, et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Van Osch, et al., 
2013). At the same time little effort has been made to empirically investigate 
why people high in honor respond more forcefully, or to develop methods that 
might prevent these negative consequences.  
In the current study we aim to identify which self-related concerns are 
responsible for the heightened sensitivity of people from an honor culture 
towards insults and how aggression can be prevented. Based on theoretical 
underpinnings of honor, we distinguish between personal worth — the value of 
a person in his own eyes — and social worth — the value of a person in the 
eyes of others. We connect interpersonal differences in social worth to 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to insulting feedback in a scenario 
study using a correlational design. We will demonstrate that reliance on social 
approval in defining one’s worth makes people vulnerable to (negative) social 
evaluations such as insults. In a second experimental study, we assess the 
effectiveness of a social affirmation in reducing insult-elicited aggression 
among honor-culture participants in an immersive paradigm with real insults 
and behavioral indicators of aggression. This second study examines whether a 
social affirmation significantly reduces insult-elicited aggression compared to a 
control condition, while a personal self-affirmation does not. These findings are 
not only theoretically relevant for cross-cultural and conflict management 
researchers. They can also inform practitioners on ways to develop interventions 
that might prevent, reduce, or resolve conflicts in many day-to-day situations 
where cultural differences might exacerbate conflicts.  
Honor, insults and aggression 
Based on seminal work in anthropology (Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 
1965; Schneider, 1969), social psychologists usually define honor as “…the 
value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society” (Pitt-
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Rivers, 1965, p. 21). This definition highlights an important aspect of honor, 
which is the relative importance of other peoples’ approval in defining a 
person’s self-worth. Honor is a person’s claim to worth, but this worth can only 
be claimed effectively if it is conferred by others (Gilmore, 1987). Cultures in 
which members adhere strongly to honor are considered honor cultures 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a). In these cultures, honor norms dictate 
behavior and people are evaluated according to the extent to which they are 
perceived to adhere to these norms. As such, the maintenance and protection of 
one’s reputation and social image play an important role in social interactions in 
honor cultures. Self-worth in honor cultures thus entails both personal worth (a 
person’s value in their own eyes) and social worth (a person’s value in the eyes 
of others)13.  
Honor cultures are found in different parts of the world such as the 
Middle-East, the Mediterranean, and the southern parts of the United States 
(Leung & Cohen, 2011). According to Cohen and Nisbett (1994) honor cultures 
historically developed in areas with scarce resources and a weak state. In the 
absence of effective law-enforcement, people living in these areas were at high 
risk of being robbed from their livelihood and had to rely on self-protection to 
deter rivals. As such, it became very important to develop a reputation of being 
someone who is not to be taken advantage of, but also as someone who is not 
about to take advantage of others. As Schneider describes in his work on honor 
in Sicily, it was very important for an honor culture member to “(…) 
                                                 
13 Recently, Leung & Cohen (2011) further developed a framework around honor and two 
other cultural ideals, those of dignity and face. Dignity is defined as the value of an 
individual, irrespective of the opinion of others. In dignity cultures, the value of a person is 
inherent at birth and at least equal to that of every other person. Face also concerns the value 
of a person in the eyes of society, but depends more on a person’s position within the greater 
social hierarchy. Face is also not something that is contested; people have face until they lose 
it, but they cannot lose it at the expense of someone else’s face (for a full discussion of these 
two ideals see Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
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demonstrate to others that (1) he is worthy of their trust and loyalty, and (2) that 
he is not a fesso, not to be taken lightly, not to be taken advantage of “ 
(Schneider, 1969, p. 147). 
Personal integrity and assertiveness — especially for males — are hence 
two important domains of honor. Another domain which is considered vital in 
such cultures is family honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002a). Family honor pertains to the good name and reputation 
of one’s family and reciprocally influences the way people are perceived and 
valued in honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000). Upholding one’s 
family honor is essential for honor culture members, particularly in the Middle-
East and the Mediterranean, and these family honor concerns have been shown 
to cause antagonistic responses to honor threats in these cultures (Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002b; Van Osch, et al., 2013).  
The relationship between honor, insults, and aggression has been the 
focal point of most honor research. For example, on 18 November 2013, the key 
words “culture of honor” return 41 hits in Web of Science of articles related to 
honor of which 34 (85%) carry a title or abstract that includes violence, revenge, 
or some reference to aggression. A number of these studies examine insults as 
instigators of threat to one’s honor and the interpersonal ramifications of being 
offended. Early work by Cohen and colleagues for example (Cohen, et al., 
1996) showed that after being insulted, participants from an honor culture 
showed more non-verbal and physiological signs of stress and aggression, 
compared to non-honor culture members. More specifically, the tendency to 
respond more vigorously to insults has been linked to the protection of family 
honor and the need to protect one’s social image in subsequent research 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Van Osch, et al., 2013). Additionally, prior 
research shows that honor-endorsement not only explains intercultural 
differences but also intracultural differences in responding aggressively to 
insults. Even in non-honor cultures, people with high honor values also perceive 
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more threat after an insult and respond more vigorously to it (Beersma, et al., 
2003; IJzerman, et al., 2007).  
In conclusion, previous research has made clear a) that honor is for an 
important part based on social worth, b) that the maintenance and protection of 
positive social evaluations are considered essential in honor cultures, c) that 
insults threaten this sense of social worth and d) insults are met with aggression 
in order to prevent or eliminate their potentially honor-threatening impact. 
At the same time, less attention is usually paid to a recurring finding that 
in the absence of insults or in response to a good deed, people from an honor 
culture are in fact more friendly, forthcoming, and cooperative than non-honor 
culture members (Cohen & Vandello, 2004; Harinck, et al., 2013; Leung & 
Cohen, 2011). In fact, recent research has shown that both obliging responses 
before and aggressive responses after an insult result from the same underlying 
motivational inclination — the need to prevent loss of honor (Shafa, et al., 
under review). This means that honor-related aggression is not insurmountable 
and that there are conditions in which people who attach high value to honor try 
to avoid conflict escalation. The question what motivates this behavior has not 
been answered by research thus far. Additionally, research has not provided 
concrete strategies that might be effective in reducing honor culture members’ 
need to become aggressive in response to an insult. In the current paper, we 
develop such a strategy and assess its effect in an immersive experimental 
paradigm.  
Explaining insult-elicited aggression 
Of particular interest to our studies is the notion that social worth plays an 
important part in defining one’s honor and that insults instigate a threat to this 
social worth. As social worth relies on positive external evaluations, it is a 
commodity that is hard to gain but easy to lose (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As 
such, social worth is transient and vulnerable. Empirical findings support this 
notion, since social disapproval has a more severe impact on people who rely on 
external cues for self-validation than on those who rely on internal cues for self-
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validation (Barnes, et al., 1988; Williams, Schimel, Hayes, & Martens, 2010). 
Internal or personal worth on the other hand is believed to be more stable and 
less vulnerable to external judgments (Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
The distinction between personal worth and social worth has not been 
addressed empirically in previous research examining the impact of insults on 
aggression. In the current paper we connect source of self-worth to affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral responses to insults. We argue that when self-worth 
depends on social approval, as it does when people have high concerns for 
honor, people will be more sensitive to social evaluative cues, making them 
more susceptible to negative consequences of insults. This sensitivity should 
result in more negative affect, more cognitive self-devaluation, and a stronger 
need to respond in a confrontational manner than when self-worth depends on 
internal approval.  
Preventing insult-elicited aggression 
Research has shown that one possible way to relieve the impact of a self-
threat such as an insult is by self-affirmation (Critcher, Dunning, & Armor, 
2010; Henry, 2009). Self-affirmations consist of an array of self-defensive 
strategies for the psyche to maintain its integrity in response to the numerous 
potentially threatening situations that people face (Sherman & Cohen, 2002; 
Steele, 1988). This strategy is also often used by psychologists in experimental 
procedures to decrease the implications of a threatening event for self-integrity 
(for a review, see Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Prior research thus suggests that 
self-affirmation offers a fruitful approach to diminish insult-elicited aggression. 
However, its effect has not been empirically tested in an honor-culture context, 
where self-integrity more strongly relies on external evaluations. We argue that 
a strategy that affirms the social self, rather than the personal self might be more 
effective in honor cultures (see also Hoshino-Browne, et al., 2005). This should 
be the case because vigilance towards insults among honor culture members is 
the result of the vulnerable nature of the self-worth, which for an important part 
relies on social worth. Our approach is novel because this is a first attempt to 
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distinguish different forms of affirmation that should cater for internally and 
socially conferred self-worth.  
Role of self-esteem 
In our studies, we also take into account the level of self-esteem of our 
participants and assess its interplay with source of self-worth. Heretofore, 
research assessing the connection between self-esteem and aggression has 
revealed mixed results (for a review, see Ostrowsky, 2010). On the one hand, 
some studies have shown that low self-esteem rather than high self-esteem is 
associated with aggression (Walker & Bright, 2009; Webster, 2006). Recently 
however, there is more evidence suggesting that high (or inflated) self-esteem 
rather than low elf-esteem is associated with aggressive responses to ego-threats 
(Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; 
Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). It might be that the relation between high self-
esteem and aggression hinges on the extent to which self-esteem is stable or 
vulnerable. For people with high self-esteem have more to lose from an ego-
threat than people with low self-esteem, particularly if self-esteem is vulnerable. 
As discussed before, self-worth that is based on social evaluations, as in honor 
cultures, is more vulnerable than internally defined worth. Therefore, we argue 
that particularly high levels of self-esteem might fuel the relationship between 
reliance on social approval, such as honor, and aggressive responses to ego-
threats or insults.  
Current studies 
In the current paper, we first examined the overall relations between 
source of self-worth, self-esteem, and insult-elicited aggression. In a 
correlational study, we first measured self-esteem and source of self-worth. 
Next, we assessed participants’ emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses 
to different insult scenarios. We hypothesized that, in general, those who highly 
depend on social worth would be negatively affected by the insults, but mainly 
those who depend on social worth and have high self-esteem would respond in a 
confrontational manner. To examine whether source of self-worth and 
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sensitivity to insults covary — irrespective of cultural background — we first 
assessed this relation independent from honor values, that is, within a non-
honor-culture context.  
In a second study, we extended these findings to an honor-culture context 
by focusing on honor-culture participants. We assessed the efficacy of a self-
affirmation and a social affirmation in reducing insult-elicited aggression 
among honor culture members. If socially conferred worth is indeed what 
makes honor-culture members more aggressive after an insult, a social 
affirmation should be effective in reducing insult-elicited aggression while a 
traditional self-affirmation should not. To test this hypothesis, we used an 
immersive experimental paradigm in which participants were actually insulted 
and behavioral indicators of aggression were measured.  
Study 5.1 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited at the Faculty of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences of Leiden University. In total, 135 students participated. Because the 
aim of this study was to examine the hypothesized relation between self-esteem, 
source of self-worth, and aggressive responses to an insult in a homogeneous 
cultural sample, 22 participants with a cultural background other than Dutch 
were excluded from analysis. The final dataset consisted of 113 participants (84 
female, 74.3%; age M = 20.93, SD = 3.47). The study had a within-subject (3 
scenarios) design, with source of self-worth and self-esteem as continuous 
independent variables.  
Instruments and procedure 
Participants were recruited with the cover story that this study was about 
the impact of negative affect on consumer behavior. After entering the lab and 
signing the informed consent, participants were placed in individual cubicles in 
front of a desktop computer. A questionnaire was administered using Qualtrics 
software.  
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After the general instructions, we first measured self-esteem and source 
of self-worth, followed by demographics and some filler questions pertaining to 
consumer behavior. We then presented participants with three different 
scenarios describing an insult. The vignettes were based on freely generated 
insult scenarios as described by Uskul and colleagues (Uskul, et al., 2012) and 
adapted to a setting that would resonate with a student population. In the first 
scenario, a person’s morality was called into question when he/she was falsely 
accused by his/her manager of stealing money from the safe and called a thief. 
In the second scenario, after not being assertive enough, a person’s sociability 
was impugned by a roommate by being called socially inadequate. In the third 
scenario, a person was made to look incompetent in the presence of his/her 
partner and called retarded by a bank employee. We used three different 
scenarios to make sure that our findings were not restricted to one particular 
setting or type of insult. The order in which each insult was presented was 
randomized. Each scenario was followed by the same set of questions assessing 
the offensiveness of the insult and the cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
responses of the participants. Afterwards, participants were informed about the 
true nature of the study, thanked and rewarded with either € 3,- or 1 course 
credit for their participation. 
Measures 
All items were measured using seven-point scales, unless stated 
otherwise.  
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1979). This scale measures trait self-esteem using ten 
positively worded and negatively worded items (e.g., On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself and I feel I do not have much to be proud of’(r); α = .88). 
Items were recoded such that higher scores indicated higher self-esteem. 
Source of worth. We used the Approval of Others scale of the 
Contingencies of Self-worth questionnaire (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & 
Bouvrette, 2003) to assess the extent to which participants relied on internal vs. 
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social evaluations as a source of personal worth. This scale originally consisted 
of three items indicating an internal source of worth (e.g., What others think of 
me has no effect on what I think about myself) and two items indicating an 
external source of self-worth (e.g., I can’t respect myself if others don’t respect 
me). For the purpose of this study, we added a sixth item closely related to 
concerns for honor and assessing participants’ reputational concerns (It is 
important for me to have a good reputation). Reliability analyses showed that 
this item fit well with the original scale (α = .71, α if item deleted = .68). Items 
were recoded such that higher scores indicated a more socially-based sense of 
worth. 
The following measures reappeared after each of the three insult 
vignettes.  
Offensiveness. Participants indicated on three items to what extent they 
considered the scenario to be offensive (I would feel a)offended, b)hurt, 
c)insulted if this would happen to me; α = .44). Higher score in this scale 
indicate more offensiveness.  
Cognitive devaluation. Cognitive devaluation of the self following the 
insult was measured with four items (If this situation would happen to me, I 
would a)evaluate myself in a more negative way, b)feel rejected, c)feel inferior, 
d)feel insecure about myself; α = .69). Higher scores indicate more devaluation 
of the self. 
Negative affect. The affective response to the insult was measured with 
four items (If I would be in this situation, I would be a) upset, b) frustrated, c) 
angry, d) irritated; α = .60). Higher scores indicate more negative affect. 
Behavioral inclinations. Eight items assessed participants’ behavioral 
inclinations in the given scenario. Four items assessed the inclination to 
confront the transgressor (I would a) assert myself, b) confront the wrongdoer, 
c) raise my voice, d) verbally disapprove of the wrongdoer if this would happen 
to me, α = .49). Four items assessed the inclination to behave in an avoidant 
manner (I would a) withdraw from the scene, b) avoid confrontation, c) ignore 
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the wrongdoer, d) avoid a conflict if this would happen to me; α = .69) in 
response to the insult. Confrontation and withdrawal were correlated negatively 
in all three scenarios (r = -.38, r = -.51, and r = -.74 respectively, all ps < .001). 
Therefore we recoded the withdrawal items and combined them into one scale 
in such a way that high scores indicated more confrontation and low scores 
indicated more withdrawal (α = .74). We ran analyses on the separate and 
combined scales. Results were highly similar for both types of analyses. To be 
concise, we will only report the results pertaining to the combined scale. 
Results 
 
Table 5.1  
Descriptive statistics per scenario 
  Morality Sociability Competence 
Offensiveness M 6.24
a 4.65b 6.07a 
SD .92 1.57 1.11 
Cognitive devaluations M 3.11
a 3.40b 3.71c 
SD 1.34 1.45 1.43 
Negative Affect M 5.85
a 4.63b 5.01c 
SD .98 1.34 1.17 
Behavior M 5.38
a 4.91b 5.01b 
SD .91 1.11 1.34 
Note. Means in rows with different signs differ significantly  
 
Descriptive statistics for each scenario and within-subject effects are 
presented in Table 5.1. In general, participants considered the morality insult to 
be most offensive, followed by the competence insult, and the sociability insult. 
Also, the morality insult caused more negative affect and the inclination to 
confront the transgressor more than the other two insults. The self-devaluation 
however, was lowest in this scenario, indicating that participants generally 
rejected this insult the most. Initial inspections revealed that analyzing the 
scenarios separately resulted in the same pattern of outcomes as analyzing the 
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collapsed data, but the latter yielded more robust effects. Therefore, we will 
only discuss the findings pertaining to the collapsed data.  
For the purpose of the following analyses, we first centered source of 
self-worth and self-esteem around their mean and also calculated their centered 
interaction term. Then we regressed our dependent measures on both main 
effects, after which we included the interaction term in the second step. 
Correlations between measures are presented in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2  
Correlations between source of self-worth, self-esteem and dependent measures 
collapsed over scenarios 






Self-esteem -.304**     
Offensiveness .408** -.045    
Cognitive deval. .517**. -.459** .426**   
Negative affect 329** -.185* .708** .435**  
Behavior -.117 .215* .095 -.315** .176
+ 
Note. n = 113, ** p < .01, * p < .05., + p < .1 (two sided) 
 
Offensiveness. For offensiveness, we only found a significant main effect 
for source of self-worth, β = .435, t(112) = 4.76, p < .001, 95% CI = .244 - .533. 
The stronger their reliance on external approval, the more offense participants’ 
took at the insults. The main effect of self-esteem and the interaction effect of 
source of self-worth and self-esteem were not significant (ts < 1).  
Cognitive devaluation. We found significant but opposing main effects 
for source of self-worth and self-esteem on cognitive devaluation. The higher 
their reliance on external approvals, the more participants tended to devalue 
themselves in response to the insults, β = .416, t(112) = 5.20, p < .001, 95% CI 
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= .324 - .721. On the other hand, higher self-esteem led participants to devalue 
themselves to a lesser extent. The interaction effect of source of self-worth and 
self-esteem was not significant (t < 1).  
Negative affect. There was only a significant main effect of source of 
self-worth on negative affect following insults. The higher their reliance on 
external approval as a source of self-worth, the more negative affect participants 
reported after being insulted β = .300, t(112) = 3.19, p = .002, 95% CI = .113 - 
.484. The regression analysis did not yield a significant main effect of self-
esteem nor an interaction between source of self-worth and self-esteem on 
negative affect (ts < 1.13, ns).  
Behavioral inclinations. We found a significant main effect of self-
esteem on behavioral inclinations in response to the insults, indicating that the 
higher their self-esteem, the more inclined participants were to confront the 
transgressor β = .233, t(112) = 2.39, p = .019, 95% CI = .04 - .37. Interestingly, 
we also found a significant interaction of source of self-worth and self-esteem 
on behavior, β = .194, t(112) = 2.08, p = .04, 95% CI = .01 - .32; see Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1.  
Source of self-worth by self-esteem interaction effect on behavioral inclinations 
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Analyses indicated that participants with a more internal source of self-
worth — low on external self-worth — responded equally confrontational to the 
insults, irrespective of their level of self-esteem. However, among participants 
who relied strongly on an external source of self-worth, those with high self-
esteem were more inclined to confront the transgressor while those low in self-
esteem were less inclined to confront and more inclined to avoid the 
transgressor. Additionally, the main effect of source of self-worth was not 
significant.  
Discussion 
In this study, we examined which self-related concerns associated with 
honor — source of self-worth and self-esteem — influence participants’ 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to insults. The findings 
corroborate our predictions that, independent of cultural background, people 
who strongly rely on social approval as a source of self-worth are more 
vulnerable to the negative affective and cognitive consequences of interpersonal 
insults. Interestingly, we also found that among those with an internal source of 
self-worth, high self-esteem might inhibit the need to respond vigorously to 
insults. However, when self-worth relies on external evaluations, high self-
esteem fuels the need to respond more forcefully to insults.  
Study 5.2 
The results of the previous study are conceptually interesting, because 
they are among the first to empirically connect source of self-worth to insult-
elicited cognition, affect, and behavior. However, the study had a correlational 
design and was conducted among a group of participants who have generally 
low endorsement of honor values. Therefore, in a second study, we aimed to 
assess the causal relation between social worth and insult-elicited aggression by 
introducing an experimental manipulation that affects this specific self-related 
concern, i.e., a social affirmation. We assessed to what extent this manipulation 
would be able to prevent insult elicited-aggression in a sample of honor-culture 
participants. We compared its effect to a control condition without any 
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affirmation and to a comparable manipulation that has been forwarded in 
previous literature — a self-affirmation, (Henry, 2009) — but is expected to be 
less effective in reducing insult-elicited aggression if our predictions are valid.  
We hypothesized that a traditional self-affirmation, that instructs people 
to think of characteristics or values that are important to them personally, might 
be less effective in reducing aggression among people who define their worth 
on the basis of external evaluations, as is the case in honor cultures. In such 
contexts it might be more effective to remind people of characteristics that are 
especially praised by important others, i.e. using a social affirmation (see also 
Hoshino-Browne, et al., 2005). As such we expect that the efficacy of a social 
affirmation is related to the extent to which people rely on social evaluations as 
a source of self-worth. Additionally, as self-worth may be more vulnerable 
when it is based on external evaluations, like in honor cultures, a traditional 
self-affirmation might backfire among those with high self-esteem, because it 
inflates the self-esteem, making it more sensitive to ego-threats (Ostrowsky, 
2010). We compared the effect of both types of affirmations to a control 
condition with no affirmation at all.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited at the Faculty of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences of Leiden University. In total, 80 participants with an honor-culture 
background participated. We classified participants who were born in an honor 
culture, and/or whose both parents were born in an honor-culture as honor 
culture participants (Harinck, et al., 2013; Shafa, et al., 2014). All recruited 
participants fit this qualification. Seven participants were excluded from 
analysis because they communicated to us that they did not believe they were 
actually paired with another participant during the study. Two additional 
participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not comply with 
the intervention instructions. The final dataset consisted of 71 honor-culture 
participants with age (M = 22.63, SD = 4.10) and gender (55 female, 77.5%) 
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equally distributed among conditions. The study had a single factorial between-
participants design with three conditions (Affirmation: social affirmation vs. 
self-affirmation vs. control).  
Instruments and procedure 
When participants entered the lab, they were informed that they were 
about to participate in a study investigating the characteristics of digital 
cooperation, such as via mail or online chat. They were told that they would be 
randomly paired with another participant in the lab, whom they did not know or 
meet, and would perform two tasks together. Additionally, they would answer 
questions related to their performance and experience. After consenting, 
participants were placed in individual cubicles in front of a PC and randomly 
assigned to one of the three conditions. All test materials were administered via 
a desktop computer equipped with Authorware 7 and a standard issue 
headphone.  
First, participants answered a number of questions assessing mood, self-
esteem, and source of self-worth. These questions were followed by the 
affirmation manipulation. In the affirmation conditions, participants were 
instructed to think of a situation in which they felt good about themselves 
because of an exceptional achievement or characteristic. In the social 
affirmation condition, participants were instructed to think about when they 
were praised by close others, while in the self-affirmation condition, they were 
instructed to think about a time when they praised themselves (see Appendix 
5.1). They were encouraged to describe that situation in detail and report what it 
was that made them feel good about themselves. In the control condition, 
participants were asked to report which was their favorite movie and why.  
Next, each participant was ostensibly linked to another participant via a 
network connection and performed the two cooperation tasks. These were the 
exact same two tasks as described in Study 3 and 4.3, in which participants 
solve 30 word puzzles on the first task and then engage in a reaction time game 
in the second task (Competitive Reaction Time task, Taylor, 1967). In this study 
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however, all participants received insulting feedback. The second task again 
gauged the level of aggression they tended to express towards that same 
collaborator.  
After these two tasks, the supposed connection between participants was 
terminated, and participants continued by filling out a remaining questionnaire. 
This questionnaire contained an honor concerns measure, a post-measure of 
mood, some questions about their experience of the cooperation, and 
demographics. Afterwards, participants were debriefed about the true nature of 
the study, thanked, and rewarded with either € 3,- or 1 course credit for their 
participation. All measures were assessed using seven-point scales unless stated 
otherwise.  
Measures 
Mood. We used the Dutch version of the Positive and Negative Affect 
scale (F. P. M. L. Peeters, Ponds, & Vermeeren, 1996; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) to measure mood at the beginning and at the end of the 
experiment. This measure consists of 20 items assessing both positive (e.g., 
excited and determined) and negative mood states (e.g., irritated and afraid). 
Exploratory factor analyses indicated that a solution consisting of three factors 
fit our data best in both pre- and the post-measures. Thus we constructed three 
mood scales per measure indicating positive mood (10 items; pre-measure ; α = 
.91.; post-measure ; α = .94), dejection/fear (6 items; pre-measure ; α = .77; 
post-measure ; α = .84) and annoyance (4 items; pre-measure ; α = .60; post-
measure ; α = .70).  
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1979) as in Study 1 (α = .85).  
Source of worth. Besides the Approval of Others scale we used in Study 
1 (α = .86 in this sample), we used three additional scales of the Contingencies 
of Self-worth Questionnaire that were most relevant to the current study and 
cultural sample to measure source of worth. These scales were Family support 
(e.g., It is important to my self-respect that I have a family that cares about me; 
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α = .71), Virtue (e.g., My self-esteem depends on whether or not I follow my 
moral/ethical principles; α = .76), and Competition (e.g., Doing better than 
others gives me a sense of self-respect; α = .93). Each scale consisted of five 
items. We included the additional scales to rule out alternative sources of self-
worth as alternative predictors of our hypothesized outcome.  
Aggression. The level of noise bursts administered throughout the 
Competitive Reaction Time task (Taylor, 1967) was used as an indication of 
participants’ aggression towards their supposed opponent. This measure varied 
between 60 dB and 105 dB. In line with previous research, we analyzed the 
noise level in the first trial separately from the remaining 24 trials (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998; Meier, et al., 2006). The first noise burst most accurately 
reflects the response to the previous insulting interaction, while the advanced 
noise bursts are highly influenced by the preceding noise levels set by the other. 
The levels of noise participants received was set to steadily incline, mimicking 
conflict escalation (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). 
Honor concerns. To measure honor concerns, we used the Family Honor 
Scale of the Honor Concerns questionnaire (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b). 
This scale consisted of five items and assessed to what extent certain honor-
threatening scenarios would harm a person’s self-worth (e.g., To what extent 
would it harm your self-worth if you were known as someone who is not able to 
protect your family’s reputation; α = .66). We focused on this domain because 
previous research has shown that concerns in this domain are the most central 
part of honor in our sample and the reason why they respond aggressively to 
insults (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2012; Van Osch, et al., 2013). Because the 
Family Honor Scale measures stable individual differences, we decided to 
include this scale at the end of the experiment to avoid suspicion about the 
specific focus of the study and to avoid priming the participants with honor.  
Checks. Seven questions assessed how participants had experienced the 
cooperation. Three questions concerned the valence of the cooperation (The 
cooperation with the other participants was pleasant (r), amusing (r), and tense; 
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α = .74) and three questions assessed the extent to which participants were 
offended by the feedback they received (I was offend by/angry with the other 
participant and I wanted to punish the other participant; α = .72). Finally, 
participants were encouraged to evaluate the cooperation in an open-ended 
question. The response to this question was screened to assess whether 
participants were suspicious of the cover story or the absence of an actual 
collaborator.  
Results 
Checks. ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between conditions 
on both control measures indicating that participants in all conditions 
experienced the supposed cooperation as equally negative and insulting (Fs < 
1.21).  
Honor concerns. An ANOVA examining self-reported honor concerns 
revealed that these did not differ between experimental condition (F < 1). As 
intended, all participants in this study scored well above the scale midpoint (M 
= 5.39, SD = .85; t(70) = 13.75, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.19 - 1.59), indicating that 
family honor was a major concern in this context.  
Mood. We used three Repeated Measures ANOVAs with condition as 
between-subject factor and pre- and post-measure as within-subject factor to 
analyze differences in the three mood scales separately. We found significant 
within-subject effects for positive mood (F(1, 68) = 11.29, p = .01, ηp
2 = .14) 
and annoyance (F(1, 68) = 17.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21). In general, participants 
experienced less positive mood (pre-measure: M = 4.62, SD = 0.95; post-
measure: M = 4.28, SD = 1.16) and more annoyance (pre-measure: M = 1.79, 
SD = 0.74; post-measure: M = 2.29, SD = 1.14) after having been insulted. 
Participants did not experience more dejection or fear-related emotions and 
there were no interactions between the within- and between-subject factors (all 
Fs < 1). These results indicate that being insulted indeed caused distress in all 
participants and to an equal extent in all conditions. 
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Self-esteem and source of worth. We analyzed the self-esteem and 
source of worth scales using separate ANOVAs with condition as between-
subject factor. Neither of these scale scores depended significantly on 
experimental condition (all Fs < 1). This confirms there were no pre-existing 
differences between conditions on the two measures relating to self-worth.  
Aggression. The noise levels set in each condition during the course of 
the CRT are depicted in Figure 5.2. To assess the effect of condition on 
aggression, while taking into account individual differences in source of self-
worth and level of self-esteem, we first centered source of self-worth and level 
of self-esteem around their mean. We also calculated their interaction term. We 
then regressed level of white noise on the main effects of condition, self-worth, 
and self-esteem in the first step and then added the interaction term of self-
worth and self-esteem in the second step. We performed two separate regression 
analyses, one for the noise level set on the first trial and one for the averaged 
noise levels set on the remaining trials (2-25).  
 
Figure 5.2 
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First trial. We first examined the noise levels set on the first trial (see 
Table 5.3), as this is most indicative of participant’s response to the insulting 
feedback previously received. The regression analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of source of self-worth, β = -.244, t(70) = -2.07, p = .042, 95% CI = -5.23 
- -.095, indicating that overall in this sample of participants from an honor 
culture, those whose sense of worth was more socially-defined tended to 
respond less aggressively after being insulted. More importantly, we observed a 
significant main effect of condition β = .277, t(70) = 2.42, p = .018, 95% CI = 
.86 - 8.98. To investigate this effect further, we performed ANOVA on the first 
noise level with condition as between-subject factor, and conducted LSD post 
hoc tests to examine specific contrasts. This revealed that the noise levels in the 
social affirmation condition (M = 71.74, SD = 12.12) were significantly lower 
compared to the control condition (M = 81.30, SD = 14.94; p = .024), as 
predicted. The self-affirmation condition (M = 74.60, SD = 14.86) did not differ 
from the other two conditions. As a result, the overall effect of condition was 
only marginally significant in the ANOVA, F(2, 68) = 2.81, p = .067, ηp
2 = .08).  
These results indicate that the social affirmation condition was indeed 
effective in lowering the initial need to become aggressive in response to 
insulting feedback, while the self-affirmation condition did not significantly 
diminish the amount of aggression participants displayed compared to the 
control condition. The main effect of self-esteem was not significant, nor was 
the interaction effect of source of self-worth and level of self-esteem. To further 
examine how socially-defined self-worth affects noise levels under different 
circumstances, we examined correlations between the noise level on the first 
trial, source of self-worth, and self-esteem in each experimental condition.  
In the social affirmation condition, initial noise levels were only 
significantly correlated to the source of self-worth scale, r = -.489, p = .018, 
indicating that in this condition, noise levels were set lower by those who 
defined their worth socially.  
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Table 5.3  
Regression analysis of condition, and source of self-worth (SSW), and self-
esteem (SE) on noise level in first trial 
  B SE t p F change 
Step 1 Constant 66.00 4.38 15.08 <.001 .016 
 Condition 4.92 2.03 2.42 .018  
 SSW -2.66 1.29 -2.07 .042  
 SE .86 1.87 .46 .65  
Step 2       
 Constant 66.32 4.42 14.99 <.001 .516 
 Condition 4.88 2.04 2.39 .020  
 SSW -2.58 1.29 -1.99 .051  
 SE 1.0 1.88 .53 .59  
 SSW*SE .778 1.19 .65 .52  
Note. Condition 1 = social affirmation, 2 = self-affirmation, 3 = control ; 
n = 113 
 
Interestingly, in the self-affirmation condition, noise levels on the first 
trial were only significantly correlated with level of self-esteem, r = .50, p = 
.011, indicating that in this condition, higher levels of noise were set by those 
high in self-esteem. There were no significant correlations between noise levels 
and self-esteem, or self-worth in the control condition.  
Trials 2-25. The noise levels set during the remainder of the CRT were 
combined to indicate aggression in response to further escalation of the 
situation, in which the other person administers increasing levels of noise to the 
participant. Regression analysis on the average noise levels set in the remaining 
24 trials of the CRT (see Table 5.4) revealed a significant interaction of source 
of self-worth by self-esteem, β = .277, t(70) = 2.42, p = .018, 95% CI = .86 - 
8.98.  
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Table 5.4  
Regression analysis of condition, and source of self-worth (SSW), and self-
esteem (SE) on average noise levels in trials 2-25 
  B SE t p F change 
Step 1 Constant 70.42 4.17 16.87 <.001 .504 
 Condition 2.85 1.93 1.47 .14  
 SSW -.56 1.23 -.45 .65  
 SE .04 1.78 .021 .98  
Step 2       
 Constant 71.41 4.07 17.52 <.001 .028 
 Condition 2.74 1.88 1.46 .15  
 SSW -.29 1.20 -.24 .81  
 SE .49 1.74 .28 .78  
 SSW*SE 2.47 1.09 2.52 .028  
Note. Condition 1 = social affirmation, 2 = self-affirmation, 3 = control ;  
n = 113 
 
We have plotted this interaction in Figure 5.3. Results show that when 
self-worth is defined internally high self-esteem buffers against the need to 
respond more aggressively to insults. However, when self-worth is strongly 
based on social approval, high self-esteem actually fuels the need to react more 
aggressively to insults, which resonates with our observation in Study 5.1.  
Discussion 
The current study extends the findings of Study 5.1 to participants from 
an honor culture, and examines a possible way to prevent aggressive responses. 
In a more immersive situation in which honor-culture participants were actually 
insulted and exchanged white noise with their supposed insulter (indicating 
escalating aggression), we demonstrated that a social affirmation is effective in 
diminishing the initial need to respond more vigorously to insults compared to a 
control situation where no affirmation was made. A traditional self-affirmation, 
however, did not have this effect. 




Source of self-worth by self-esteem interaction effect on mean white noise. 
 
 
Additionally, taking into account interpersonal variations in source of 
self-worth and self-esteem, we found that a social affirmation reduced initial 
displays of aggression more when participants relied more strongly on socially 
conferred worth, as predicted. Notably, self-affirmation did not significantly 
reduce levels of aggression compared to the control condition and even 
increased aggression to the extent that participants had higher self-esteem.  
Notably, displays of aggression during escalating noise levels set during 
the later trials replicated the results of Study 5.1 among an honor-culture 
sample. As the effect of the intervention faded during the CRT, a source of self-
worth by self-esteem interaction effect on aggression emerged. This 
complements results of Study 5.1 which revealed that while self-esteem acts as 
a buffer among participants who define their self-worth internally, it fuels the 
need to become aggressive among those who define their worth socially.  
Importantly, participants in all conditions reported to be equally affected 
by the insulting feedback, were equally concerned with their honor and 
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negative. These controls exclude a number of possible alternative explanations 
for the diminished levels of aggression in the social affirmation condition.  
General discussion 
Elaborating on previous research on honor, insults, and aggression, we 
hypothesized that insult-elicited aggression results from honor culture members’ 
tendency to base their self-worth for an important part on social evaluations. 
Consequently, socially-conferred worth makes them more vulnerable to the 
negative consequence of negative social evaluations including insults. In a first 
correlational study, we connected socially-conferred worth to higher levels of 
cognitive self-devaluation and negative affect in different insulting scenarios. 
Additionally, we showed that socially-conferred worth interacted with level of 
self-esteem in predicting confrontational inclinations in these scenarios. While 
level of self-esteem did not affect confrontational inclinations in people who 
defined their worth internally, it did so among people who mainly defined their 
worth socially. Those high in self-esteem were more likely to confront the 
insulter while those low in self-esteem were more likely to withdraw.  
In our second study, we extended these finding to a sample of honor-
culture participants. In an immersive experiment, we compared the effectiveness 
of two different types of affirmations in preventing insult-elicited aggression. 
We discovered that a social affirmation reduced the tendency to administer 
white noise among honor culture members who had been insulted during a 
previous task relative to a control group with no affirmation, while a traditional 
self-affirmation did not have this effect. Moreover, results showed that this 
social affirmation was more effective when reliance on social approval was 
high, while the self-affirmation was less effective when self-esteem was high. 
Finally, during the course of the interaction, as the effect of the intervention 
started to fade, a similar interaction pattern between source of self-worth and 
level of self-esteem appeared, indicating that high self-esteem fuels aggression 
in response to insult, among those who define their worth based on social 
approval.  
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These results are both novel and fascinating. While most previous 
research has focused on establishing that honor culture members respond 
aggressively to insults, our findings are among the first to demonstrate a 
relationship between the social dimensions of honor and the heightened 
aggression following an insult — going beyond establishing covariation, to 
demonstrate a causal relation (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). Such 
a response is a way of protecting and preventing further damage to one’s social 
worth, an important dimension of honor. The results are also fascinating 
because they are the first to show that insult-elicited aggression among honor-
culture members is not insurmountable. As our results revealed, affirming one’s 
social worth is an effective way of preventing insult-elicited aggression among 
honor culture members. This finding complements the growing number of 
studies reporting honor-related antagonism, in which very few attempts have 
been made to examine measures that may help prevent these negative outcomes.  
To our knowledge, one such attempt was made by Henry (2009) who 
argued that honor cultures develop among groups of people who are under the 
constant burden of a relatively low status. According to Henry, adherence to 
honor and aggressive protection of one’s reputation is a form of vigilant low-
status compensation, resulting from the need to protect one’s stigmatized sense 
of social worth. Thus, a self-affirmation strategy would help compensate this 
low sense of worth and eliminate the need to respond aggressively to a threat to 
one’s self-worth, such as after an insult. In an experiment, he showed that a self-
affirmation diminished reported proneness to become aggressive after an insult 
among low-status participants (i.e. students with low parental income), 
compared to not-affirmed low-status participants. This difference was not found 
among affirmed and not-affirmed high-status participants. However, Henry did 
not make the important distinction between personal worth and social worth, as 
the self-affirmation in that study contained both aspects of worth. Additionally, 
this initial work examined imagined insults and self-reported indicators of 
aggression among high or low-status participants, instead of investigating honor 
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culture participants who actually suffer and respond to provocations — as was 
the case in our study. Therefore, our findings contribute to the prior literature on 
honor and insults by demonstrating the central importance of social worth as an 
important dimension of honor and its causal role in potentially escalatory 
responses to insults and offenses. 
A strength of the current research is that we used different methods and 
measures to investigate the connection between source of worth and sensitivity 
to insults. Study 5.1 assessed self-reports in a correlational design to investigate 
the hypothesized association between source of worth and cognitive, emotional, 
and behavioral responses to different insult descriptions. We included different 
types of insults to be able to relate our findings to different situations. In the 
second study, we demonstrated the causal relation between these focal 
variables, in an experimental design. In this study, honor culture participants 
were actually insulted and demonstrated genuine behavior indicative of 
aggression. This approach extends the external validity of our findings, and 
yields important information about possible interventions that may help prevent 
the emergence of aggression. 
A possible limitation of this study is the fact that we cannot empirically 
ascertain the extent to which the social affirmation prevented aggression by 
buttressing participants’ social worth. Including a measure that gauges this 
process might have clarified this issue. However, we did not include such a 
measure in the current study in order to avoid the risk of making participants 
aware of the purpose of the self-affirmation procedure. Drawing further 
conclusions from this research, it is important to note that we only established 
an effect of the social affirmation on initial displays of aggression (i.e., during 
the first trial of the white noise task). During the course of the task, participants 
were confronted with increasing levels of white noise administered by their 
interaction partner, which arguably overruled initial tendencies based on the 
affirmation manipulation. This explains why during the course of the task the 
behavior displayed by participants is guided more by the increasing noise levels 
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set by their interaction partner, as well as their individual dispositions — which 
in this case included source of worth and self-esteem. In fact, this also reflects 
results of prior research with this task, in which — for similar reasons — the 
main focus was on participants’ behavior during the first trial (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998; Meier, et al., 2006). In line with these earlier studies, the 
effects of the affirmation manipulation are most clearly visible on participants’ 
behavior on the first trial of this task.  
We highlight two interesting directions for future research. First, it is 
important to investigate whether the effectiveness of a social affirmation in 
reducing aggression is something that is particular to honor, or that a social 
affirmation in general is just more powerful than a self-affirmation. Our results 
cannot answer this question. One way to do this is by repeating the same study, 
including participants from honor cultures as well as dignity cultures. Such a 
study would not only allow for a replication of the current findings, it would 
also allow for an assessment of the impact of different types of affirmations in 
each of the two groups. Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the ideal of 
dignity, one would expect that a self-affirmation would be more effective in a 
dignity group, because their worth is defined more internally. 
 Additionally, these results could be of particular interest to practitioners 
in the field of negotiation and conflict management. As mentioned before, little 
has been done to develop methods that might prevent negative outcomes 
associated with insults. Our study offers a first step in this direction, as it 
informs us on what interventions should consist of in order to be effective in 
reducing insult-elicited aggression. The next step is to develop practical 
interventions, based on this knowledge, which can be tested and further 
improved in the field of negotiation and conflict management. As intercultural 
communication is now commonplace in many societies, this line of research can 
contribute significantly to easing intercultural relations involving honor 
cultures.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, our results show that socially-defined worth plays an 
important part in explaining why people from an honor culture respond more 
aggressively to insults. By affirming their social worth, we were able to reduce 
their need to respond aggressively to insulting feedback in a sample of honor 
culture members while a traditional self-affirmation was not as effective. These 
findings have important theoretical and practical implications and inform us on 
why insults elicit more aggression when honor is at stake and how aggression 
can be prevented. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Social affirmation  
Describe a situation in which you were praised by your relatives, because of 
your exceptional characteristics or performance, which made you feel good 
about yourself. In your description, please mention what they said or did and 
why they made you feel good about yourself in detail.  
 
Self-affirmation 
Describe a situation in which you praised yourself because of your exceptional 
characteristics or performance, which made you feel good about yourself. In 
your description, please mention how this characteristic or performance was 

























General Discussion | 151 
 
Due to globalization, contact between people from different ethnic 
backgrounds has become commonplace in contemporary societies. In the Dutch 
society for example, 21% of the population is estimated to have a non-native 
ethnic background (CBS, November 2013). Ethnic diversity offers both 
advantages and challenges to daily life, because people from different ethnic 
backgrounds endorse different cultural norms, values, and convictions. 
Differences in core convictions may increase the risk of value conflicts 
(Kouzakova, et al., 2012) occurring in intercultural situations. This is especially 
likely when parties are unaware of each other’s goals or do not recognize cues 
indicating increasing frustration about emerging differences. Therefore, 
understanding cultural differences and their impact on the way people manage 
conflicts is a topic of central importance in social psychological research. 
In this dissertation however, I addressed differences in the way people 
weave together a set of shared values, norms, and beliefs into so-called cultural 
logics. These logics revolve around a central theme, each defined in terms of an 
ideal, which pertains to the way the worth of an individual is defined within that 
cultural context and how he/she should ideally behave (Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
The ideals of specific interest to this dissertation were honor and dignity. Honor 
reflects the value of an individual in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of others 
(Pitt-Rivers, 1965). Hence, honor can be lost due to negative social evaluations, 
such as offenses and confrontations. Dignity reflects the notion that each person 
possesses a value, intrinsic to him at birth, and at least equal to others (Ayers, 
1984).  
The cultural ideals of honor and dignity have received considerable 
attention in studies of conflict situations and conflict escalation, particularly 
with respect to antagonistic reactions after insults (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; 
Cohen, et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, et 
al., 2002b; Van Osch, et al., 2013). In general, it has been found that insults 
instigate more anger, higher levels of cortisol and testosterone, and more 
dominant and aggressive behavior in honor culture members compared to 
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dignity culture members. However, hardly any empirical research has addressed 
the question of why they respond in such a way (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, 
et al., 2008). As such, few researchers have investigated the implications of 
adherence to honor in relation to underlying psychological mechanisms such as 
judgment formation, threat management, or self-regulation and their impact on 
insult-elicited aggression. The studies in this dissertation contribute to existing 
knowledge by explicitly addressing these underlying psychological 
mechanisms, thus offering insight into what exactly leads to the destructive 
reactions of honor culture members to conflicts in general and insults in 
particular. Not only does this increase our understanding of the effects of honor 
values on conflict processes, it also enables us to discover ways in which the 
negative ramifications of insults can be prevented or diminished for those 
concerned with honor.  
In this final chapter, I will discuss the findings of my own research in this 
area in this broader context. In a nutshell, the chapter covers honor-related 
differences in the perception and appraisal of insults, their impact on conflict 
management, as well as ways to diminish their negative impact. I will start by 
summarizing the most important findings of the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation before reflecting on overarching implications. I will also specify the 
limitations of this work and elaborate on recommendations that can be made on 
the basis of my findings.  
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I examined how people perceive and evaluate insulting 
behavior, as this has been shown to be an important cause of conflict escalation 
when honor is at stake. Following previous conceptualizations of insults (Bond 
& Venus, 1991; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 2008) and research on interpersonal 
and group impression formation (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Leach, et al., 
2007; Wojciszke, 2005), I assessed to what extent insults damage people’s 
sense of morality or competence and how this is influenced by honor.  
General Discussion | 153 
 
Results of Study 2.1 revealed that individuals from an honor culture 
consider insulting behavior to be a stronger indication of immorality than 
incompetence of the transgressor compared to individuals from a dignity 
culture. In fact, both groups of participants were equally upset, but those high in 
honor reported to be more offended by the insulting behavior. Interestingly, the 
relationship between culture and the heightened moralization of the insulting 
behavior was mediated by the extent to which those high in honor were 
offended by the behavior. Apparently, insults are moralized more by those high 
in honor because they are considered more offensive. In Study 2.2, I took a 
different perspective, and asked participants to indicate how they would 
evaluate themselves after being insulted. Participants rated insults collected in 
Study 2.1 on the extent to which each insult would harm their own sense of 
morality or competence. Results of Study 2.1 were replicated, as participants 
who were more concerned with honor tended to moralize the insults to a larger 
extent. Again, the degree to which high-honor participants reported to be 
offended by the insults mediated this effect.  
These findings are the first to connect honor to moral concerns. Morality 
is an important aspect of honor, as it is particularly important for honor culture 
members to be perceived as moral by others (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 
2002b; Uskul, et al., 2012). However, it has not specifically been considered in 
previous attempts to understand why people high in honor respond differently to 
insults. In fact, it has been implied that fierce responses to insults are primarily 
driven by concerns about one’s perceived competence. Specifically, it has been 
argued that honor culture members respond more fiercely to insults because 
they do not want to appear weak or an easy prey (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; 
Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The current findings challenge this previous 
perspective on honor because they show that insults threaten honor culture 
member’s perceived morality more than their perceived competence. These 
findings also demonstrate that insults affect people’s moral identity because 
they are considered more offensive. 
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These findings elucidate why members from an honor culture respond 
more aggressively to insults; insults might require a direct reprimand for those 
high in honor because insults more strongly violate core moral norms. 
Aggression may be needed to rectify such violations and to maintain group 
integrity. This resonates with an explanation that Cohen and colleagues offered 
for their results. They stated that the more aggressive reaction to insults 
displayed by those from the Southern, rather than Northern States in the U.S.A. 
could perhaps be explained by the former being “… not accustomed to such 
rudeness” (Cohen, et al., 1996, p. 957). When collecting the data for this thesis, 
I have regularly experienced this myself when insulted honor culture 
participants stepped out of their cubicle during the course of the experiment to 
complain about their rude counterpart. Apparently, the generic moral imperative 
of being treated with respect by others is even more essential for those high in 
honor. 
Chapter 3 
Results of Chapter 2 demonstrated that those high in honor perceive 
insults differently. Insults are moralized more by those high in honor. In 
Chapter 3 of my dissertation, I investigated how this difference influences 
appraisals of insults in a competitive situation. I addressed this question by 
including physiological indicators that would allow me to examine responses 
that might not be revealed in traditional self-report measures. Specifically, I 
investigated how insults affect reactivity in measures of heart-rate, blood 
pressure, and vascular impedance. According to the Biopsychosocial model of 
arousal regulation (Blascovich, 2000; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), reactivity 
in these cardiovascular indicators distinguishes between stress regulation 
associated with the psychological states of (negative) threat versus (positive) 
challenge. Using an experimental manipulation to activate honor or dignity 
concerns, I examined the general prediction that insults instigate threat when 
honor is made salient.  
General Discussion | 155 
 
Results confirmed that when honor was activated, participants showed 
more cardiovascular reactivity associated with threat after receiving insulting 
feedback on their performance, while cardiovascular responses indicated 
challenge in response to neutral feedback. This response pattern characterized 
the activation of honor concerns, as it was reversed among participants whose 
dignity concerns had been experimentally activated. Behavioral displays of 
aggression (the extent to which participants administered white noise blasts to 
their supposed opponent) resonated with these physiological indicators. 
Interestingly, the results of this chapter also showed that – when honor concerns 
had been activated - participants who had been insulted (and who had exhibited 
the most aggression) reported being least angry by the end of the procedure. 
This suggests that the behavioral expression of resentment, through the 
administration of white noise to their opponent, helped participants to regulate 
their emotions after being insulted, as participants in this condition indicated 
being least angry after completion of the white noise task. 
The notion that the behavioral expression of anger may facilitate the 
resolution of resentment has also been reported previously by Cohen and 
colleagues (Cohen, et al., 1999). In their study, honor culture participants who 
had acted out after being insulted were most likely to forgive their insulter 
compared to those who had not. The self-reported levels of anger we observed 
after the competitive task are in line with these earlier observations. More 
relevant to the central question in this thesis, Study 3 demonstrates that when 
the ideal of honor – rather than dignity - is made salient, insults are more likely 
to instigate a physiological state of threat as well as a forceful behavioral 
response.  
Chapter 4 
Results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrated that insults are not only 
perceived as having more moral implications by those concerned with honor, 
they also instigate a sense of threat among them. The purpose of Chapter 4 was 
to investigate how these differences in insult perception and insult appraisal 
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affect the process of conflict development and conflict escalation when honor is 
at stake. More specifically, I set out to investigate why those concerned with 
honor are more obliging prior to an overt confrontation, but become more 
forceful once they have been offended, compared to those less concerned with 
honor (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 1999; Harinck, 
et al., 2013). I argued that when honor norms are activated, people will not only 
be concerned with managing an emerging conflict, they will also be concerned 
with preventing threats to their honor. To investigate this notion, I turned to 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), that distinguishes between ideal 
goals and ought goals. When pursuing ideal goals, people employ a promotion 
focus, show eagerness, and are willing to take risks to achieve desired gains. 
When pursuing ought goals, people employ a prevention focus, are vigilant, and 
operate cautiously in order to avoid undesired losses. As the maintenance of 
one’s reputation and the prevention of loss of honor is an important aspect of 
honor endorsement, I expected honor concerns to be associated with higher 
levels of prevention focus. In three studies, I investigated the link between 
honor and prevention focus as well as their impact on behavior during different 
stages of conflict. 
Results of a first correlational Study (4.1) among a community sample 
showed that chronic prevention focus was higher among honor-culture 
members, compared to dignity-culture members, while promotion focus was 
equally high in both samples. These findings confirmed the notion that honor is 
associated with a pre-occupation with prevention goals rather than promotion 
goals.  
In Study 4.2, I investigated how higher levels of prevention focus, 
associated with honor endorsement, affect behavior in a situation that has the 
potential to escalate but has not escalated yet. Results of this study revealed that 
the experimental activation of honor concerns resulted in more prevention 
strategies, more cooperative conflict intentions, and less dominant conflict 
intentions. Interestingly, the preference for more cooperative conflict intentions 
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in the high-honor group was mediated by the increased endorsement of 
prevention strategies. Additionally, participants indicated more agitation — an 
emotion that is seen as characterizing a prevention focus — when honor 
concerns had been activated, while no differences were found for discontent — 
a typical promotion focus emotion (Higgins, 1996).  
In Study 4.3, I used the same experimental manipulation to assess the 
impact of honor activation on regulatory focus and aggression in an offensive 
setting, i.e. a setting in which a conflict had escalated. Results of this study 
supported the reasoning that insulting interactions are particularly likely to elicit 
more aggressive responses when honor concerns are involved. Importantly, 
when honor was deactivated, no reliable differences were found in aggression 
displays after being insulted compared to the situation where participants had 
received negative feedback. These findings demonstrate that derogatory or 
offensive feedback is particularly likely to instigate aggression among those 
high in honor, compared to an interaction where negative feedback is presented 
in an inoffensive way. Furthermore, parallel results were observed for measures 
of regulatory focus, indicating that aggression was associated with higher level 
of prevention focus when honor was activated.  
Together, the results of these studies corroborate the notion that 
prevention concerns constitute a relevant factor in the psychology of honor. 
Activating honor concerns enhances the motivation to avoid undesired 
outcomes associated with conflict escalation. In a potentially conflictual 
interaction, individuals concerned with honor may not only jeopardize desired 
outcomes, but also run the risk of losing their honor. The increased vigilance 
results in a more deescalating approach at the initial stages of a possible 
confrontation. The purpose of this approach is to avoid that the conflict 
becomes overt. Importantly, however, these same concerns easily trigger 
aggressive responses once the interaction becomes offensive. As a pre-
occupation with honor concerns implies that loss of honor is to be avoided at all 
cost, vigilance can quickly turn into tension and agitation when confronted with 
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an insulting comment, resulting in an outburst to reprimand the offender. The 
findings of these three studies are in line with the notion that honor is a scarce 
and costly commodity, which is hard to gain and easy to lose (Uskul, et al., 
2012). In the face of a confrontation, people stand to lose their honor if insulted. 
The results also provide initial evidence for our reasoning regarding the link 
between honor, prevention focus, and conflict behavior. Patterns of early 
conflict avoidance and sudden conflict escalation are driven by the same 
underlying psychological mechanism, namely the prevention of loss of honor. 
Chapter 5 
The previous chapters of this dissertation focused on underlying 
psychological reasons why people concerned with honor respond more 
forcefully after being insulted. In Chapter 5, I addressed the question of how 
such responses can be diminished or prevented. Honor has been defined as the 
value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of others (Leung & 
Cohen, 2011; Peristiany, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). However, 
the specific implications of defining one’s worth based on other people’s 
evaluations has rarely been considered in understanding or preventing insult-
elicited aggression. I argued that reliance on socially-defined self-worth makes 
people more sensitive to the negative consequences of derogatory social 
evaluations, such as insults.  
Results of the first correlational study (5.1) showed that the more people 
relied on social evaluations to define their self-worth, the more they tended to 
self-devaluate and experience negative affect when they were insulted. 
Additionally, participants with socially-defined self-worth and a high level of 
self-esteem preferred a more confrontational response type, while those with 
socially-defined worth and low self-esteem preferred a more avoidant response 
type.  
In Study 5.2, I extended these findings to a more realistic setting by 
investigating how honor culture participants actually respond to offensive 
feedback on their performance. I assessed the role of social worth by 
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introducing an affirmation that buffers the social worth of individuals rather 
than their personal worth. Results of this study indeed showed that the social 
affirmation was effective in reducing initial levels of aggression honor culture 
participants displayed towards their supposed insulter compared to no 
affirmation at all. The level of aggression after the traditional self-affirmation 
did not differ from the control group. Interestingly, the social affirmation 
proved to be even more effective among those honor culture members who 
defined their self-worth more socially, which further corroborates the 
hypothesized link between socially-defined worth and insult-elicited aggression. 
Additional analyses once more showed that participants with more socially-
defined self-worth aggressed more when they had high self-esteem than when 
they had low self-esteem. On the other hand, for participants with internally 
defined self-worth, high self-esteem evoked less aggression than low self-
esteem. 
In sum, these two studies together highlight an important reason why 
those high in honor respond more vigorously to insults. They do so because an 
essential part of their self-worth is based on the way they are valued by others. 
Socially-defined self-worth makes people more vulnerable to the negative 
cognitive and affective consequences of destructive social evaluations, such as 
insults. The results also show that insult-elicited aggression among those high in 
honor is not inevitable. It can be prevented by making a person less vulnerable 
to the negative impact of the insult to one’s honor, for example by affirming 
one’s social worth. This method of affirming one’s social worth instead of 
affirming one’s personal worth proved an effective way in postponing the 
moment at which honor culture members felt the need to respond aggressively 
after being insulted.  
Furthermore, these studies identify level of self-esteem as an important 
predictor of more vigorous responses to insults. More specifically, results of the 
two studies combined suggest that self-esteem moderates the relation between 
source of self-worth and insult-elicited aggression. When self-worth is defined 
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internally, high self-esteem can help prevent aggression, possibly because it 
operates as a buffer against the negative consequences of insults. However, 
when self-worth is defined socially, high self-esteem might even fuel the need 
to respond more vigorously to insults.  
Theoretical implications 
The research and findings discussed in this dissertation contribute to 
theory in different ways, which I will discuss more elaborately below. In 
general, they extend the recently developed framework of cultural logics that 
bind norms, values, and customs around central themes such as honor and 
dignity (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Thereby, these findings contribute to existing 
knowledge about a class of cultures prevalent in the Middle-East and the 
Mediterranean, the culture of honor. These cultures are systematically 
overlooked in traditional cross-cultural research, which mainly focusses on 
prototypically individualistic or prototypically collectivistic cultures such as the 
USA and China respectively. To the extent that prior research has addressed 
honor concerns, this work has primarily revealed what people from honor 
cultures find insulting (Cross, et al., 2013; Uskul, et al., 2012) and how they 
respond to confrontational situations (Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 1999; 
Hayes & Lee, 2005; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000). Only a very limited 
number of studies have addressed the psychological mechanisms that might 
explain why these patterns occur (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Van Osch, 
et al., 2013).  
Psychological impact of insults 
The current dissertation extends this knowledge by offering insights into 
the reasons why those concerned with honor respond differently to offenses. In 
general, findings indicate that offenses have a more severe psychological impact 
when honor is a major concern. Several findings confirm these notions. First, 
those concerned with honor judged other’s insulting behavior to be more 
offensive and therefore moralized insults to a greater extent, compared to those 
low in honor. Additionally, insults instigated more threat on a physiological 
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level when honor concerns were activated, but not when dignity concerns were 
activated. Moreover, in the face of a —possibly— confrontational situation, 
activation of honor concerns was associated with prevention focus, indicating 
the motivation to avoid potentially undesired outcomes. Finally, results showed 
that among those who base their self-worth on social evaluations, as is the case 
with honor, insults have a more negative impact on cognitive and emotional 
self-concerns. These findings together highlight that insults evoke more 
negative appraisals among those concerned with honor, due the fact that their 
self-worth is based on other’s approval. 
Insult and the process of conflict development 
Moreover, our results show that honor instigates prevention focus in the 
face of a confrontational situation, because people are invested in dealing with 
the conflict but also want to avoid potential threats to their honor. The current 
findings offer an exciting new perspective on conflict emergence and conflict 
management as well as relevant underlying mechanisms. That is, they reveal 
that the concern with the maintenance and protection of honor has consequences 
for the initial willingness to engage in a potentially conflictual situation, as well 
as the way the situation is managed after being offended. Hence, when honor is 
a major concern, the initial approach to an emerging conflict consists of de-
escalatory actions. In different studies, I found that prior to being offended or in 
the absence of insulting feedback, those high in honor are actually less 
aggressive and even more obliging than individuals for whom honor concerns 
are less salient. The more obliging side of honor prior to conflict escalation has 
been observed in previous research (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996). 
However, it has only recently received attention (Harinck, et al., 2013; Leung & 
Cohen, 2011), because most of the previous research has focused on reactions 
after being insulted.  
The pattern of obliging behavior in the initial stages of conflict 
development was particularly evident in the study reported in chapter three, 
which focused on the process of conflict development and conflict escalation. 
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The findings reported here, which link obliging responses to prevention focus, 
clearly highlight the notion that those high in honor are more sensitive to the 
negative psychological ramifications of offensive behavior and operate in ways 
to avoid these outcomes. Apparently, the purpose of this approach is to prevent 
the conflict from becoming overt and escalating to a point where both parties 
have no option but to engage in destructive measures to defend their honor. 
However, initial obliging behavior might be misinterpreted by those who are 
unaware of its true purpose, because it does not explicitly communicate that a 
person is actually in a vigilant state of mind. Therefore, once the confrontation 
evokes a sudden forceful response, it seems like this response is radical and 
inexplicable. In this regard, the current findings are important, because they not 
only demonstrate behavior that is observable at the surface, but also reveal the 
underlying mechanism involved in the process prior to conflict escalation. 
The reactions following insulting behavior observed throughout this 
dissertation were in line with previously reported findings. That is, in line with 
standard accounts (Beersma, et al., 2003; Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 
1999; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002b; Van Osch, et al., 2013), I observed 
that those high in honor tend to exhibit higher levels of aggression after being 
insulted. These reactions pertained to honor endorsement resulting from 
intercultural differences, interpersonal differences, as well as after an 
experimental manipulation of honor. Interestingly, we found that aggressive 
responses are also associated with higher levels of prevention focus. The link 
between prevention focus and aggression qualifies the aggression, showing that 
this response is not offensive but defensive in nature. After being insulted, the 
prevention goal of not losing honor is thwarted and requires action to restore 
this loss.  
As preventions goals are considered necessities, they can have severe 
psychological consequences when they are not met, resulting in agitation and 
anxiety (Higgins, 1996, 1997; Sassenberg, et al., 2007). Recent research has 
shown that people will go to great lengths to accomplish their prevention goals 
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and they are even prepared to use aggression if required to do so (Sassenberg & 
Hansen, 2007; Scholer, et al., 2010; Zaal, et al., 2011). Such is also the case 
with honor. Once it has been threatened, it requires and justifies aggressive 
responses to restore it, since maintaining one’s honor is truly a necessity. In this 
light, I also found that after exhibiting aggression, those concerned with honor 
were better able to let go of their agitation. Thus people can let go of their 
agitation once they have defended their honor by aggression, restoring their 
prevention goals. Again, these findings reveal that aggressive responses serve a 
prevention goal, as agitation is considered an emotion specific to failing to 
reach prevention goals. Together, these findings allow for a better 
understanding of why insults evoke more aggression among those concerned 
with honor and which purpose this behavior serves. 
Preventing insult-elicited aggression 
Despite the growing body of literature connecting honor to aggression, 
little is known about how this aggression can be prevented. The findings 
discussed in this dissertation offer important insights in this respect. As I 
demonstrated in different chapters, avoiding confrontations and threats to their 
honor is an effective way of insuring cooperative responses among those 
concerned with honor. Nevertheless, in conflict situations it might be 
particularly hard to avoid confrontations, even if they are not intended as such. 
Therefore, in Chapter 5, I set out to investigate which factor makes people with 
high concerns for honor more sensitive to the negative ramifications of 
offensive behavior. Results of this line of research identified socially-defined 
self-worth as an important factor in this respect. Results demonstrated that the 
more people rely on social evaluations as a source of self-worth, the more they 
suffer from cognitive self-devaluation and negative affect after being insulted. 
These findings are particularly relevant to honor, since honor is for a 
considerable part based on socially-defined worth — i.e. the value of a person in 
the eyes of others. Additionally, these findings also implicate that buffering 
socially-conferred worth might be an effective way in limiting or postponing the 
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need to respond aggressively to confrontations. Indeed, by affirming their social 
worth prior to an offensive interaction, I was able to postpone honor-culture 
participants’ need to become aggressive after they were insulted. A traditional 
self-affirmation induction did not have the same beneficial effect compared to a 
control group with no affirmation at all. This outcome highlights the relative 
importance of socially-defined worth in understanding insult-elicited aggression 
among those high in honor (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008). 
Moreover, it offers insights on what might be the focus of possible intervention 
aimed at preventing conflict escalation. These findings demonstrate, to my 
knowledge for the first time, that insult-elicited aggression is not only 




The findings discussed in this dissertation also have important practical 
implications for cross-cultural communication and conflict management. One 
highly relevant discovery is that those concerned with honor use different 
strategies to deal with conflicts than those concerned with dignity. Although 
previous research on honor values has highlighted aggressive reactions 
displayed by those with high honor values in response to conflict situations, 
current findings show that people endorsing honor norms will more likely avoid 
situations that potentially threaten their honor. When possible, they will 
therefore try to refrain from overt conflict engagement so as to avoid 
confrontations that may end up in a clash over one’s honor. People endorsing 
dignity norms are less concerned with threats to their self-worth resulting from 
confrontational encounters with others. Therefore, they are more likely to 
engage in a direct conflict management strategy, such as competing, pursuing 
own goals, and engaging in problem solving (for a review, see Holt & DeVore, 
2005). This proactive style of conflict management might be ineffective or even 
counterproductive when dealing with people from honor cultures. Particularly 
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confrontational or overt conflict behavior may evoke the need to protect or 
restore one’s honor by means of destructive reactions. Accordingly, an approach 
that takes into account honor culture members’ specific relational needs, in 
terms of respect and honor, and reciprocates cooperative intentions may be 
more effective.  
Furthermore, findings of the studies in this dissertation also show that 
even when they use the same conflict strategies as non-honor culture members, 
honor culture members might signal something else by it. For example, our 
findings pertaining to the initial de-escalation of an emerging conflict showed 
that early concession making does not mean that people are not concerned about 
their own interests and goals. In fact, results showed that activating honor made 
people more aware that they had something to lose, resulting in the willingness 
to be more cooperative and avoid conflict escalation. On the other hand, insult-
elicited aggression is not competitive in nature, as it does not aim to further 
conflict goals or personal interests. Rather, it is defensive in nature as 
aggression is driven by the same underlying regulatory focus and it serves to 
prevent loss of honor. In order to know how to effectively manage conflicts 
involving honor culture members, it is important to understand what motivates 
their behavior in a given context. The observed behavior alone might not be an 
accurate indication of what is actually going on.  
Interventions 
Additionally, the current findings suggest that when honor is salient, 
different conflict stages require different interventions to ease the process of 
conflict resolution. Honor-related concerns result in appeasing behavior and 
avoidance of competition in the initial stages of an encounter. If not responded 
to in the right way, for example by reciprocating a favor or giving space, these 
honor-related concerns may be thwarted resulting in even more frustration. 
However, avoiding the conflict at hand altogether may be detrimental in the 
long run, because nothing is actually resolved. In order to promote active 
conflict engagement, without risking destructive reactions to confrontations, 
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affirmation tactics might be effective in buffering self-related concerns 
associated with honor. The goal of such an intervention would be to make 
people less sensitive to the negative consequences of confrontations that they 
may consider offensive. As a result, they are able to endure longer before 
reaching the point at which they feel they should retaliate. The findings of 
Chapter 5 provide initial evidence for this notion and show that a social 
affirmation is effective in postponing the need to become aggressive in response 
to offensive feedback. Additionally, results of this chapter showed that 
traditional self-affirmation procedures, which rely on boosting self-esteem, 
might not be an effective way of reducing aggression after an insult among 
participants high in honor might not be. Apparently, socially-defined self-worth 
might fuel the need to respond more aggressively when it is accompanied by a 
high level of self-esteem. 
However, different interventions need to be considered once a conflict 
escalates past the breaking point. This stage of conflict is characterized by the 
need to restore one’s damaged honor, often by means of retaliatory aggression 
towards the transgressor. At this point, interventions that aim to prevent one’s 
honor from being damaged are no longer effective. Other interventions should 
be considered to help restore the damaged honor. A method that might be 
effective at this point is an apology. An apology is a message that conveys an 
admission of guilt and regret by the transgressor and it may also involve the 
desire to restore the sustained damage to continue the relationship (Tomlinson, 
Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). Apologies have been shown to restore the moral 
character of the perpetrator (Gold & Weiner, 2000) and restore the social 
identity (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) of the person perpetrated against. 
Therefore, apologies are likely to be effective in diminishing the need to 
retaliate a transgression, providing that the apology is sincere (Ohbuchi, et al., 
1989; Tomlinson, et al., 2004; Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vas, 2004). 
Based on findings discussed in the current dissertation, showing that moral 
concerns and social worth are two central aspects of honor, an apology might be 
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particularly promising in reducing insult-elicited aggression among those 
concerned with honor. The effectiveness of apologies in reducing insulting 
elicited aggression specifically should also be investigated empirically in future 
research.  
Strengths, limitations and future directions 
In four empirical chapters, I discussed different lines of research 
investigating the underlying psychological mechanisms explaining why people 
concerned with honor respond differently when offended and what can be done 
to prevent this response. Each chapter is followed by an extensive discussion of 
possible strengths and limitations specific to that chapter. For the purpose of the 
current reflection, I will focus on a number of issues that address overlapping 
strengths and limitations.  
One strength of this research is that I employed a multi-method approach 
to address the research questions. For example, I used correlational studies to 
link differences in —intercultural and interpersonal— honor endorsement to 
self-reported emotions and cognitions following insults. However, correlations 
do not allow for causal inference about the impact of insults on the observed 
patterns. Therefore, I reassessed the same research questions in experiments, 
using hypothetical situations in which people had to imagine being insulted or 
not and indicate their emotions and intentions. Still, self-report measures only 
reflect intentions, which may not always be in line with actual behavior, 
particularly in heated situations like conflicts. Hence, in other studies I used 
controlled offenses to insult participants who were unaware of the true purpose 
of the study and assessed cardiovascular patterns and behavioral indicators of 
aggression. This approach adds to the validity of the findings across different 
samples and in different contexts.  
Of considerable interest in this respect is that, besides considering honor 
as a cultural phenomenon, I developed an experimental manipulation to activate 
or deactivate honor in a mono-cultural sample of participants. This is a novel 
approach that allows for the examination of honor as a situational factor and 
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permits causal inferences directly related to honor endorsement. Additionally, it 
isolates the impact of honor from other social confounds, such as financial and 
societal status, belonging to an ethnic minority group and language barriers. 
This attempt to causally link findings directly to honor endorsement has been 
lacking in previous research, where honor endorsement is sometimes assumed 
and generalized based on ethnic background.  
One limitation of the current research is that when using multi-cultural 
samples, the dignity group was usually very homogenous — consisting of 
Dutch participants — , while the honor group was fairly heterogeneous —
mainly consisting of Turkish and Moroccans, but sometimes also other 
ethnicities. This method was sometimes necessary as the number of Turkish and 
Moroccans participants alone was not enough to ensure satisfactory honor-
culture-sample sizes, but may have introduced additional error in our honor 
culture sample. Additionally, although all honor culture participants included in 
the analyses were from an honor culture background, most of them had grown 
up in the Dutch society. As a result, their cultural values had integrated at least 
to some extent with Dutch culture, making honor-related characteristics less 
noticeable in this sample. A such, it is recommended that the findings discussed 
in this dissertation should be replicated in future research among more 
homogeneous groups of honor culture members.  
At this point, I note that the field of social psychology has gone through 
rapid changes during the past years, in particular regarding research practices 
and methods. An important development relates to the desire to avoid false 
positives, which has resulted in changing practices with respect to interpretation 
of significance levels around p = .05. Another important change is that more 
importance is now placed on a priori power analyses for the purpose of 
participant sampling. However, most of the studies described in this dissertation 
were conducted, written up and submitted for publication before these changes 
came about. Moreover, my research involves cultural groups that are not easily 
accessible - especially within academic environments - and complicated data 
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collection techniques. Both these features make it difficult to obtain sample 
sizes that would be ideal from a statistical point of view. Nevertheless, 
especially because it is relatively difficult to gain access to this target group for 
research purposes, there is added value in considering the potential implications 
of observations made, even if these were obtained with relatively small 
participant samples and were sometimes only marginally significant. This is 
why I have discussed these findings and their possible implications within the 
context of this dissertation. Of course, caution should be practiced in 
generalizing conclusions from these findings, and the robustness of the patterns 
observed here should still be established in future research using larger sample 
sizes to ensure sufficient statistical power.  
The current research offers interesting new perspectives on why insults 
have such destructive effects on conflict management when honor is at stake 
and how these effects might be diminished. Nevertheless, future research could 
more thoroughly consider methods that may help prevent or resolve honor 
related conflicts. Chapter five of this dissertation, that examines the effect of a 
social affirmation on insult-elicited aggression, is a first step in this direction. 
However, it is yet unclear whether the additional effect of a social affirmation is 
only specific to honor cultures, or that it pertains to affirmations in general, also 
in dignity cultures. Although theory suggests that it is not, because self-worth is 
defined more internally in such contexts, it is important to assess this point 
empirically. Additionally, the current intervention pertains to insults 
administered through chat messages and aggression in the context of a 
laboratory setting. Though promising, this knowledge has yet to be transformed 
into specific interventions that are applicable in real-life conflicts. Applied 
research in the field of conflict management should be considered to take the 
interventions beyond the laboratory setting and assess the effectiveness of 
different interventions in real-life settings. 
Additionally, the current findings do not yet provide information about 
ways to reduce anger and aggression once conflicts have escalated past the 
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breaking point, where a party feels that honor has been lost and needs to be 
restored. The current findings together with research on apologies do suggest 
that apologies may be particularly effective in this respect, Unfortunately, 
knowledge about the effect of apologies in different cultures is scarce (Merolla, 
Zhang, & Sun, 2013; Shariati & Chamani, 2010). Therefore, more research is 
required to formulate recommendation for this specific stage of conflict 
resolution in respect to honor-related concerns.  
Finally, future research should also consider the positive side of honor 
endorsement. As stated before in Chapter 5, almost the entire body of literature 
examining honor has focused on aggression or retaliation. This paints a rather 
one-sided picture of the characteristics and function of honor. However, 
anthropological findings highlight the notion that in general, honor culture 
members are gracious, friendly, and hospitable (Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 
1965). They are proud, have high concerns for personal integrity, and go to 
great lengths to pay back dues. However, these and other positive observation 
associated with honor have never been seriously investigated in social 
psychological research. Only recently, some researchers have started doing 
research in this area. For example, Harinck and colleague’s also showed that in 
the absence of offensive encounters honor culture members actually prefer more 
cooperative conflict management styles than dignity culture members (Harinck, 
et al., 2013). Additionally, Leung and Cohen demonstrated that honor culture 
members will show more effort to payback a favor and cheat less (Leung & 
Cohen, 2011). In order to have a clear and full understanding of the function of 
honor and its influence on social psychological processes and behavior, the 
positive side of honor has to be considered as well.  
Conclusion 
The discoveries made in the context of this dissertation paint a more 
balanced picture of the role of honor in conflict management and inform us on 
possible avenues of effective conflict intervention. I demonstrated that the moral 
imperative of treating others with respect is a core concern in honor cultures and 
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insults are considered more of a moral violation of this norm among those high 
in honor. As honor is the worth of an individual predominantly based on their 
value in the eyes of other, insults are more likely to threaten self-worth than 
when people endorse dignity. Therefore, in the face of potential conflicts, 
preventing loss of honor becomes a major concern. This concern initially results 
in more appeasing and less dominating conflict management styles to prevent 
conflict escalation. Nevertheless, if confrontations or offensive behavior persist, 
the same concern may evoke more aggressive reactions. One way to avert this 
reaction is by affirming the social worth of those concerned with honor, in order 
to postpone the point at which people feel the need to defend their honor by 
means of aggression. Such interventions may help advance the process of 










References | 175 
 
Anderson, E. (1994). The Code of the Streets. Atlantic Monthly, 273, 81-94.  
Ayers, E. (1984). Vengeance and Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Barnes, B. D., Mason, E., Leary, M. R., Laurent, J., Griebel, C., & Bergman, A. (1988). 
Reactions to social vs self-evaluation: Moderating effects of personal and social 
identity orientations. Journal of Research in Personality, 22(4), 513-524. doi: 
10.1016/0092-6566(88)90007-4 
Baumeister, R. F., Bushman, B. J., & Campbell, W. K. (2000). Self-Esteem, Narcissism, and 
Aggression: Does Violence Result From Low Self-Esteem or From Threatened 
Egotism? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(1), 26-29. doi: 
10.1111/1467-8721.00053 
Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., & Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism to 
violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological Review, 
103(1), 5-33. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.103.1.5 
Beersma, B., Harinck, F., & Gerts, M. J. J. (2003). Bound in honor: how honor values and 
insults affect the experience and management of conflicts. The International Journal 
of Conflict Management, 14(2), 75-94. doi: 10.1108/eb022892 
Blascovich, J. (2000). Using physiological indexes of psychological processes in social 
psychological research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research 
methods and personality psychology (pp. 117-137). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blascovich, J., & Tomaka, J. (1996). The Biopsychosocial Model of Arousal Regulation. In 
P. Z. Mark (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 28, pp. 1-51): 
Academic Press. 
Bond, M. H., & Venus, C. K. (1991). Resistance to Group or Personal Insults in an Ingroup 
or Outgroup Context. International Journal of Psychology, 26, 83-94. doi: 
10.1080/00207599108246851 
Brambilla, M., Rusconi, P., Sacchi, S., & Cherubini, P. (2011). Looking for honesty: The 
primary role of morality (vs. sociability and competence) in information gathering. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(2), 135-143. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.744 
Brett, J. M. (2000). Culture and negotiation. International Journal of Psychology, 35(2), 97-
104. doi: 10.1080/002075900399385 
Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, 
and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? 
176 | References 
 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 219-229. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.75.1.219 
CBS. (November 2013). Statline, from 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37296ned&D1=
a&D2=0,10,20,30,40,50,60,(l-1),l&HD=130605-0924&HDR=G1&STB=T 
Chalabaev, A., Major, B., Cury, F., & Sarrazin, P. (2009). Physiological markers of challenge 
and threat mediate the effects of performance-based goals on performance. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 991-994. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.009 
Cingöz-Ulu, B., & Lalonde, R. N. (2007). The role of culture and relational context in 
interpersonal conflict: Do Turks and Canadians use different conflict management 
strategies? International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 31(4), 443-458. doi: 
10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.12.001 
Cohen, D. (2001). Cultural variation: Considerations and implications. Psychological 
Bulletin, 127(4), 451-471. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.127.4.451  
Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1994). Self-protection and the culture of honor: Explaining 
southern violence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 551-567. doi: 
10.1177/0146167294205012  
Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1997). Field experiments examining the culture of honor: The 
role of institutions in perpetuating norms about violence. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 23(11), 1188-1199. doi: 10.1177/01461672972311006 
Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the 
southern culture of honor: An 'experimental ethnography'. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 70(5), 945-960. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.945 
Cohen, D., & Vandello, J. (2004). The Paradox of Politeness. In M. Anderson (Ed.), Cultural 
Shaping of Violence: Victimization, Escalation, Response (pp. 119-132). West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press. 
Cohen, D., Vandello, J., Puente, S., & Rantilla, A. (1999). 'When you call me that, smile!' 
How norms for politeness, interaction styles, and aggression work together in 
Southern culture. Social Psychology Quarterly, 62(3), 257-275. doi: 10.2307/2695863 
Critcher, C. R., Dunning, D., & Armor, D. A. (2010). When Self-Affirmations Reduce 
Defensiveness: Timing Is Key. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(7), 
947-959. doi: 10.1177/0146167210369557 
References | 177 
 
Crocker, J., Luhtanen, R. K., Cooper, M. L., & Bouvrette, A. (2003). Contingencies of Self-
Worth in College Students: Theory and Measurement. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85(5), 894-908. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.894 
Cross, S. E., Uskul, A. K., Gerçek-Swing, B., Alözkan, C., & Ataca, B. (2013). Confrontation 
versus withdrawal: Cultural differences in responses to threats to honor. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16(3), 345-362. doi: 10.1177/1368430212461962 
De Bruin, E. N. M., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). Impression formation and cooperative 
behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(2-3), 305-328. doi: 
10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199903/05)29:2/3<305::AID-EJSP929>3.0.CO;2-R 
De Dreu, C. K. W., Evers, A., Beersma, B., Kluwer, E. S., & Nauta, A. (2001). A theory-
based measure of conflict management strategies in the workplace. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 22(6), 645-668. doi: 10.1002/job.107 
De Raad, B., van Oudenhoven, J. P., & Hofstede, M. (2005). Personality Terms of Abuse in 
Three Cultures: Type Nouns between Description and Insult. European Journal of 
Personality, 19(2), 153-165. doi: 10.1002/per.540 
de Wit, F. R. C., Scheepers, D., & Jehn, K. A. (2012). Cardiovascular reactivity and 
resistance to opposing viewpoints during intragroup conflict. Psychophysiology, 
49(11), 1691-1699. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01456.x 
Ellemers, N., Pagliaro, S., Barreto, M., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Is it better to be moral than 
smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at 
group status improvement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 
1397-1410. doi: 10.1037/a0012628  
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: 
warmth and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77-83. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005 
Gausel, N., & Leach, C. W. (2011). Concern for self-image and social image in the 
management of moral failure: Rethinking shame. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 41(4), 468-478. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.803 
Gilmore, D. D. (Ed.). (1987). Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean. 
Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association. 
Gold, G. J., & Weiner, B. (2000). Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies 
About Repeating a Transgression. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22(4), 291-
300. doi: 10.1207/S15324834BASP2204_3 
178 | References 
 
Green, E. G. T., Deschamps, J.-C., & Páez, D. (2005). Variation of Individualism and 
Collectivism within and between 20 Countries: A Typological Analysis. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(3), 321-339. doi: 10.1177/0022022104273654 
Hamamura, T., Meijer, Z., Heine, S. J., Kamaya, K., & Hori, I. (2009). Approach—
Avoidance Motivation and Information Processing: A Cross-Cultural Analysis. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(4), 454-462. doi: 
10.1177/0146167208329512 
Harinck, F., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). Negotiating interests or values and reaching 
integrative agreements: the importance of time pressure and temporary impasses. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(5), 595-611. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.218 
Harinck, F., Shafa, S., Ellemers, N., & Beersma, B. (2013). The Good News about Honor 
Culture: The Preference for Cooperative Conflict Management in the Absence of 
Insults. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 6(2), 67-78. doi: 
10.1111/ncmr.12007 
Hayes, T. C., & Lee, M. R. (2005). The southern culture of honor and violent attitudes. 
Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association, 25(5), 593-617. doi: 
10.1080/02732170500174877 
Heine, S. J. (2007). Culture and motivation: What motivates people to act in the ways that 
they do? In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology. (pp. 
714-733). New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
Henry, P. J. (2009). Low-status compensation: A theory for understanding the role of status 
in cultures of honor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(3), 451-466. 
doi: 10.1037/a0015476  
Higgins, E. T. (1996). The 'self digest': Self-knowledge serving self-regulatory functions. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(6), 1062-1083. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.71.6.1062 
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52(12), 1280-1300. 
doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.52.12.1280 
Hofstede, G. H. (1980). Culture’s Consequences : International Differences in Workrelated 
Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. H., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software 
of the mind (Vol. 2). London: McGraw-Hill. 
References | 179 
 
Holt, J. L., & DeVore, C. J. (2005). Culture, gender, organizational role, and styles of conflict 
resolution: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29(2), 
165-196. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.06.002 
Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & 
Lackenbauer, S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of 
Easterners and Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(3), 294-
310. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.294 
IJzerman, H., & Cohen, D. (2011). Grounding cultural syndromes: Body comportment and 
values in honor and dignity cultures. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(4), 
456-467. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.806 
IJzerman, H., Van Dijk, W. W., & Galluci, M. (2007). A bumpy train ride: A field 
experiment on insult, honor, and emotional reactions. Emotion, 7(4), 869-875. doi: 
10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.869 
Jay, T. (2009). Do offensive words harm people? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15(2), 
81-101. doi: 10.1037/a0015646 
Keller, J., Hurst, M., & Uskul, A. (2008). Prevention-focused self-regulation and 
aggressiveness. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(4), 800-820. doi: 
10.1016/j.jrp.2007.10.005 
Kim, Y.-H., Cohen, D., & Au, W.-T. (2010). The jury and abjury of my peers: The self in 
face and dignity cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(6), 904-
916. doi: 10.1037/a0017936 
Kitayama, S., & Cohen, D. (2007a). Handbook of cultural psychology. New York, NY 
Guilford Press. 
Kitayama, S., & Cohen, D. (Eds.). (2007b). Handbook of Cultural Psychology. New York, 
NY: Guilford Press. 
Kouzakova, M., Ellemers, N., Harinck, F., & Scheepers, D. (2012). The Implications of 
Value Conflict: How Disagreement on Values Affects Self-Involvement and 
Perceived Common Ground. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(6), 798-
807. doi: 10.1177/0146167211436320 
Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality 
(vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93(2), 234-249. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.234 
180 | References 
 
Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an 
interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(3), 518-530. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.68.3.518 
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gardner, W. L. (2000). The pleasures and pains of distinct self-
construals: The role of interdependence in regulatory focus. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 78(6), 1122-1134. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.78.6.1122 
Leung, A. K. Y., & Cohen, D. (2011). Within- and between-culture variation: Individual 
differences and the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity cultures. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 507-526. doi: 10.1037/a0022151 
Libby, L. K., & Eibach, R. P. (2002). Looking back in time: Self-concept change affects 
visual perspective in autobiographical memory. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82(2), 167-179. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.2.167 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, 
emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295x.98.2.224 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Culture, Self, and the Reality of the Social. 
Psychological Inquiry, 14(3-4), 277-283. doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1403&4 
Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D., & Wilkowski, B. M. (2006). Turning the Other Cheek. 
Psychological Science, 17(2), 136-142. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01676.x 
Mendes, W. B., Blascovich, J., Lickel, B., & Hunter, S. (2002). Challenge and Threat During 
Social Interactions With White and Black Men. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 28(7), 939-952. doi: 10.1177/014616720202800707 
Merolla, A. J., Zhang, S., & Sun, S. (2013). Forgiveness in the United States and China: 
Antecedents, Consequences, and Communication Style Comparisons. Communication 
Research, 40(5), 595-622. doi: 10.1177/0093650212446960 
Miller, W. I. (1993). Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and 
Violence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996). Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the 
South. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Oetzel, J. G., & Ting-Toomey, S. (2003). Face Concerns in Interpersonal Conflict: A Cross-
Cultural Empirical Test of the Face Negotiation Theory. Communication Research, 
30(6), 599-624. doi: 10.1177/0093650203257841 
References | 181 
 
Oetzel, J. G., Ting-Toomey, S., Masumoto, T., Yokochi, Y., Xiaohui, P., Takai, J., et al. 
(2001). Face and Facework in Conflict: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of China, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States. [Article]. Communication Monographs, 
68(3), 235.  
Ohbuchi, K.-i., Kameda, M., & Agarie, N. (1989). Apology as aggression control: Its role in 
mediating appraisal of and response to harm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56(2), 219-227. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.219 
Ostrowsky, M. K. (2010). Are violent people more likely to have low self-esteem or high 
self-esteem? Aggression and Violent Behavior, 15(1), 69-75. doi: 
10.1016/j.avb.2009.08.004 
Pagliaro, S., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2011). Sharing Moral Values: Anticipated Ingroup 
Respect as a Determinant of Adherence to Morality-Based (but Not Competence-
Based) Group Norms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(8), 1117-1129. 
doi: 10.1177/0146167211406906 
Peeters, F. P. M. L., Ponds, R. H. W. M., & Vermeeren, M. T. G. (1996). Affectiviteit en 
zelfbeoordeling van depressie en angst. Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie, 38(3), 240-250.  
Peeters, G. (1992). Evaluative meanings of adjectives invitro and in context - some 
theoretical implications and practical consequences of positive-negative asymmetry 
and behavioral-adaptive concepts of evaluation. Psychologica Belgica, 32, 211-231.  
Peristiany, J. (Ed.). (1965). Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
Pitt-Rivers, J. (1965). Honour and social status. In J. Peristiany (Ed.), Honour and Shame: 
The Values of Meditteranean Society (pp. 19-77). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect 
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & 
Computers, 36(4), 717-731. doi: 10.3758/BF03206553 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing 
and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research 
Methods, 40(3), 879-891. doi: 10.3758/brm.40.3.879 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P., Fischer, A. H., Manstead, A. S. R., & Zaalberg, R. (2008). Attack, 
disapproval, or withdrawal? The role of honour in anger and shame responses to being 
insulted. Cognition and Emotion, 22(8), 1471-1498. doi: 
10.1080/02699930701822272 
182 | References 
 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P., Liskow, M., & DiBona, K. (2012). Honor and Emotion. In-Mind 
Magazine, (13). Retrieved from http://beta.in-mind.org/issue-13/honor-and-emotion 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2000). The role of honor-
related values in the elicitation, experience, and communication of pride, shame, and 
anger: Spain and the Netherlands compared. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 26(7), 833-844. doi: 10.1177/0146167200269008 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2002a). Honor in the 
Mediterranean and Northern Europe. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33(1), 
16-36. doi: 10.1177/0022022102033001002 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2002b). The role of honour 
concerns in emotional reactions to offences. Cognition and Emotion, 16(1), 143-163. 
doi: 10.1080/02699930143000167 
Rosenberg, M. (1979). Conceiving the Self. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Sassenberg, K., Ellemers, N., & Scheepers, D. (2012). The attraction of social power: The 
influence of construing power as opportunity versus responsibility. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48(2), 550-555. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.11.008 
Sassenberg, K., & Hansen, N. (2007). The impact of regulatory focus on affective responses 
to social discrimination. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(3), 421-444. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.358 
Sassenberg, K., Jonas, K. J., Shah, J. Y., & Brazy, P. C. (2007). Why some groups just feel 
better: The regulatory fit of group power. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(2), 249-267. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.2.249 
Sassenberg, K., & Woltin, K.-A. (2008). Group-based self-regulation: The effects of 
regulatory focus. European Review of Social Psychology, 19, 126-164. doi: 
10.1080/10463280802201894 
Scheepers, D. (2009). Turning social identity threat into challenge: Status stability and 
cardiovascular reactivity during inter-group competition. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45(1), 228-233. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.09.011 
Schneider, P. (1969). Honor and Conflict in a Sicilian Town. Anthropological Quarterly, 
42(3), 130-154.  
Scholer, A. A., Zou, X., Fujita, K., Stroessner, S. J., & Higgins, E. T. (2010). When risk 
seeking becomes a motivational necessity. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 99(2), 215-231. doi: 10.1037/a0019715 
References | 183 
 
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimensions of 
values. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and collectivism 
(pp. 85-117). London: Sage. 
Seery, M. D., Weisbuch, M., Hetenyi, M. A., & Blascovich, J. (2010). Cardiovascular 
measures independently predict performance in a university course. [Article]. 
Psychophysiology, 47(3), 535-539. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00945.x 
Semin, G. R., & Rubini, M. (1990). Unfolding the concept of person by verbal abuse. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 20(6), 463-474. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.2420200602 
Shafa, S., Harinck, F., Ellemers, N., & Beersma, B. (2014). Who Are You Calling Rude? 
Honor-Related Differences in Morality and Competence Evaluations After an Insult. 
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 7(1), 38-56. doi: 
10.1111/ncmr.12024 
Shafa, S., Harinck, F., Ellemers, N., & Beersma, B. (under review). Regulating honor in the 
face of insults.  
Shah, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2001). Regulatory concerns and appraisal efficiency: The general 
impact of promotion and prevention. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
80(5), 693-705. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.5.693 
Shariati, M., & Chamani, F. (2010). Apology strategies in Persian. Journal of Pragmatics, 
42(6), 1689-1699. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2009.10.007 
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting Threatening Information: Self–
Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases. [Article]. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science (Wiley-Blackwell), 11(4), 119-123.  
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation 
theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol 38. 
(pp. 183-242). San Diego, CA US: Elsevier Academic Press. 
Sherwood, A., Allen, M. T., Fahrenberg, J., Kelsey, R. M., Lovallo, W. R., & van Doornen, 
L. J. P. (1990). Methodological Guidelines for Impedance Cardiography. 
Psychophysiology, 27(1), 1-23. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.1990.tb02171.x 
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. 
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 21: Social 
psychological studies of the self: Perspectives and programs. (pp. 261-302). San 
Diego, CA US: Academic Press. 
184 | References 
 
Summerville, A., & Roese, N. J. (2008). Self-report measures of individual differences in 
regulatory focus: A cautionary note. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(1), 247-
254. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2007.05.005 
Taylor, S. P. (1967). Aggressive behavior and physiological arousal as a function of 
provocation and the tendency to inhibit aggression. Journal of Personality, 35(2), 
297. doi: 10.1111/1467-6494.ep8935190 
Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kelsey, R. M., & Leitten, C. L. (1993). Subjective, physiological, 
and behavioral effects of threat and challenge appraisal. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 65(2), 248-260. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.248 
Tomaka, J., Blascovich, J., Kibler, J., & Ernst, J. M. (1997). Cognitive and physiological 
antecedents of threat and challenge appraisal. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 73(1), 63-72. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.63 
Tomlinson, E. C., Dineen, B. R., & Lewicki, R. J. (2004). The Road to Reconciliation: 
Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise. 
Journal of Management, 30(2), 165-187. doi: 10.1016/j.jm.2003.01.003 
Triandis, H. C. (1972). The analysis of subjective culture. Oxford England: Wiley-
Interscience. 
Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. 
Psychological Review, 96(3), 506-520. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.506  
Triandis, H. C. (2000). Culture and conflict. International Journal of Psychology, 35(2), 145-
152. doi: 10.1080/002075900399448 
Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 
118-128. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.118 
Uskul, A. K., Cross, S. E., Sunbay, Z., Gercek-Swing, B., & Ataca, B. (2012). Honor Bound: 
The Cultural Construction of Honor in Turkey and the Northern United States. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43(7), 1131-1151. doi: 
10.1177/0022022111422258 
Van Osch, Y., Breugelmans, S. M., Zeelenberg, M., & Bölük, P. (2013). A different kind of 
honor culture: Family honor and aggression in Turks. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 16(3), 334-344. doi: 10.1177/1368430212467475 
Van Oudenhoven, J. P., De Raad, B., Askevis-Leherpeux, F., Boski, P., Brunborg, G. S., 
Carmona, C., et al. (2008). Terms of abuse as expression and reinforcement of 
References | 185 
 
cultures. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32(2), 174-185. doi: 
10.1016/j.ijintrel.2008.02.001 
Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (2004). When Believing Is Seeing: Sustaining Norms of 
Violence in Cultures of Honor. In M. Schaller & C. S. Crandall (Eds.), The 
Psychological Foundations of Culture. London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Wagner, J. A., & Moch, M. K. (1986). Individualism-collectivism: Concept and measure. 
Group & Organization Studies, 11(3), 280-304. doi: 10.1177/105960118601100309  
Walker, J. S., & Bright, J. A. (2009). False inflated self-esteem and violence: a systematic 
review and cognitive model. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 
20(1), 1-32. doi: 10.1080/14789940701656808 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Webster, G. (2006). Low self-esteem is related to aggression, but especially when controlling 
for gender: A replication and extension of Donnellan et al.(2005). Representative 
Research in Social Psychology, 29, 12. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01535.x 
Williams, T., Schimel, J., Hayes, J., & Martens, A. (2010). The moderating role of extrinsic 
contingency focus on reactions to threat. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
40(2), 300-320. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.624 
Wojciszke, B. (2005). Morality and competence in person- and self-perception. European 
Review of Social Psychology, 16, 155-188. doi: 10.1080/10463280500229619 
Wojciszke, B., Bazinska, R., & Jaworski, M. (1998). On the Dominance of Moral Categories 
in Impression Formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(12), 1251-
1263. doi: 10.1177/01461672982412001 
Zaal, M. P., Laar, C. V., Ståhl, T., Ellemers, N., & Derks, B. (2011). By any means 
necessary: The effects of regulatory focus and moral conviction on hostile and 
benevolent forms of collective action. British Journal of Social Psychology, 50(4), 
670-689. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02069.x 
Zechmeister, J. S., Garcia, S., Romero, C., & Vas, S. N. (2004). Don't apologize unless you 
mean it: A laboratory investigation of forgiveness and retaliation. Journal of Social & 












Samenvatting | 189 
 
De toenemende globalisering heden ten dage zorgt ervoor dat mensen met 
verschillende culturele achtergronden frequent met elkaar in contact komen. 
Multiculturalisme biedt uitdagingen met betrekking tot het delen van kennis, 
tradities en gewoontes, maar kan er ook toe leiden dat verschillende normen en 
waarden met elkaar in botsing komen. Eerder onderzoek heeft namelijk 
aangetoond dat meningsverschillen die gebaseerd zijn op tegengestelde normen 
en waarden moeilijker op te lossen zijn dan conflicten die gebaseerd zijn op 
tegengestelde materiele belangen (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Kouzakova, et al., 
2012). Het is daarom belangrijk om te weten of culturele waardestelsels van 
elkaar verschillen en hoe we deze verschillen kunnen overbruggen. Twee 
culturele waardestelsels waar recent onderzoek naar is gedaan in het kader van 
conflicten zijn eerculturen en waardigheidsculturen.  
Eerculturen komen veelal voor in Latijns Amerika, het gebied rond de 
Middellandse zee en het Midden-Oosten (Cohen, et al., 1996; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2000; Uskul, et al., 2012). In dergelijke samenlevingen is het 
hebben èn behouden van eer van essentieel belang voor deelname aan het 
sociale leven. Eer draait om de waarde van een individu in zijn of haar ogen, 
maar ook in de ogen van de omgeving (Pitt-Rivers, 1965). Dat wil zeggen dat in 
eerculturen het hebben van een goed imago en het geven en krijgen van respect 
centraal staat in het dagelijkse leven. Eer geeft een individu bestaansrecht. 
Daartoe is het essentieel dat men zich houdt aan de erecode (Rodriguez 
Mosquera, et al., 2002b). De erecode bestaat uit algemeen heersende normen en 
gedragsregels, die specifieke omgangsvormen in sociale interacties 
voorschrijven en daarmee het dagelijkse leven in eerculturen reguleren. Deze 
normen hebben betrekking op het in stand houden van de familie-reputatie, 
normen rondom persoonlijke integriteit, reciprociteit en sociale cohesie evenals 
gender specifieke normen. Wie zich niet aan deze regels en voorschriften houdt 
loopt het risico op sociale afkeuring en directe vergelding, wat tot eerverlies en 
verstoting kan leiden. Eer is daarom een kostbaar goed dat kan worden 
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verkregen maar ook verloren kan gaan of door anderen kan worden ontnomen 
(Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1965).  
Waardigheidsculturen komen voor in wat bekend staat als Westerse 
samenlevingen zoals in Noord-Amerika en West-Europa (Cohen, et al., 1996; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2000; Uskul, et al., 2012). Het centrale idee in dit 
waardenstelsel is dat ieder individu dezelfde waardigheid bezit, die aan 
hem/haar wordt toegekend bij de geboorte en gelijk is aan die van ieder ander. 
Deze waardigheid is inherent aan hem/haar bij de geboorte en onafhankelijk van 
het oordeel van naderen (Ayers, 1984; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Daarmee is 
waardigheid als bron van zelfwaarde minder vergankelijk dan eer, omdat het 
niet verloren kan gaan of kan worden afgepakt. In waardigheidsculturen worden 
sociale interacties gereguleerd door geïnternaliseerde morele standaarden, 
terwijl men tegen overtredingen wordt beschermd door een effectief opererend 
rechtssysteem. Reciprociteit is in deze culturen ook belangrijk, maar neemt 
minder strikte vormen aan dan in eerculturen. Andere waarden die in deze 
culturen centraal staan zijn autonomie, individuele prestaties en persoonlijke 
verantwoordelijkheid (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2002a).  
Voorgaand onderzoek heeft vooral gekeken naar hoe mensen uit een 
eercultuur reageren op beledigende situaties en hoe zij hierin verschillen van 
mensen uit een waardigheidscultuur. Verschillende onderzoeken hebben 
aangetoond dat mensen uit een eercultuur na een belediging meer boosheid 
ervaren, meer dominantie tentoonspreiden en meer gericht zijn op agressie dan 
mensen uit een waardigheidscultuur (Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen, et al., 1999; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008; Van Osch, et al., 2013). Er is echter weinig 
empirisch onderzoek gedaan naar waarom mensen uit een eercultuur zo 
reageren en welke psychologische mechanismen aan deze reacties ten grondslag 
liggen. Bovendien is er niets bekend over hoe deze reacties kunnen worden 
voorkomen. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift probeert antwoord te geven op 
deze twee vragen. Het doel van dit onderzoek is om eergerelateerde verschillen 
in conflict gedrag beter te begrijpen en op basis hiervan methodes te 
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ontwikkelen, die kunnen bijdragen aan het voorkomen en oplossen van 
interculturele conflicten.  
In vier verschillende onderzoekslijnen heb ik onderzocht waarom mensen 
die eerwaarden aanhangen bozer reageren op beledigingen en wat er gedaan kan 
worden om dit te voorkomen. Globaal bezien heb ik onderzocht wat de invloed 
is van eer op de perceptie en beoordeling van beledigingen, welke rol eer speelt 
in het proces van conflict escalatie en hoe agressieve reacties op beledigingen 
kunnen worden voorkomen. In wat volgt zal ik de belangrijkste bevindingen in 
vogelvlucht doornemen en de implicaties van deze bevindingen bespreken.  
Hoofdstuk 2 
In Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift heb ik onderzocht wat de invloed is 
van eerwaarden op de perceptie van beledigingen. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond 
dat moraliteit en competentie twee centrale domeinen van sociale percepties zijn 
(Ellemers, et al., 2008; Leach, et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 2005). Een belediging 
kan worden gezien als een manier om iemands eer en goede naam aan te tasten 
door zijn moraliteit dan wel competentie in twijfel te trekken (Bond & Venus, 
1991). In twee studies heb ik deelnemers gevraagd om naar aanleiding van 
verschillende beledigingen te evalueren in welke mate dit hun gevoel van 
moraliteit dan wel competentie aantast. In Studie 2.1 dienden de deelnemers de 
belediger te evalueren, in Studie 2.2 dienden zij zichzelf te evalueren na 
beledigd te zijn. Beide studies lieten zien dat beledigingen bij mensen met 
hogere eerwaarden sterker de moraliteit aantasten, ten opzichte van 
competentie, dan bij mensen met lage eerwaarden. Dit effect van eerwaarden op 
sterkere moraliteitsoordelen werd in beide onderzoeken gemedieerd door de 
mate waarin men beledigingen beledigend vond. Deze resultaten laten zien dat 
beledigingen bij mensen met hoge eerwaarden meer worden gemoraliseerd, 
omdat beledigingen als een sterkere overtreding van omgangsnormen rondom 
respect en eerbied worden beschouwd. 
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Hoofdstuk 3 
In Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik de relatie tussen eer en de beoordeling van 
beledigingen in een competitieve situatie onderzocht. Zo heb ik onderzocht of 
een experimentele activatie van eerwaarden — in vergelijking tot activatie van 
waardigheid— leidt tot een sterkere fysiologische bedreiging en een sterkere 
uiting van daadwerkelijke agressie na beledigd te zijn. Deelnemers werden, 
buiten hun weten om, door een niet bestaande andere deelnemer gedurende een 
computer taak verbaal beledigd. De mate van bedreiging dan wel uitdaging 
werd, in overeenstemming met het Biopsychosociale model (Blascovich, 2000; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), gemeten aan de hand van cardiovasculaire 
indicatoren zoals hartslag, bloeddruk en impedantie. Agressie werd gemeten aan 
de hand van een tweede taak waarop deelnemers de belediger konden bestraffen 
door middel van harde geluiden.  
De resultaten toonden inderdaad aan dat bij deelnemers wier eer 
geactiveerd was beledigingen een staat van bedreiging opriepen. Er was echter 
meer sprake van uitdaging als ze niet werden beledigd. Deze reactie was 
specifiek voor de eeractivatie, aangezien het patroon van bedreiging en 
uitdaging omgekeerd was bij deelnemers bij wie waardigheid geactiveerd was. 
Daarnaast toonden beledigde deelnemers bij wie eer geactiveerd was de hoogste 
mate van agressie. De niet-beledigde deelnemers bij wie eer geactiveerd was 
toonden echter de laagste mate van agressie. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat 
beledigingen, naast agressie, ook een staat van bedreiging oproepen bij mensen 
wier eer op het spel staat. Dit geldt echter alleen voor wanneer ze beledigd zijn. 
In lijn met bevindingen uit eerder onderzoek, lieten ook onze resultaten zien dat 
mensen die sterk aan eer hechten juist welwillender en minder agressief zijn dan 
mensen die aan waardigheid hechten, zolang ze niet beledigd worden (Cohen, et 
al., 1996; Harinck, et al., 2013; Leung & Cohen, 2011).  
Hoofdstuk 4 
De twee voorgaande hoofdstukken laten duidelijk zien dat beledigingen 
een grotere psychologische impact hebben op mensen wanneer hun eer op het 
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spel staat. In Hoofdstuk 4 heb ik onderzocht hoe deze bevindingen het proces 
van conflict ontwikkeling en conflict escalatie beïnvloedt. Ik heb daarbij ook 
gekeken welke onderliggen psychologische mechanismen aan dit proces ten 
grondslag liggen. Ik heb meer specifiek de rol van preventie focus onderzocht. 
Volgens de Regulatiefocus Theorie (Higgins, 1997) zullen mensen die vooral 
op het voorkomen van verlies gericht zijn zich laten leiden door preventie focus. 
Zij streven ernaar om nadelige uitkomsten te voorkomen en zullen geagiteerd 
raken of zelfs agressief reageren wanneer dit niet lukt (Sassenberg & Hansen, 
2007; Scholer, et al., 2010; Zaal, et al., 2011). Een conflict situatie brengt ook 
het risico op eerverlies met zich mee. Aangezien eerverlies te allen tijde moet 
worden voorkomen, zullen zij die aan eer hechten zich ook in potentiele conflict 
situaties sterk laten leiden door preventie focus. In drie studies heb ik gekeken 
naar de relatie tussen eerwaarden, preventiefocus en hun invloed op conflict 
gedrag voor en na escalatie als gevolg van beledigingen.  
Studie 4.1 toonde aan dat chronische preventie focus hoger was bij 
mensen uit een eercultuur dan mensen uit een waardigheidscultuur. Studie 4.2 
toonde aan dat een experimentele activatie van eerwaarden ook leidde tot meer 
activatie van preventie strategieën, in vergelijking tot deactivatie van 
eerwaarden. Bovendien leidde activatie van eerwaarden in eerste instantie ook 
tot meer coöperatieve en minder competitieve intenties in een situatie met 
tegengestelde belangen. De relatie tussen eeractivatie en coöperatief gedrag 
werd gemedieerd door preventie strategieën. Studie 4.3 toonde tot slot aan dat 
activatie van eerwaarden tot meer agressie leidde na een beledigende 
confrontatie. De verhoogde mate van agressie hing bij mensen met eerwaarden 
ook samen met verhoogde agitatie — een emotie kenmerkend voor preventie 
focus (Higgins, 1997). Deze resultaten verduidelijken niet alleen het proces van 
conflict escalatie wanneer eer op het spel staat. Ze identificeren ook preventie 
focus als een potentiële onderliggende psychologische mechanisme. Zoals blijkt 
is preventie van eerverlies een belangrijke zorg voor mensen die eerwaarden 
aanhangen. Deze zorgen leiden in de verschillende fases van een conflict tot 
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ander gedrag. Wanneer een potentieel conflict zich voordoet zullen mensen die 
aan eer hechten aanvankelijk proberen de-escalerend te handelen om een 
bedreigende situatie te vermijden. Echter, na beledigd te zijn leiden diezelfde 
zorgen ertoe dat zij zich agressiever op stellen, teneinde eerverlies te beperken 
of te herstellen.  
Hoofdstuk 5 
De voorgaande hoofdstukken tonen aan dat mensen die aan eer hechten 
doorgaans gevoeliger zijn voor de negatieve gevolgen van beledigingen en 
confrontaties dan mensen die minder aan eer hechten. Daarmee geven zij een 
mogelijke verklaring voor waarom mensen die aan eer hechten met meer 
boosheid en agressie reageren nadat zij beledigd zijn. In Hoofdstuk 5 
onderzocht ik wat deze gevoeligheid veroorzaakt. Deze kennis is van belang bij 
het ontwikkelen van methodes om eergerelateerde agressie na beledigingen te 
voorkomen. Eer is gedefinieerd als de waarde van een individu in zijn eigen 
ogen, maar ook in de ogen van anderen (Gilmore, 1987; Pitt-Rivers, 1965). In 
dit hoofdstuk onderzocht ik of de gevoeligheid voor beledigingen veroorzaakt 
wordt door de bron van zelfwaarde, ofwel dat zelfwaarde intern (persoonlijk) of 
extern (sociaal) wordt bepaald (Studie 5.1). Daarnaast onderzocht ik ook of het 
affirmeren van persoonlijke dan wel sociale zelfwaarde agressieve reacties op 
beledigingen onder mensen uit een eercultuur kan verminderen (Studie 5.2).  
De resultaten van Studie 5.1 toonden aan dat mensen die hun zelfwaarde 
meer baseren op sociale evaluaties (zoals bij eer het geval is) zichzelf meer 
devalueren en meer boosheid ervaren na een belediging, dan mensen die hun 
zelfwaarde intern definiëren. Studie 5.2 toonde bovendien aan dat een affirmatie 
procedure, die de sociale waarde van het individu bevestigt, effectief is in het 
reduceren van agressieve reacties op beledigingen onder deelnemers uit een 
eercultuur. Een traditionele zelf-affirmatie die de persoonlijke zelfwaarde 
bevestigt had dit agressie-reducerende effect niet onder deelnemers uit een 
eercultuur. Deze twee studies samen tonen aan dat eer, mensen gevoeliger 
maakt voor de negatieve consequenties van beledigingen voor het zelfbeeld. 
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Daarnaast biedt dit hoofdstuk ook een opzet voor het ontwikkelen van een 
praktische interventie, die de noodzaak voor het agressief beschermen van de 
eer als reactie op een belediging vermindert.  
Conclusie 
De bevindingen van dit proefschrift schetsen een genuanceerder beeld 
van de invloed van eerwaarden op conflict gedrag en vormen een basis voor 
mogelijke interventies om eergerelateerde conflicten te beheersen. De resultaten 
tonen aan dat de morele norm van het elkaar met respect behandelen in 
eerculturen meer centraal staat waardoor beledigingen meer als een schending 
van die norm worden ervaren in vergelijking tot waardigheidsculturen. Omdat 
de eer, ofwel de zelfwaarde van mensen in eerculturen mede gebaseerd is op 
wat anderen van hen vinden, zullen beledigingen hun eer eerder bedreigen. In 
waardigheidsculturen is dit niet het geval, aangezien in deze culturen de 
zelfwaarde van een individu niet afhangt van het oordeel van anderen. Daarom 
is het voorkomen van eerverlies een belangrijke zorg voor mensen uit 
eerculturen, zeker in situaties die snel uit kunnen lopen op een openlijke 
confrontatie, zoals in conflicten. Deze zorg voor het voorkomen van eerverlies 
leidt aanvankelijk tot meer inschikkelijkheid en het vermijden van een openlijke 
confrontatie. Maar als het provocerende gedrag aanhoudt, zal dezelfde zorg ook 
meer agressie oproepen bij mensen uit een eercultuur om de negatieve gevolgen 
voor hun eer te beperken of te herstellen. Een manier om dergelijke reacties te 
voorkomen is door de sociale waarde van mensen die aan hun eer hechten te 
affirmeren, zodat de behoefte om schade aan hun eer met agressie te herstellen 
uitgesteld kan worden. Een dergelijke interventie kan het oplossen van 
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